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INTRODUCTION

The law of evidence provides a set of rules through which "the
admission of proof at the trial of a lawsuit is regulated."'
To be
effective, the rules must provide reasonable certainty as to whether
offered evidence will be received. At the same time, they must be
readily capable of uniform application so that similar admissibility
decisions will be made in different cases when the same evidence is
offered.
This Article reviews the evidence rules that control the
presentation of witnesses in criminal and civil trials and that permit
attacks on these witnesses' credibility through the introduction of prior
inconsistent statements.
Three general principles dominated the common-law evidence model
for the presentation of witnesses.
S
2 First, a calling party vouched for the
credibility of his or her witnesses. Second, a calling party could not ask
1 I MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 1, at 2 (4th ed. 1992).
2 See 1 MCCORMIK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 38, at 126; 3A JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 898, at 661 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)
[hereinafter WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE]. Several authorities have traced the origins of the

voucher rule. See Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 U. VA. L. REV. 996, 996 (1963)
(describing the voucher rule as "one of the most ancient of the common-law principles");

Mason Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Wtness-New Developments, 4 U. CHI. L.
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his or her witnesses leading questions on direct examination because they
suggested the specific answers desired. 3 Third, calling parties, because
of the voucher rule, could not introduce out-of-court prior inconsistent
statements to impeach the credibility of their witnesses and the adversary
only could use such statements to impeach these witnesses-not as

substantive evidence. 4 Although each of these principles had a different
genesis, they came to be rigidly applied under the common-law model.
The common-law evidence model entered the twentieth century

remarkably intact. But, in the mid-twentieth century, a strong movement
to reform the common-law rules developed.
The evidence reform
movement first found expression in the American Law Institute's (ALI)
Model Code of Evidence (Model Code). 5 The ALI's Model Code sought
to demolish the common-law evidence model and to replace it with a set
of flexible rules providing for broad judicial discretion over the calling

REV. 69 (1936).

Courts have also explained its genesis.

See Crago v. State, 202 P.

1099, 1100-01 (Wyo. 1922) (tracing the voucher rule to the decisory oath of Roman law

and discussing its evolution in the courts). For a discussion of the rationales underlying
the voucher rule, see Michael H. Graham, Examination of a Party's Own Witness Under
the FederalRules of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54 TEx. L. REV. 917 (1976).
See 1 McCoRIUCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 6, at 16-17. Wigmore explained
the prohibition against the use of leading questions during direct examination:
The object of the rule is to prevent the supplying of suggestions of false
testimony to a witness who is disposed to take advantage of them. He is
assumed to be friendly to the party putting him on the stand; but this is
only a provisional assumption; and, accordingly, if he turns out to be
hostile to the party, the prohibition ceases and, conversely, if on crossexamination by the other party, to whom he has been assumed to be
hostile, he turns out to be a friendly partisan, the prohibition applies
equally on cross-examination.
3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 909, at 699.
4 Under the common-law model, out-of-court statements were inadmissible
hearsay
because the statements (1) were not made under oath; (2) the trier of fact did not observe
the declarant's demeanor at the time the statement was made; and (3) the declarant was
not subject to cross-examination. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 34, at
113, § 38, at 126; 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 117; 3A
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996, § 1827, at 411. Advocates of the
common-law model claim that cross-examination at the time of trial is not an adequate
substitute for testing the veracity of the statement at the time it was made. See Charles
M. Fox, Rule of Evidence 63(J)(a): Proposed Redraft of New Jersey's Much-Amended
Rule on PriorInconsistent Statements, 34 RuTGERS L. REv. 777, 779 (1982); Edmund M.
Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L.
REV'. 177, 182 (1948).
5 The American Law Institute formulated the comprehensive Model Code in 1942.
See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].

Just prior to its

completion, Dean Mason Ladd published that the Model Code represented the "best and
most practical thought of the bench and bar of American [sic] upon this vital subject of
evidence." Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence, 27 IOWA L. REV. 213, 215
(1942).
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and questioning of witnesses.
Under the Model Code, calling parties
would not have to vouch for the credibility of witnesses but rather could
take the witnesses as they found them, thus allowing the calling party to
impeach them, if appropriate. 7 Finally, the Model Code revolutionalized
the use of prior inconsistent statements at trial by making them
admissible as substantive evidence when the declarant was present and
available for cross-examination. 8
While the Model Code never entered the law of evidence as a
working code, it had considerable influence on the two evidence codes
that did-the Uniform Rules of Evidence (Uniform Rules) and the
Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rules).
These two codes were
produced in the thirty-five years following publication of the Model
Code. Though they have had a profound effect on evidence law
generally, and on the model for presenting and challenging witnesses in
particular, these codes have not resolved a number of basic issues.
Key among such issues are the conditions under which the court
receives prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence.
The
Uniform Rules opted for the wholesale receipt of such information so
long as the declarant was available and subject to cross-examination. 9
The Federal Rules, on the other hand, require special circumstances of
reliability, that being the prior statement be made in a formal proceeding
and under oath, before these statements could be so received.' 0 While
6 See infra note 95 and accompanying text.

7 Professor Morgan, the Model Code's Reporter, remarked that the voucher
rule
"has no place in any rational system of investigation in modem society.

And all attempts

to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serve only to demonstrate its
irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation."

EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC

PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 52, 64-65 (1957) [hereinafter MORGAN ON EVIDENCE].
8 Model Code Rule 503 provided for the admission of hearsay statements made
either by an unavailable declarant or a declarant who was present and subject to crossexamination. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule 503 at 231-32. Many state courts
supported the Model Code treatment of prior inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Hobbs v.
State, 359 P.2d 956 (Alaska 1991); Jett v. Commonwealth, 436 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Ky.
1969); Letendre v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 236 N.E.2d 467, 470 (N.Y. 1968).
But one leading authority predicted that practitioners would be uneasy with the Model
Code. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 119-20.
See

1953 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, Rule 63(1) [hereinafter 1953 PROCEEDINGS].
The Uniform Rules rejected the Model Code admission of hearsay statements made by
unavailable declarants, but embraced the broad admissibility of hearsay statements when
the declarant was available and subject to cross-examination.
The Uniform Rules,
therefore, were more conservative than the Model Code in their treatment of hearsay
statements. See Charles T. McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence
Rules, 33 TEx. L. REV. 559, 561 (1955).

10 The Federal Rules permit the introduction of prior inconsistent statements given

under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury in a trial, hearing, or other judicial
proceeding or in a deposition. See infra note 182 and accompanying text. The issues
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the federal approach unquestionably provides greater assurances that the
out-of-court statement was actually uttered, it leaves a large body of

evidence available only for use in impeachment. Some claim that this is
a particularly mischievous type of evidence because juries will disregard
court instructions to consider such statements only for impeachment and
rather will give them substantive value."
This Article explores these questions and offers a model for
presenting and challenging witnesses that adopts the best parts of the
Uniform Rules and Federal Rules. New Jersey is an excellent state to
study in this regard. It initially embraced most of the Uniform Rules
and, in 1993, adopted much of the Federal Rules. New Jersey, however,
failed, in our view, to develop the best model for presenting and
challenging witnesses because it permits the wholesale receipt of alleged

prior inconsistent statements of witnesses for substantive purposes when
offered by a non-calling party. 12 Studies in the social sciences done since
promulgation of the Model Code and Uniform Rules have suggested that
requiring special circumstances of reliability removes disputes over
whether a statement was actually said and significantly improves a
statement's accuracy.1 3 Moreover, New Jersey differentiates between
calling and non-calling parties in determining whether prior inconsistent
statements must have special circumstances of reliability to qualify as
surrounding the circumstances under which prior inconsistent statements should be
substantively admitted was hotly debated in Congress. See Walker J.Blakey, Substantive
Use of PriorInconsistent Statements Under the FederalRules of Evidence, 64 KY. L.J. 3,
6-10 (1975); Michael H. Graham, Employing Inconsistent Statements for Impeachment
and as Substantive Evidence: A Critical Review and Proposed Amendments of Federal
Rules of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A), 613 and 607, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1565, 1568 (1977).
11 Leading authorities have recognized that juries often disregard limiting instructions.
See Graham, supra note 2, at 917 (stating that limiting instructions would not prevent the
jury from considering the statement as substantive evidence); Charles T. McCormick,
The Turncoat Wimess: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25 TEx. L. REv.
573, 580 (1947) (stressing that instructions to consider prior statements only for
impeachment purposes are a "mere verbal ritual"); Morgan, supra note 4, at 188
(claiming that permitting the trier of fact to hear prior inconsistent statements for
impeachment purposes has no practical effect). Others share this view. See Jennifer L.
Hilliard, Substantive Admissibility of a Non-Party itness' PriorInconsistent Statements:
Pennsylvania Adopts the Modern View, 32 VILL. L. RE'.. 471, 499 (1987) (commenting
that the Federal Rules guarantee the reliability of witnesses' prior inconsistent statements
"at the expense of other equally reliable statements which are then relegated to use solely
for their impeachment value"); see also 2 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, §
251, at 117, 120.
12 For a discussion of state court decisions concerning the issue of whether prior
inconsistent statements made by a witness in a criminal proceeding may be admitted as
substantive evidence, see Annotation, Use or Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent
Statements of Witnesses as Substantive Evidence of Facts to Which They Relate in
Criminal Cases-Modern State Cases, 30 A.L.R.4th 414 (1984).
13 See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.
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substantive evidence. This differential treatment reminds us of the
discredited voucher rule and should be abandoned in favor of an
approach that requires special circumstances of reliability to insure that
such prior statements have indeed been made by the witness.
Part II of this Article discusses the origins of the common-law
evidence model for the presentation of witnesses. In particular, it charts
the use of the voucher rule with its blanket prohibition against attacking
the credibility of witnesses a party might call. The voucher rule, based
on the belief that parties really are free to select their witnesses, was
often combined with the rule prohibiting the use of leading questions
during direct examination. The combination of these rules made it
virtually impossible to call an adverse witness under the common law.
Finally, the powerful cross-examination tool, impeachment by admission
of prior inconsistent statements, was limited to non-calling parties.
Moreover, such statements, even when introduced, could not be received
as affirmative evidence.
Part III of this Article relates the assaults on the common-law model
made by the ALl and, later, by the Uniform Commissioners on State
Laws. Both bodies recognized that the common-law voucher rule and the
restrictive common-law rule on the use of prior inconsistent statements
had to be completely revamped.
Ultimately, both bodies chose to
recommend abolition of the voucher rule and the receipt of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. The use of leading
questions during direct examination continued to be controversial and
ultimately was left by the Uniform Rules to local implementation.
Part IV of this Article chronicles the continued review of the
common-law model during the development of the Federal Rules. That
evidence code, unlike its predecessors, has experienced a widespread
acceptance with over half of the states accepting the Federal Rules as the
basis of their evidence law. The Federal Rules permit the impeachment
of witnesses without regard to who called them and also allow for the use
of leading questions when questioning adversaries and those identified
with them. Federal Rule 801(d)(1), however, changed the calculus for
the substantive admission of prior inconsistent statements made by
testifying witnesses. The Rule only permits the substantive use of such
statements when they are made under oath in a "proceeding."
Other
inconsistent statements can still be received but only for impeachment
purposes.
Part V of this Article relates New Jersey's efforts to adopt an
evidence code culminating in its 1993 adoption of a code largely modeled
on the Federal Rules. In 1967, New Jersey, after many years of study,
adopted a variation of the Uniform Rules, but continued to embrace the
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voucher rule. As adopted in 1967, New Jersey's evidence code actually
aligned itself with a minority of states that continued to adhere to the
rule. On the other hand, New Jersey's evidence code opted for the broad
substantive receipt of prior inconsistent statements.
This odd
combination permitted non-calling parties to broadly use prior
inconsistent statements but essentially forbade their use by a calling
party.
New Jersey's policy toward the substantive use of prior inconsistent
statements changed, however, in 1980 in the wake of a controversy over
the use of such statements in criminal cases. For a short time, New
Jersey adopted a rule similar to Federal Rule 801(d)(1) and required
special circumstances of reliability (a signed statement or testimony under
oath at a "proceeding") before permitting the substantive receipt of prior
inconsistent statements. The new rules "levelled the playing field" for
calling and non-calling parties in the use of this important type of
evidence. Now both the calling and non-calling parties could make
substantive use of such statements. The change, however, was short
lived. By 1982, New Jersey adopted a new rule that returned the
dichotomy in the law between calling and non-calling parties. New
Jersey now permitted calling parties to make substantive use of prior
statements, but only if they had special circumstances of reliability. Noncalling parties could use any prior statement for its substantive value.
New Jersey's adoption in 1993 of an evidence code modelled on the
Federal Rules has carried this dichotomy into the present law.
Moreover, New Jersey, while denying that the voucher rule has any place
in its law of evidence, continues to treat calling and non-calling parties
differently.
In Part VI of this Article, we argue that New Jersey unwisely has
chosen to permit the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements in
circumstances where there may be substantial disputes over whether the
statements actually were made. Permitting receipt of such evidence is
particularly illogical because New Jersey insists at the same time that
prior inconsistent statements made by witnesses of a calling party be
received as evidence only if special circumstances of reliability exist.
These special circumstances of reliability (a writing made or signed by
the witness, a recording, or testimony under oath in a "proceeding") are
largely designed to insure that the statement was actually made.
Special circumstances of reliability are an important assurance that a
statement to be given substantive value was actually made and under
conditions that enhance trustworthiness. Social science research has
shown that statements made under such circumstances are more
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reliable.1 4 This is true because the context of the statement and the fact it
was said are apparent from a transcript, a recording, or a writing.
Moreover, the act of writing the statement, signing it, and/or swearing to
it, or giving testimony at a proceeding better insures the statement's
reliability. Further, moving toward adoption of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)
will end New Jersey's irrational distinction between calling and noncalling parties.
Finally, while accepting the need for special
circumstances of reliability may increase the use of non-substantive
impeaching statements in New Jersey courts, there is no reason to believe
that the modest increase in this evidence will lead to jury confusion or
misuse.
New Jersey has broadened the federal definition of special
circumstances of reliability.
We think this broadened definitionpermitting the receipt of signed, recorded, or statements made by
testifying declarants-is something that should be adopted by the Federal
Rules. Permitting written statements made or signed by the declarant or
such statements preserved on a recording to be substantively used is
consistent with the concern of the drafters of the Federal Rules that the
statement was actually made. It also insures that the context for the
statement is provided. The federal requirement that the statement be
made in a "proceeding" probably provides little additional assurance of a
statement's reliability but certainly excludes useful and highly probative
evidence.
II.

A.

THE COMMON-LAW MODEL FOR PRESENTING WITNESS TESTIMONY

The Voucher Rule

The origin of the voucher rule is obscure. Many have traced its
15
lineage to trial by compurgation during the Middle Ages in England.
14 See infra notes 333-34 and accompanying text.

15 For a comprehensive discussion concerning the probable origins of the voucher
rule, see 1 MCCORIICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 38, at 126; 3A WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 659; Ladd, supra note 2. Another theory traces the
voucher rule to Roman law where parties generally could not impeach their own
witnesses. See Crago v. State, 202 P. 1099, 1100 (Wyo. 1922). A party whose case was
difficult or impossible to prove was permitted to call upon his adversary to prove his
claim or defense. The adversary would make a statement under oath and the sworn
statement would be binding and could not be contradicted. The oath was a particularly
powerful weapon to secure the truth where the penalty for false swearing was thought to
be eternal damnation. See Charles J. Walsh & Steven R. Rowland, Immunized Testimony
and the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine: An Appropriate Transplant of the Exclusionary
Rule or an Excuse for a Broken Promise?, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 967, 968, 970-71
(1993) (citing Harold W. Wolfram, John Lilburne: Democracy's Pillar of Fire, 3
SYRACUSE L. REV. 213, 219 (1952)).
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There parties proved their cases by making statements under oath and
then selecting "oath-helpers" from among close friends and relatives to
swear to the veracity of those statements. 6 No thought was given to the
need to impeach or contradict the testimony of these oath-helpers because
the party freely chose them.'

Moreover, these oath-helpers were more

akin to character witnesses and so their testimony bore little relation to
the impartial ascertainment of facts. 18
The voucher rule made its debut in the common law during two
criminal cases tried in England in 1681.19 In one of those cases, Lord
Chief Justice North coined the now-classic statement of the voucher rule:
[W]hatsoever witnesses you call, you call them as witnesses to testify
the truth for you; and if you ask them any questions, you must take
what they have said as truth . .. [l]et him answer
you if he will; but
20
you must not afterwards go to disprove him.

In the other case, the voucher rule was applied to prevent an
accused from contradicting the testimony of his own witness.
A short
time later, the rule was applied in civil cases thereby entering the
common law as a foundation for the direct examination of witnesses in
the English courts.22
The voucher rule was founded on the belief that calling parties were
free to select their own witnesses. 23 Thus it was thought to be wrong to
16 See 1 MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 38,
at 126; 3A WIGMOPE ON

EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 658-59; Ladd, supra note 2, at 69-70.
17 See Crago, 202 P. at 1100; MAITLAND, THE FORMs OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW
15 (1962); 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 659; see also Ladd, supra
note 2, at 69-70. One court explained that "[wlhen witnesses were called by a party from
among his friends to act as compurgators it was completely rational that the party calling
them would have to stand by what they said. After all he chose his friends." Johnson v.
Baltimore & O.R. Co., 208 F.2d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1953).
18 See MAITLAND , supra note 17, at 15.
19 See Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. 549 (1681); Fitzharris'
Trial, 8 How. St. Tr.
223 (1681).
2 Colledge's Trial, 8 How. St. Tr.
at 636.
21 See Fitzharris' Trial, 8 How. St. Tr. at 369.
22 See, e.g., Adams v. Arnold, 90 Eng. Rep. 1064 (1700) (stating that it "[wlould not
suffer the plaintiff to discredit a witness of his own calling, he swearing against him");
Warren Hastings' Trial, 31 Parl. Hist. 369 (1788) (applying voucher rule to prohibit
prosecutor from interrogating his own witnesses concerning a prior contradictory
statement where the witness failed to remember certain facts).
23 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 38, at 126;
3A WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 659. "The limitation against impeaching a party's
own witness arose out of the adversary system and the idea that a party had a free choice
in selecting witnesses." Ladd, supra note 5, at 221. Dean Ladd would later serve on the
Evidence Editorial Group of the American Law Institute, which recommended abolition
of the common-law voucher rule in its Model Code.
See infra notes 72-74 and
accompanying text.
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permit a party to select a witness, and then attack the testimony if it
proved unfavorable. 24 The voucher rule remained largely intact over the
next 200 years both in England and the United States as did the policy
view supporting it:
It seems to be pretty generally conceded that a party cannot impeach
his own witness by general evidence of his bad character for truth;
and the reasons given for the rule are, that by offering a witness in
proof of his case, a party thereby represents him as worthy of belief,
and that thereafter to attack his general character for truth, would be
not only bad faith towards the court, but in the language of Buller,
"would enable the party to destroy the witness if he spoke against
him, and to make him a good witness if he speaks for him, with the
means in his hands of destroying his credit if he speaks against
him. ,25

By the nineteenth century, the voucher rule began to show its
limitations as a common-law pillar. Accordingly, the English courts bent
the rules to permit the introduction of prior inconsistent statements under
certain circumstances. The first exception to the voucher rule is believed
to have been carved in 1796 during the Trial of Crossfield.26 There, the

court permitted a prosecutor to examine a witness using a prior written
statement to refresh that witness's recollection. 27 By 1834, one English
court went beyond the refreshment of recollection rationale and permitted
introduction of a prior inconsistent statement by a calling party in a civil
24 Legal scholars have thoroughly criticized the voucher rule on grounds that calling

parties are not free to select their witnesses. See Ladd, supra note 2, at 77 (stating that
"[tihe chief fault in the vouching theory lies in the lack of free choice in the selection of
witnesses ... [eixcept in the case of character witnesses and expert testimony, parties
under the adversary system do not choose any persons they might like to place upon the
witness stand."). Wigmore described the rule as a primitive notion. See 3A WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 659. The United States Supreme Court, too, has
criticized the voucher rule as based on false premises. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 296 (1973) (observing that "[wihatever validity the 'voucher' rule may have
once enjoyed, and apart from whatever usefulness it retains today in the civil trial
process, it bears little present relationship to the realities of the criminal process"); see
also Johnson v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 208 F.2d 633, 635 (3d Cir. 1953) (stating that
"when witnesses are called, in some stranger's lawsuit, to tell about things they saw,
heard, or did, there is no reason in logic or common sense or fairness why the party who
calls them should have to vouch for everything they say."). The United States Supreme
Court has determined that the voucher rule would deny a defendant constitutional due
process if strictly enforced in a criminal trial. See Chambers, 410 U.S. at 296.
25 Cox v. Eayres, 55 Vt. 24, 27 (1883) (quotation omitted).
26 26 How. St. Tr. 1 (1796).
27 See id. at 37. Similarly, the court in Melhuish v. Collier, 117 Eng. Rep. 690
(1850), permitted a party to introduce prior inconsistent statements to refresh recollection.
Nineteenth century commentators discussed the prohibition against the use of prior
inconsistent statements.

447-51 (1849).

See 2 S. MARCH PHILLIPPS, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
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case where the witness had related a different story to the lawyer before
trial.' s The rationale for deviating from the rule appears to have been the

court's belief that the attorney for the calling party was genuinely
surprised by the witness' testimony.
It was not until the English Common Law Procedure Act of 1854
(English Act of 1854), however, that the common-law prohibition against
impeachment of one's witness was significantly altered.2 9 In substance,
the English Act of 1854 allowed a calling party to introduce specific
contradictory evidence when the judge found a witness to be "adverse."
The English Act of 1854 clearly accelerated the attack on the legal fiction
underlying the voucher rule-that calling parties freely select their

witnesses. 30
The English Act of 1854 strongly influenced the development of the
voucher rule in the United States. Prior to its passage, most United
States courts insisted that the calling party be bound by the testimony of
the witness he or she called. 3 1 A number of courts, however, carved
exceptions to the voucher rule and permitted parties to impeach the
credibility of witnesses under certain circumstances.3 2
28 See Wright v. Beckett, 1 Moo. & Rob. 414, 416 (C.P. 1834) (permitting plaintiff to

introduce evidence of contradictory statements where the witness had given prejudicial
testimony).
29 See English Act of 1854, 17 & 18 Vict. ch. 125, § 22 (1854). The English Act of
1854 provided that:
A Party producing a Witness shall not be allowed to impeach his Credit by
general Evidence of bad Character, but he may, in case the Witness shall
in the Opinion of the Judge prove adverse, contradict him by other
Evidence, or, by Leave of the Judge, prove that he has made at other
Times a Statement inconsistent with his present Testimony.
Id. emphasis added)
See 1 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 38, at 127; see also Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 (1973).
31 See Ellicott v. Pearl, 10 U.S. (1 Pet.) 412 (1836); Harris v. Berry, 1 Hay. & Haz.
272, 272 (D.C. 1847); People v. Safford, 5 Denio 112, 116 (N.Y. 1847); Lawrence v.
Barker, 5 Wend. 300, 301, 305 (N.Y. 1830). But see State v. Norris, 2 N.C. 429 (1
Hay. & Haz. 1796), where the court declined to follow the common law and permitted
the solicitor to impeach his witness with prior contradictions. The Norris holding was
expressly rejected in State v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 694, 694 (1883). Another North Carolina
civil court declined to follow the Norris decision and applied the common-law voucher
rule to prohibit a party from impeaching the testimony of his or her own witness. See
Sawrey v. Murrell, 3 N.C. 397, 397 (1 Hay. & Haz. 1806).
32 Some courts permitted calling parties to introduce prior inconsistent statements to
refresh their witnesses' recollections. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 44, 78 (1853)
(allowing prior inconsistent statements to be introduced to refresh recollection). Other
courts permitted the introduction of prior inconsistent statements where the court
compelled production of the witness. See, e.g., Brown v. Bellows, 22 Mass. 179, 194
(1826) (allowing introduction of prior inconsistent statements where party is compelled to
call that witness).
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Following passage of the English Act of 1854, many United States
courts began to endorse departures from the voucher rule, and gradually

formulated several exceptions to alleviate its harshness."

For example,

in Hickory v. United States,34 the United States Supreme Court modified

the rule to permit prosecutors to examine witnesses about their prior
inconsistent statements. The Court stated:
When a party is taken by surprise by the evidence of his witness, the
latter may be interrogated as to inconsistent statements previously
made by him for the purpose of refreshing his recollection and
inducing him to correct his testimony; and the party so surprised may
also show the facts to be otherwise than
35 as stated, although this
incidentally tends to discredit the witness.

In the wake of Hickory, exceptions to the voucher rule began to
appear in state statutes and decisional rules. 36 A number of state courts,
for example, permitted a party to impeach his or her own witness when
surprised, misled, or deceived by the testimony. 3 7 By the early twentieth
century,
several states had enacted statutes mirroring the English Act of
3
1854.

8

33 Even after passage of the English Act of 1854, the general trend was to prohibit
calling parties from introducing prior inconsistent statements to discredit their witnesses.
But some courts permitted the introduction of such statements under certain
circumstances. See, e.g., Bullard v. Pearsall, 53 N.Y. 230, 231 (1873) (finding that a
party could probe the witness's "recollection, recalling to his mind the statements he has
previously made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent inconsistency ....

It is

also proper for the purpose of showing the circumstances which induced the party to call
him.").
34 151 U.S. 303 (1894).
35 Id. at 309.
36 See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
37 For cases that permitted calling parties to impeach the credibility of their witnesses
in the event of surprise, see, e.g., People v. Payne, 91 N.W. 739 (Mich. 1902)
(permitting party to examine witness on prior inconsistent statement in event of surprise);
Selover v. Bryant, 56 N.W. 58 (Minn. 1893) (allowing party to impeach witness with
prior inconsistent statement in event of surprise); State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 86 A.
414 (1913) (permitting party to discredit witness with prior statement in event of
surprise); and George v. Triplett, 63 N.W. 891 (N.D. 1895) (holding that when a party is
surprised by a witness's testimony, he may confront him with a prior inconsistent
statement). See also Sturgis v. State, 102 P. 57, 68 (Okla. 1909), which found that it
would be manifestly unjust to prohibit calling parties from impeaching their witness's
credibility upon showing deception.
38 See VA. CODE ANN. § 8-292 (Michie 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1642
(1973). The Massachusetts legislature enacted a statute modeled after the English Act but
that did not require the judge to determine that a witness was adverse. Massachusetts
General Laws provided that "the party who produces a witness shall not impeach his
credit by evidence of bad character, but may contradict him by other evidence, and may
also prove that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present
testimony." MASS. GEN. LAws. ch. 233, § 23 (1959) (repealed 1975). For states that
modeled their statutes after Massachusetts's lead see IND. CODE ANN. § 1926 (Michie
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The Prohibitionof Leading Questions on Direct Examination

As the common-law model developed, the voucher rule operated in
tandem with the prohibition against the use of leading questions on direct
examination. The origin of the rule against leading questions can be
traced to the seventeenth century when courts in England prohibited their
use on direct examination. 39 By the early nineteenth century, legal
scholars in England crystallized the reasons for the prohibition of leading
questions on direct examination. 4 0 Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough
summarized these essentials as follows:
That the judge restrains an advocate who produces a witness on one
particular side of a question, and who may be supposed to have a
leaning to that side of the question, from putting such interrogatories
as may operate as an instruction to that 41
witness how he is to reply to
favor the party for whom he is adduced.

Common-law courts in the United States followed the lead of the
English and
prohibited
• regularly
• •
42
• .a party from leading his or her witness
on direct examination.
Prohibition of the use of leading questions on
1933); CARROLL's KY. CODE § 596 (1932); and TExAs CRIM. CODE ANN. § 732 (West
1929). Other states, such as Louisiana, enacted statutes that modified the English Act by
permitting a party to impeach his witness upon establishing surprise. LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 487, 488 (West 1991).
39 Wigmore traced the term back to the seventeenth century. See 3 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 769, at 155 n.1 (citing Coke, 4th Inst. 279 (1634); Rosewell's
Trial, 10 How. St. Tr. 147, 190 (1684)). See also KENNY'S OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW
481 n.2 (19th ed. 1966) (citing Trial of Lilburne, 4 St. Tr. 1337, 1337 (1649), for the
proosition that leading questions were objected to as early as 1649).
See 11 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 34 (1827). Bentham commented that "the

response ought in every instance to be the expression of the actual recollection of the
proposed respondent, and not the allegation of another person, adopted by the
res ondent, and falsely delivered as his own. .. ." Id. at 35.
1 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 769, at 155 (citing 25 Hans., Parl. Deb.
207 (1813)). Two years later, Lord Ellenborough recognized that while leading questions
generally could not be asked during direct examination, it is sometimes necessary to
-lead the mind of the witness to the subject of inquiry." Nicholls v. Dowding and Kemp,
171 Eng. Rep. 408, 408 (1815).
42 For a general discussion concerning the use of leading questions see 3 JACK B.
WEINSTEIN ET AL., WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE § 611[05], at 611-77 (1994) [hereinafter
WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE]. Several courts admonished the suggestive powers of leading
questions. See United States v. Dickinson, 25 F. Cas. 850, 852 (1840) ("a question shall
not be so propounded to a witness as to indicate the answer desired"); Lee v. Tinges, 7
Md. 214, 234 (1854) ("lleading questions, that is, such as instruct[ing] a witness how to
answer on material points, are not allowed in the examination-in-chier); Page v. Parker,
40 N.H. 47, 63 (1860) ("a question is leading which instructs the witness how to answer
on material points, or puts into his mouth words to be echoed back, as was here done, or
plainly suggests the answer which the party wishes to get from him"); and Snyder v.
Snyder, 6 Am. Dec. 493, 496 (Pa. 1814) (sustaining objection to leading question
because "the question was so framed as to indicate particularly the answer which the
plaintiff wished"). Another court prohibited the questioner from showing the witness his
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direct examination has some relation to the voucher rule. If a party were
permitted to impeach the credibility of his or her witness, the party
would be in a position to control that witness's testimony. 43 So too,
leading questions are a powerful tool in securing contradictions from
witnesses." For example, examiners could lead witnesses to a point

where their present testimony becomes
inconsistent with their former
45

testimony, statements, or writings.
The policy reasons behind the prohibition of leading questions on
direct examination-the danger that the questions suggest the answershas little applicability when the witness either is an adverse party or a
person identified with one. 46 It also is apparent that in some cases it is
necessary or at least desirable to call such witnesses during the trial. 47
Nevertheless, most common-law courts forbade the use of leading
questions of such adversaries.48 Conversely, when the calling party was
prior testimony and asking him whether it was true. See also Trammell v. McDade, 29
S.C. 360, 361 (1867).
43 See Ladd, supra note 2, at 76; see also MORGAN ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 7, at 52
("[t]he theory upon which the rule against leading is based is that the ordinary person is
readily susceptible to suggestion and particularly is inclined to adopt an assertion which is
only approximately accurate, and that a witness is likely to be predisposed in favor of the
party calling him."). The Seventh Circuit has stated that the restrictions against leading
questions were "designed to guard against the risk of improper suggestion inherent in
examining friendly witnesses through the use of leading questions." Ellis v. City of
Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1981).
44 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 6, at
16, § 38, at 126.
45 See id.; 3 WEINsTEIN's EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 611[05], at 611-77.
Leading
questions can be harmful for others reasons:
[F]irst, that the witness is presumed to have a bias in favour of the party
calling him; secondly that the party calling a witness, knowing what that
witness may prove, might by leading bring out only that portion of the
witness' story favourable to his own case; and, thirdly, that a witness,
intending to be entirely fair and honest, might assent to a leading question
which did not express his real meaning.
G. Stephen Denroche, Leading Questions, 6 CRIM. L.Q. 21, 22 (1963).
46
47 See supra note 40-45 and accompanying text.
See C.J.S. Witnesses §§ 15, 363 (1957); Vokroy v. Johnson, 196 A.2d 451 (Md.
App. 1964) (finding that "the circumstances of the [car] accident made it necessary for
theslaintiff to call his adversary as a witness and rely heavily upon his testimony").
3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 915, at 707. Generally, New Jersey
courts prohibited parties from asking leading questions to adverse parties they called to
the stand. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-11 (West 1994) (stating that "except as
otherwise provided by law, when any party is called as a witness by the adverse party he
shall be subject to the same rules as to examination and cross-examination as other
witnesses."). New Jersey courts, however, could exercise their discretionary powers to
permit parties to use leading questions to interrogate adverse witnesses whom they called
to the stand. See Bruce H. Stern, The Adverse Party as Your Mtness, N.J. TRIAL LAW.,
Aug. 1988, at 70, 70-71. Some jurisdictions permitted parties to use leading questions to
interrogate adversaries they called to the stand. See, e.g., General Equip. Mfrs. v.
Westfield Ins. Co., 635 A.2d 173, 185 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (citing Kimble v. Wilson,
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required to call the adversary to establish a necessary element of the case,
common-law
the adversary's counsel could use leading questions in some
49
,
courts because the witness was being "cross examined.

C.

The Use of PriorInconsistent Statements in the Common-Law
Model

One of the most effective weapons in the arsenal of an examiner is
the impeachment of a witness through the introduction of prior
inconsistent statements. 50 Under the common-law model, however, a
calling party was prohibited from introducing a prior inconsistent
While an adversary could introduce such
statement for such purposes.
statements, under the common-law model, they could not be used as
factfinder. 52 This "orthodox" approach was
substantive evidence by the that
such statements were not trustworthy
based on the perception

42 A.2d 526 (Pa. 1945)); Cronkite v. Trexler, 41 A. 22 (Pa. 1898); Endicott Johnson
Corp. v. Golde, 190 N.W.2d 752, 754 (N.D. 1971); Lindsay v. Teamsters Union, 97
N.W.2d 686, 694 (N.D. 1959).
49 For courts that permitted a witness's own counsel to ask leading questions
on

cross-examination, see generally Annotation, Cross-Examinationby Leading Questions of
Witnesses Friendly to or Biased in Favor of Cross-Examiner, 38 A.L.R.2d 952 (1954).
See, e.g., Lauchheimer & Sons v. Jacobs, 55 S.E. 55, 58 (Ga. 1906); Sinift v. Sinift, 293
N.W. 841, 850-51 (Iowa 1940); Westland Housing Corp. v. Scott, 44 N.E.2d 959, 964
(Mass. 1942); A. Graf Distilling Co. v. Wilson, 156 S.W. 23, 27 (Mo. 1913). See
generally Wilcox v. Erwin, 49 S.W.2d 677 (Mo. App. 1932).
50 See 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 33, at 111, § 38, at 126. See
also In re Wolf, 231 N.J. Super. 365, 371, 555 A.2d 722, 725 (App. Div. 1989)
(recognizing that the use of prior inconsistent statements to discredit witnesses has been
called "one of the most valued tools of litigation"). Litigants regularly introduce prior
inconsistent statements to attack a witness's credibility so that the jury will give less
weight to that witness's in-court testimony. See Colleen Gale Trend, State v. Hunt:
Rekindling Requirements for Impeaching One's Own Witness, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1236
Courts have been wary of litigants trying to introduce prior inconsistent
(1990).
statements as a pretext for placing before the jury otherwise inadmissible evidence. See
generally Don Johnsen, Impeachment with an Unsworn Prior Inconsistent Statement as
Subterfuge, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 295 (1987).
51 See generally 4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 801(d)(1)[011, at 801128, 801-129; 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996. The commonlaw prohibition against the use of prior inconsistent statements has been subjected to
intense criticism. Some commentators have argued that contradictory statements should
be admissible because they were made nearer in time to the event, and therefore, are
more likely to be accurate. See I. Daniel Stewart, Jr., Perception, Memory, and
Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the ProposedFederalRules of Evidence, 1970
UTAH L. RE'v. 1, 8-22. Wigmore and McCormick criticized the common-law model
because the declarant was subject to cross-examination at the present trial with respect to
his prior statements. See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 117; 3A
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996.
52 See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 117; 3A WIGMoRE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996-98.
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because: (1) the hearsay statements were not made under oath; 53 (2) the
trier of fact did not observe the witness's demeanor at the time the
statements were made; and (3) the witness was not subject to crossexamination by the party against whom the statements were offered.
The orthodox rule was almost universally accepted by the commonlaw civil and criminal courts. 5 As our adversarial system developed,
common-law commentators stressed the importance of cross-examination
as to observation, memory, narration, and sincerity at the time the
statement was made. 56 In one of the leading cases espousing this view,
State v. Saporen,57 the Minnesota Supreme Court noted:
53 The requirement of oath was believed to give the statement religious sanctity and
solemnity. See 6 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1827, at 411. Chief Baron
Gilbert, who argued early on that hearsay statements not made under oath should be
inadmissible, stated "[blesides, though a person testify what he hath heard upon oath, yet
the person who spake it was not upon oath; and if a man had been in Court and said the
same thing and had not sworn it, he had not been believed in a court of justice."
Morgan, supra note 4, at 181-82 (citing GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 152 (2d ed.
1760)).
54 Wigmore opposed the requirement that the declarant be subject to crossexamination at the time the statement was made. In his classic statement, which has been
reiterated by numerous courts and legal scholars, he remarked that "the witness is present
and subject to cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the basis
for his former statement. The whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been already
satisfied."
3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996; see also 2
MCCORMiCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 117-18; Graham, supra note 10, at
1568.
55 See United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 1960).
For a
comprehensive discussion of the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements
under the early common law, see Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1943).
See Annotation, ExtrajudicialStatements by Witness Who is Subject to Cross-examination
as Evidence of Facts to Which They State, 133 A.L.R. 1445 (1939) (citing cases). Some
courts permitted the introduction of grand jury testimony to refresh recollection, but not
as substantive evidence. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
234 (1939). Other courts were adamant in their prohibition against the introduction of
prior inconsistent statements. See, e.g., Southern Ry. v. Gray, 241 U.S. 333, 337 (1915)
("[olf course, the contradictory statements can have no legal tendency to establish the
truth of their subject-matter"); Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 309 (1894) ("but
proof of the contradictory statements of one's own witness, voluntarily called and not a
party, inasmuch as it would not amount to substantive evidence and could have no effect
but to impair the credit of the witness, was generally not admissible at common law").
56 It was widely believed that cross-examination would expose the possible
deficiencies in the out-of-court statements, such as suppressions, sources of error, and
untrustworthiness. See 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 3. Wigmore
has described the opportunity for cross-examination as "beyond any doubt the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." See 5 id., § 1367, at 32.
285 N.W. 898 (Minn. 1939).
In Saporen, defendant was convicted of carnal
knowledge and abusing a female under the age of 18. A witness to the incident gave an
out-of-court statement to a probation officer that was recorded by a stenographer. At
trial, the witness explained that he was threatened with seven years in the reformatory
unless he testified adversely to the defendant. The trial court permitted the prosecution to
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The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future time it
gives the party opponent the right to dissect adverse testimony. Its
principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing process.
Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt to harden
and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the
witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the
suggestions of others, whose
58 interest may be, and often is, to maintain
falsehood rather than truth.

A minority of courts, however, began to challenge the orthodox
view and ermitted the introduction of hearsay statements as substantive
R
evidence.
In DiCarlo
v. United States, 60 the Second Circuit departed
from traditional evidence rules and admitted a prior unsworn written
statement of a witness to be received as substantive evidence. Judge
Learned Hand explained that there should be no unyielding requirement
that evidence only come from statements made and documents received in
court:
If, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what he
says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none the
less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in court.
introduce that statement as substantive evidence because it was inconsistent with the
witness's in court testimony. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court
because the statement was not given under oath subject to cross-examination. See John
M. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a Compromising Step
Backward in Enacting Rule 801(d)(1)(A), 8 LoYoLA UNIV. L.J. 251, 255-56 (1977)
(providing a thorough discussion of the rationales underlying this case).
5 Saporen, 285 N.W. at 901.
Other cases similarly demonstrate the inherent
weaknesses in the common-law rule. See People v. Johnson, 441 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1968)
(holding inadmissible prior statements of defendant's wife and daughter in which they
testified before grand jury that defendant had engaged in incest); see also Mark
Reutlinger, PriorInconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 361, 370 (1975).
59 See DiCarlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1925). In DiCarlo,
a
witness gave grand jury testimony that identified defendants as the individuals who
attacked and shot the victim. At trial, however, the witness testified that she could no
longer identify the defendants. The prosecution, surprised by the turncoat witness, was
permitted to introduce her prior contradictory statements as substantive evidence. But see
United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir. 1937) (restricting the holding in
DiCarlo to situations where the witness's in-court conduct could be rationally interpreted
as an affirmation of the former statement). Two years later, Judge Chase permitted the
introduction of prior inconsistent statements that were contained in prior trial testimony,
because under the circumstances, the statements were guaranteed to have been made.
See United States v. Graham, 102 F.2d 436, 441 (2d Cir. 1939). Judge Hand concurred
in that decision. That same year, the Eighth Circuit held that prior inconsistent
statements could be afforded substantive value. See Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry. v.
Kulp, 102 F.2d 352, 358 (8th Cir. 1939). Shortly thereafter, the Eighth Circuit held such
statements to be inadmissible. See Ellis v. United States, 138 F.2d 612, 616 (8th Cir.
1943).

6 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1925).
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There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided 61
only in
accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in court.
Under the common-law model, of course, exceptions to the hearsay
rule traditionally were made for some statements, particularly admissions
and confessions that were received as substantive evidence. 62 This
evidence rule was supported by the view that a litigant, unlike a witness,
would not make these prior statements unless he or she believed them to
be true.63
III. EARLY EFFORTS TO REFORM THE COMMON-LAW EVIDENCE MODEL
A.

The American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence

The common-law model for the presentation of witnesses had
proved to be remarkably resilient.
By the 1920s, however, each
constituent of the common-law model and particularly the voucher rule
increasingly was subject to criticism by legal scholars.
Criticism galvanized around the ALl which was founded in 1923.
That body was created to clarify, what was believed to be, the
uncertainty and complexity surrounding common-law doctrines in various
fields of the law. 65 Initially, the ALI sought to compile the common-law
rules of evidence in a Restatement. Review, however, convinced the ALl
that such a Restatement of Evidence would be a waste of time because the
case law among the various states was in such conflict that the dominant
law of the United States was difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain. 66
Worse, the ALI found that the common-law evidence rules "in numerous
61

Id. at 368.

62 Affidavits and prior testimony, too, were treated as out-of-court statements though
made under oath. See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 118. They
generally were found to be inadmissible as substantive evidence because the affiant or
witness was not subject to cross-examination by the party against whom the statement was

offered. See id.
63 Professor Laurence Tribe has stressed the truthfulness of admissions
and
confessions. See Laurence H. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay, 87 HARV. L. REv. 957, 965
(1974). "A person is unlikely to make a statement adverse to himself unless he believes
it to be true.. .. " Id.

64 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
65 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at viii. For the background and circumstances that led
to the Model Code of Evidence, see John D. Wickhem, A Code of Evidence for
Wsconsin?, 1945 Wis. L. REV. 77, 77. Wickhem stressed the importance of codifying a
set of procedural rules that would promote expedition and fairness at trial. He stated that
"[tlhe whole law of evidence is shot through with rules of policy designed to promote
expedition, fairness and elimination of prejudice and confusion from the trial of cases."
Id. at 79. Another author recognized the need to simplify and modernize the commonlaw rules of evidence. See McCormick, supra note 9, at 559.
66 See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at viii.
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and important instances [were] so defective that instead of being a means
of developing truth, they operate[d] to suppress it." 6 7 A Restatement of

Evidence would have the effect of codifying these ineffective rules rather
than revising them.
Reform of the common law of evidence waited another decade while
ALT turned its attention to clarifying other areas of the common law. But
by the late 1930s, ALI began its evidence reform efforts by assembling a
committee of scholars and jurists seldom seen during the course of
American jurisprudence. The Evidence Editorial Group was chaired by
Professor Edmund M. Morgan, its reporter, and included Judge Learned
Hand, Professor John M. Maguire, Professor Mason Ladd, and Professor
68
Professor John H. Wigmore
Charles T. McCormick, among others.
69
In 1942, the ALI published the
served as the group's chief consultant.
The Model Code as formulated revolutionalized the law
Model Code.
by favoring the broad admissibility of evidence. 7'

67 Id. For a discussion of the deficiencies in the common-law evidence rules, see A.
Leo Levin, Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead
Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1954); and Leonard S. Powers, The North
Carolina Hearsay Rule and the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 34 N.C. L. REv. 171 (1956).
The ALl had intended to prepare a restatement of the law of evidence comparable to, for
example, the Restatements of Contracts and Torts. It abandoned its efforts to restate the
law and chose instead to revise it.
68 The ALl began its work on the Model Code of Evidence in 1939 shortly after it
received a $40,000 grant from the Carnegie Corporation. See Wickhem, supra note 65,
at 77. One author noted that "[tlhe Model Code . . . whether proposed for adoption by
rules of court or by legislative enactment is intended to make such reforms of the existing
Many legal
Id.
rules as in the judgment of the Institute should be adopted."
commentators proposed the need to revise the evidence rules rather than restore them.
See John J. Broderick, Jr. & Thomas F. Broden, The Future of the Model Code of
Evidence, 23 NOTRE DAME LAW. 226, 227 (1948) (stating that "a thorough revision of
existing law, rather than a restatement, would accomplish their purposes.").
69 Morgan and Wigmore could not agree on a conceptual approach
to the Model
Code. See Discussion of Code of Evidence Tentative Draft No. 1, 17 A.L.I. PROC. 66148 (July 1, 1939-June 30, 1940). In fact, from its inception, Wigmore emphatically
disagreed with the way in which the problems of drafting should be approached and
See generally John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of
formulated.
Evidence Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. L.J. 23 (1942).
70 See generally MODEL CODE, supra note 5. The ALI promulgated the Model
Code
on May 14, 1942. It consisted of 116 rules. See 19 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE 257 (1942).
71 Throughout the Model Code commentary, the Evidence Editorial Group advocated
the admission of all evidence having probative value. For example, they commented that
"all evidence having substantial probative value upon the credibility of a witness should
be admissible . . . unless some strong consideration of policy calls for unconditional
Regarding hearsay
exclusion." MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule 106, at 118.
statements, they remarked that "once in a while a court will frankly put the case of
reception upon the ground that all available evidence is necessary and that hearsay is
better than nothing." Id. at 222-23.
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The voucher rule was a conspicuous target for these reform
efforts. 72 Morgan noted that the rule was premised on the fictional view
that parties could select their witnesses and therefore should hold them
out as creditworthy. 73 The Model Code swept away the voucher rule and
instead permitted parties to impeach the credibility of their own
witnesses:
Rule 106. Evidence affecting credibility ... for the purpose of
impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party
including the party calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other
74
matter relevant upon the issue of his credibility as a witness ....

The Model Code also invested judges with considerable discretion to
control the presentation of evidence. In the view of the ALl, this
discretion was available to the English judges in pre-revolutionary days,
but had been stripped by many United States jurisdictions over the course
of years. 75 For example, the Model Code replaced the common-law
72 Morgan, the Model Code's reporter, led the reform efforts. Even Wigmore, who
challenged Morgan throughout the drafting process, agreed that the voucher rule should
be abandoned. See 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 896-99, at 658-66.
"There is no substantial reason for preserving this rule-the remnant of a primitive
notion." 3A id.
73 Professor Morgan explained the unsoundness of the common-law rule:
There is much doubt as to the origin of this common-law prohibition, but
the most reasonable explanation is that when parties were first permitted to
present pertinent data to the trier of fact through witnesses, it was regarded
as a matter of favor and not of right. A party who had secured the
privilege of presenting information through a witness could hardly be heard
to assert that the witness was unworthy of credit. Today, however, no one
supposes that reception of evidence is a matter of favor, or that parties
choose their witnesses; they must take them as they find them and they can
prove their cases in no other way.
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 20-21.
74 For a general discussion of Model Code Rule 106, see Ladd, supra note 5, at 22122. Ladd explained the policy reasons behind the voucher rule: (1) calling parties
vouched for the credibility of their witnesses; (2) calling parties were morally bound by
the testimony of their witnesses; and (3) courts wanted to prevent attorneys from coercing
uncooperative witnesses into testifying as desired. Each of these reasons has been
reiterated on many occasions.

See C. MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §

258 (1994); 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 897-99, at 661-66; Stalmack,
supra note 57, at 271.
The Model Code alerted the bench and bar to the need to restore power to the
judges. The commentary to Model Code Rule 105 provided:
This Rule recognizes in its introductory clause the power of the judge as it
exists under the English common law. That power has been somewhat
diminished in many jurisdictions in the United States. It ought to be
restored. Were it not for conflicting decisions dealing with the exercise of
this power in detail, the separate clauses would be unnecessary. A rule
giving the judge power to control the trial so as to secure an honest,
expeditious and speedy presentation of the evidence would suffice. His

1997]

PRESENTING AND CHALLENGING WITNESSES

419

prohibition against the use of leading questions on direct examination
with a flexible rule giving judges virtually total control over the

circumstances under which a calling party could lead his or her own

witness. 76 The rule, which pivoted on the functional relation between the
witness and the examiner, provided:
Rule 105. Control of judge over presentation of evidence. The judge
controls the conduct of the trial to the end that the evidence shall be
presented honestly, expeditiously and in such form as to be readily
understood, and in his discretion determines, among other things, ...
(g) to what extent and in what circumstances a party calling a
witness shall be permitted, and a party not calling him shall be
permitted, and a party not calling him shall be forbidden, to ut
to the witness questions suggesting the desired answers ....
In essence, the Model Code accepted the common-law view that
leading questions may well suggest an answer that a calling party
prefers- an undesirable result. 78 Generally, leading questions should not
be allowed on direct examination because the witness is assumed to be
friendly to the calling party. 79 But judges should permit a calling party
to pose leading questions when (1) the matter is preliminary or
undisputed; (2) an examination by non-leading questions would be
difficult or time consuming where the witness is unable to understand or
remember the matter; or (3) the witness avoids testifying or is hostile to
the calling party.8 0 The Model Code also permitted judges to control the
use of leading questions even on cross-examination such as where the
witness was identified with the interests of the cross-examining party. 8 '
action should be interfered with by an appellate court only for manifest
abuse of discretion.
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 104.
76 The need to "restore to the trial court's discretion the determination
of a large
number of matters now taken care of by specific rules" has been recognized. Wickhem,
supra note 65, at 81. Similarly, Dean Ladd recognized the need for judges to control the
presentation of evidence in an honest, expeditious, and understandable manner. See
Ladd, supra note 5, at 222-23.
77 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule 105(g).
78 Traditionally, leading questions were prohibited on direct examination because
their suggestive powers were undesirable. The rule continued into the twentieth century.
See Ewing v. United States, 135 F.2d 633, 640-41 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (permitting leading
questions only on cross-examination).
79 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also 1 MCCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 1, § 6, at 16; MORGAN ON EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 52.
See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 108-09; see also 1 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 1, § 6, at 16; MORGAN ON EVIDENCE, supra note 7, at 52.
The Model Code afforded judges the discretion to determine whether non-calling
parties could interrogate witnesses with questions that suggest the desired answers. See
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule 105(g).
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The Model Code revolutionalized the use of prior inconsistent
statements allegedly made by witnesses.8 2 Under the common-law

model, prior out-of-court statements were hearsay when offered for their
truth. 83
Few common-law rules were more sacrosanct than the
84
prohibition of hearsay evidence.
Hearsay statements were rarely, if
ever, admitted because most often such statements were viewed as
untrustworthy and would not be subject to cross-examination by the party
against whom the evidence was offered.8 5 The Model Code radically
departed from this view and opted for broad admissibility of such hearsay

not only to impeach a witness but also for substantive purposes .866 Rule

503 of the Model Code essentially vitiated the common-law hearsay rules
by admitting all hearsay statements8 7 made by a declarant who was
present and subject to cross-examination:
"[elvidence of a hearsay
declaration is admissible if the judge finds
that
the declarant . . . is
88
present and subject to cross-examination."
82 The Evidence Editorial Group stated that "the law governing hearsay today
is a
conglomeration of inconsistencies, developed as a result of conflicting theories.
Refinements and qualifications within the exceptions only add to its irrationality."
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 223. On a prior occasion, Morgan had attributed the
evolution of the hearsay rule to historical accident. See Edmund M. Morgan, The
Hearsay Rule, 12 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1937). Professor McCormick also criticized the
hearsay rule as "the mitigation of a rigid rule by numerous rigid exceptions." Charles T.
McCormick, The Borderlandof Hearsay, 39 YALE L.J. 489, 504 (1930).
83 See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 2 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.11
(4th ed.
1996).
See supra notes 4, 52-55 and accompanying text.
85 See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251 at 117; 5 WIGMORE
ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1362, at 3; Graham, supra note 10, at 1568; Comment, Ex
Parte Snell: The Expanding Controversy of the Admissibility of Prior Statements, 19 AM.
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 435 (1995).
86 See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 222-23. See generally WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE,
supra note 42, § 801(d)(1), at 801-131. Wickhem, supra note 65, at 83 described the
Model Code departure from the common law.
87 Model Code 503(a) also admitted hearsay declarations made by an unavailable
witness. The Evidence Editorial Group found that the necessity for an unavailable
declarant's hearsay statements outweighed common-law concerns that such statements
were untrustworthy. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 234. Professor Morgan stated
that "the unavailability of the declarant creates a necessity for the use of the evidence."
Id. at 223. The Model Code essentially eliminated the need for hearsay exceptions when
dealing with the unavailable declarant.
The Model Code made "unnecessary any
separate treatment of those common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule for which
unavailability of the declarant is necessary, such as dying declarations and declarations of
deceased persons concerning boundaries." Id. at 232. Still, some need existed for the
formulation of hearsay exceptions based on circumstantial trustworthiness when the
declarant was available but not present and subject to cross-examination. See id. at 49.
88 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule 503. The requirement that the declarant be
present at the trial insured the reliability of the in-court testimony because it was believed
that the witness would be impressed with the solemnity of the occasion. See 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 245, at 94.
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The Evidence Editorial Group reasoned that the opportunity to

cross-examine a declarant at trial was an adequate substitute for such an
examination when the statement was made.89
Group explained:

The Evidence Editorial

If the courts were really convinced that uncross-examined evidence is
too unreliable to be considered, they would be compelled to determine
what elements of weakness cross-examination is designed to uncover,
and how many of those elements need be present in any case or class
of cases in order to condemn it. No doubt a properly conducted
cross-examination will test all qualities of the perception, memory,
narration and veracity of the witness. Experience on the bench and at
the bar makes it abundantly clear that the chief value of crossexamination is to disclose defects relating to perception or memory;
occasionally it reveals misleading qualities
90 in narration, and rather
infrequently exposes intentional falsehood.

Accordingly, the Model Code rejected the common-law notion that
hearsay statements were too unreliable to be admitted. 9 I Rather, an
intelligent cross-examiner, it was believed, could test a witness's
perception, memory, narration, and sincerity as they related to the
hearsay statement. 92
The Evidence Editorial Group justified its substantial abandonment
of the hearsay concept on the premise that the numerous exceptions to the
admission of hearsay that had developed under the common-law model
were testament to the fact that such evidence has strong probative value.
Though the Model Code did not expressly deal with the use of prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, they were clearly made
admissible under Model Rule 503. 9
89 See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 223.

This proposition was endorsed by many

legal commentators. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The Model Code widely
departed from the common-law hearsay rules. The purpose of the rule was "to liberalize
the admission of what is commonly called 'first degree hearsay.'" Wickhem, supra note
65, at 83. "But this turned out to be too long a step for the profession to take."
McCormick, supra note 9, at 561.
90 MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 223.
91 See id. at 232-34.
92 See id. at 223.
93 See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 119. Under the Model
Code calculus, affidavits would be admissible as long as they met the requirements of
Rule 503. The English Evidence Act made admissible affidavits and other writings even
when the declarant was available. See ENGLISH EVIDENCE AcTs 1 & 2 Geo. 6 ch. 28, § 1
(1936). A specific exception to the Model Code hearsay model was drawn for an
available witness's prior testimony or deposition. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, Rule
511.
Professor Morgan explained, however, that resort to this exception may be
unnecessary because:
If the witness who gave the former testimony or deposition is present and
subject to cross-examination, evidence of the hearsay declaration will be
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In sum, the Model Code totally abandoned the common-law

evidence model by abolishing the voucher rule and by admitting prior
94
inconsistent statements, though hearsay, for their substantive value.
Moreover, it clothed judges with enormous discretionary authority to
determine whether a witness was adverse to the calling party, thus
permitting leading questions. 95 These and other radical departures from
the common law doomed the Model Code as a working evidence code
and no state enacted its provisions into law. 96
B.

The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws

Though never adopted as law, the Model Code had significant value
in focusing reform efforts. In 1949, the Model Code was referred to the
National Conference of Commissioners as a "basis for the preparation of
a uniform code of evidence." 97 The Commissioners on Uniform State
admissible under 503(b); if he is unavailable, it will be admissible under
503(a). Only where he is available and not present for cross-examination
will resort to the present Rule be necessary....
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 261.
94 See 2 McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 221-22.
95 Professor Morgan explained that "the proposed Code leaves no room for
doubt as
to the power of the trial judge. His historic role as master of the trial is restored. He has
complete control of the conduct of the trial."
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, at 13.
Because of this discretion, the Model Code never caught on as a vehicle for reform.
Many practicing lawyers feared the significant discretion afforded jurists. See generally
21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5005, at 87-88 (1977) (attributing failure of the Model Code to enhancing
the power of trial judges at the expense of appellate courts and the adversary system);
Herbert F. Goodrich et al., Spotlight on Evidence, 27 J.OF THE Am. JUDICATURE SOC'Y
113, 113 (1943). The failure of any state to adopt the Model Code has been attributed to
the broad discretion it afforded jurists. See Alexander Tanford, A Political Choice
Approach to Limiting PrejudicialEvidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831, 836 (1989).
The Model Code met with academic approval. See Nathan L. Jacobs, The Uniform
Rules of Evidence, 10 RUTGERs L. REv. 485, 486 (1956). Its chief critics, though, came
from the legal profession. The President of the State Bar of California adamantly
opposed acceptance of the Model Code. "In conclusion we earnestly recommend that the
Bar should be on the alert to resist to its utmost at the coming or any succeeding session
of the Legislature the enactment into law of the Code or any of the parts thereof."
REPORT, 19 CALIF. S.B.J. 262, 283 (1944). Even Morgan, the Reporter for the Model
Code, acknowledged its poor reception by the individual states. See 21 WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5005, at 86-89; Edmund M. Morgan, The Future of the Law
of Evidence, 29 TEXAS L. REV. 587, 598-99 (1951). The failure of any state to adopt the
Model Code has been pointed out. See Levin, supra note 67, at 3. Several New Jersey
courts, however, recognized that the Model Code was a better approach than the existing
evidence rules. See Robertson v. Hackensack Trust Co., 1 N.J. 304, 320, 63 A.2d 515,
523 (1949); In re Petagno, 24 N.J. Misc. 279, 286, 48 A.2d 909, 914 (Ch. 1946).
In 1948, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
formed a committee to prepare rules of evidence. Judge Spencer A. Gard chaired the
committee, which included Mason Ladd and Charles T. McCormick, among others. The
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Laws (Uniform Commissioners) ascribed the failure of the Model Code
to gain acceptance to its departure from the traditional and generally
accepted law of evidence. 98 There was a need to unify the fractionalized
body of evidence law that existed in the many United States
jurisdictions. 9 9 This body determined that ties to the common-law
evidence model were essential to gain acceptance of this reform effort
from the bench and bar.' 0 0 After several years of study, the Uniform
Commissioners promulgated the Uniform Rules in 1953. 1" A year later,
the ALl endorsed the Uniform Rules.'02
The Uniform Rules also significantly altered the common-law
evidence model, but did so in a less controversial way. 10 For example,
objectives of the Uniform Rules were objectivity and uniformity. For a discussion of the
objectives of the Uniform Rules, see Powers, supra note 67, at 172-73. "The goal of
uniformity would be expected to lead to modernization and complete reform; the goal of
acceptability would be expected to lead to concessions towards expediency and the
'law er slant.'" Id.
See 1953 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS 161 [hereinafter 1953 PROCEEDINGS]. While the
Uniform Commissioners acknowledged the importance of the Model Code, they
recognized that "its departures from traditional and generally prevailing common law and
statutory law [were] too far-reaching and drastic for present day acceptance."
Id.
Hence, the objects of "acceptability and uniformity" were paramount. See id. By
consulting with Morgan and others from the ALl, the Uniform Commissioners increased
the likelihood for consensus on their rules. Not only did the ALl appoint a committee
that interfaced with the Uniform Commissioners, but the Uniform Commissioners
solicited Morgan's views even before the appointment of the committee. See id. at 162.
One author stated that the Model Code was "too academic in its form of expression and,
perhaps the other side of the same coin, that it was lacking in realism." Powers, supra
note 67, at 171.
99 Uniformity was clearly the goal of the Uniform Commissioners.
See 1951
HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
AND PROCEEDINGS 317 [hereinafter 1951 PROCEEDINGS].
100 The Uniform Commissioners sought to ameliorate
the radical changes that the
Model Code made to the common law. See Jacobs, supra note 96, at 487 (stating that
"unlike the Model Code, the phraseology of the Uniform Rules will not be deemed too
strange nor the changes it seeks to effect too far-reaching for general acceptance by the
bench and bar."); see also Michael S. Ariens, Symposium, Does Evidence Law Matter?
Historical and Analytical Approaches to the Conceptualization and Reform of Evidence
Law, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 853 (1992).
101 See generally 1953 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98. The project was
jointly carried
out with the ALI. The Commissioners submitted drafts of its material to Morgan for his
comments and suggestions because he had been chairman of the original committee of the
ALl which had drafted the Model Code. See id. at 161-62.
102 See 40 A.B.A. J. 607, 608
(1954).
103 See 1953 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 162. The
radical alterations from the
common law, which had been suggested by the Model Code, were abandoned by the
Uniform Rules. See Ariens, supra note 100, at 861. The Uniform Rules were clearer, in
simpler form, and easier to use. See Mason Ladd, Witnesses, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 523,
523 (1956). "The Uniform Rules came as close to the 'pocket bible' ideal as seems
possible." See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5005, at 91.
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the Uniform Rules consciously decided not to adopt rules concerning
when calling parties could lead their witnesses. 10 4 Instead, the Uniform
Rules left the question of when leading questions could be posed to local
law. In most cases, the effect of this decision was to continue the
common-law rule, which forbade the calling party from asking leading
questions during direct examination. 105
The Uniform Rules were less gentle with the common-law voucher
rule. 10 6 Like its Model Code predecessor, the Uniform Rules recognized
that the voucher rule had failed to reflect reality. 10 7 Hence Uniform Rule
20 permitted a calling party to impeach his or her witness by providing:
Evidence Generally Affecting Credibility. . . . [F]or the purpose of
impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party
including the party calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and any other
matter relevant upon the issues of credibility.

The Uniform Commissioners explained that they intended through this
rule to lay to rest the legal fiction that a party is bound by the testimony
of his or her witnesses.

The Uniform Rules also codified many of the hearsay exceptions
developed under the common law.1 09 Under the Uniform Rules, hearsay
statements were inadmissible except to the extent they fell within one of
thirty-four recognized exceptions. 110 The mere unavailability of the
104 Rules addressing leading questions were thought to be "unnecessary or not within
the scope of the general scheme to deal primarily with problems of admissibility of
evidence." 1953 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 162. While the Model Code left the use
of leading questions entirely to the discretion of the trial court, the Uniform Rules did not
discuss the subject. See 28 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 6161, at 319, 333 (1993).
105 During the 1950s and 1960s, calling parties were generally prohibited from asking
leading questions during direct examination. See, e.g., Mendez v. Dorman, 195 A.2d
561, 564 (Conn. 1963); Hanson v. State, 71 S.E.2d 720, 721-22 (Ga. Ct. App. 1952);
Ogletree v. Marcus, 361 P.2d 689, 691 (Okla. 1961). Most courts prohibited a witness's
own counsel from asking leading questions on cross-examination. See Annotation, CrossExamination by Leading Questions of Wlmesses Friendly to or Biased in Favor of CrossExaminer, 38 A.L.R.2d 952 (1954).
106 The Uniform Rules virtually abandoned the rule against impeaching one's own
witness. The voucher rule was believed to have "lack[ed] logic in that in essence all
witnesses are, or should be, witnesses of the court called as a channel through which to
get the truth, and that the assignment of witnesses to one party or another is inconsistent
with good practice." James G. Holbrook, Wtnesses, 2 UCLA L. REV. 32, 38-39 (1955).
107 See 1953 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 175.
108 The Uniform Commissioners explained that "[tIhis appears to be a universally
acceptable and desirable concept, to avoid resort to fictions to escape the anachronism
that a party is bound by the testimony of a witness which he produces." Id.
109 See id.
110 See id. at 198.
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declarant, however, was rejected as insufficient to justify the receipt of
hearsay statements."
The Uniform Commissioners also rejected the
Model Code theory that favored the admissibility. of hearsay statements
based on their alleged probative value, and opted instead for the
traditional view that hearsay evidence
generally should not be received
2
because it was untrustworthy. "
But the Uniform Rules embraced the policy of broad admissibility of
hearsay reflected in Model Rule 503(b) when the declarant was present
and available for cross-examination. 113 In such a case these prior hearsay
statements would be admissible as substantive evidence. Uniform Rule
63(1) accordingly provided:
Hearsay Evidence Excluded- Exceptions. Evidence of a statement
which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing
offered to prove the truth of the matter stated is hearsay evidence and
inadmissible except...
(1) Previous Statements of Persons Present and Subject to Cross
Examination.
A statement previously made by a person who is
present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with respect
to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would
be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness
114

The Uniform Commissioners stated that "[in no instance is an exception based
solely upon the idea of necessity arising from the fact of the unavailability of the declarant
as a witness." Id.
112 The Uniform Commissioners recognized the traditional
hearsay dangers:
The Model Code theory is that since hearsay is evidence and has some
probative value it should be admissible if relevant and if it is the best
evidence available.
That policy is rejected by the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The traditional policy is adhered
to, namely that the probative value of hearsay is not a mere matter of
weight for the trier of fact but that its having any value at all depends
primarily upon the circumstances under which the statement was made.
See 1953 PROCEEDINGS, supra note 98, at 198.
113 One justification for Rule 63(1) was that the prior statements
were made nearer in
time to the event than the present testimony, and the opposing party is guaranteed the
right to cross-examine the declarant. See generally James H. Chadbourn, The "Uniform
Rules" and the California Law of Evidence, 2 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1954); McCormick,
supra note 9, at 562; Powers, supra note 67, at 180-81.
4 UNiF. R. EVID. 63(1) (1953). The Uniform Rules also provided for the
receipt of
affidavits where the witness was available for cross-examination. See 1953 PROCEEDNGS,
supra note 98, at 198-99. Similarly, depositions in the same action and prior testimony
were made admissible. See UNIF. R. EVID. 63(3) (1953).
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The Uniform Commissioners believed that the opportunity to cross-

examine a declarant at trial was an adequate5 substitute for cross-

examination at the time the statement was made."
The Uniform Rules, like the Model Code, focused the attention of
the bench and bar on reform of the law of evidence. 116 It also set .the
stage for further codification efforts that culminated in the passage of the
Federal Rules two decades later. Uniform Rule 63(1), which opened the
door to the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements, now began to
be accepted by some jurisdictions.1 1 7 Of course, the dominant rule in the
United States still limited the use of such inconsistent statements to
impeachment purposes.
115 This view has been supported by modern decisional law. See infra note 119
and
accompanying text. In his classic reasoning for the adequacy of cross-examination at the
present trial, Morgan espoused:
The declarant as a witness is now under oath and now purports to
remember and narrate accurately. The adversary can now expose every
element that may carry a danger of misleading the trier of fact both in the
previous statement and in the present testimony, and the trier can judge
whether both the previous declaration and the present testimony are
reliable in whole or in part.
Morgan, supra note 4, at 192. Wigmore stated that when the declarant is present at trial
and available for cross-examination, "the whole purpose of the hearsay rule has been
already satisfied." 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 995.
116 Though the Uniform Rules met with limited success in most jurisdictions, the
general consensus was that they represented a significant step toward evidential reform.
See Chadbourn, supra note 113, at 5, 12; Jacobs, supra note 96, at 487; Levin, supra
note 67, at 6; McCormick, supra note 9, at 561-62.
117 Kansas and the Virgin Islands adopted the Uniform Rules verbatim. See KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to 60-470 (1983); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5 §§ 771-956 (1995). See
also Prefatory Note, 1974 HANDBOOK OF THE NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROC. 913, 951a. While California gave the Uniform Rules
serious study, it enacted its own evidence code in 1966. Id. at 913-14, 951a. New
Jersey, too, studied the Uniform Rules and adopted many of them. See REPORT OF THE
RULES OF EVIDENCE STUDY COMMISSION, reprinted in 90 N.J. L.J. 277, 282 (1967)
[hereinafter 1967 STUDY COMMISSION REPORT].
Utah adopted the Uniform Rules in
1971. New Jersey, California, and Utah adopted Uniform Rule 63(1) but required that
the statement be inconsistent. See CALIF. Ev. CODE § 1235 (West 1966); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:84A-63(1) West (1994); 9 UTAH CODE ANNO. U.R.E. 63(1) (West Supp.
1997).
118 See, e.g., Comer v. State, 257 S.W.2d 564, 564-65 (Ark. 1953) (failing to
admit,
for their truth, signed statements made during prosecuting attorney's investigation);
People v. Collins, 274 N.E.2d 77, 87 (Ill. 1971) (prohibiting substantive admissibility of
signed prior statement made to police officer); State v. Granberry, 491 S.W. 528, 531
(Mo. 1973) (prohibiting introduction of statement given to an investigator, attorneys, and
a police detective, deposition testimony in another case, and videotaped statements
implicating defendant). Another court acknowledged the minority view admitting prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence, but declined to adopt that view. See State
v. Ray, 249 So. 2d 540, 542-43 (La. 1971) (forbidding introduction of hearsay statement
made to police officer).
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,A significant shift in the momentum behind the substantive use of

prior inconsistent statements occurred when California enacted a
comprehensive evidence code in 1966.119 Section 1235 of the California
Evidence Code broadened the admissibility of prior inconsistent
2°
statements by providing for their receipt as substantive evidence.1
Other 2constituents of the common-law evidence model were altered as
well.1 ' The California Evidence Code, like both the Model Code and
119

Several courts followed the lead of California and abrogated the orthodox rule.

See 2 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 119 n.16; see also State v.
Skinner, 515 P.2d 880, 888 (Ariz. 1973) (admitting statements made by inmate
concerning discussions he had with defendant); Keys v. Delaware, 337 A.2d 18, 22
(Del. 1975) (holding that prior written statement would be admissible only if witness was
produced at trial and subject to direct examination by the prosecution); Jett v. Kentucky,
436 S.W.2d 788, 792 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969) (admitting statements made over the telephone
to county sheriff); Letendre v. Hartford Acc. & Ind. Co., 236 N.E.2d 467, 479 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1968) (admitting statements made to insurance agent); State v. Igoe, 206
N.W.2d 291, 293 (N.D. 1973) (admitting grand jury testimony that defendant had sold
marijuana to witness); Gelhaar v. Wisconsin, 163 N.W.2d 609, 614 (Wisc. 1969)
(admitting statements made by children to police officers).
120Section 1235 provided:
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS. Evidence of a statement made by a witness is
not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent
with his testimony at the hearing and is offered in compliance with Section
770.

CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 (West 1966). Section 770 requires that the witness be given an
opportunity to explain or deny the prior statement at some point during the trial. See id.
§ 770. The California Law Revision Commission stated:
Section 1235 admits inconsistent statements of witnesses because the
dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed to protect are largely
nonexistent. The declarant is in court and may be examined and crossexamined in regard to his statements and their subject matter. In many
cases, the inconsistent statement is more likely to be true than the
testimony of the witness at the trial because it was made nearer in time to
the matter to which it relates and is less likely to be influenced by the
controversy that gave rise to the litigation. The trier of fact has the
declarant before it and can observe his demeanor and the nature of his
testimony as he denies or tries to explain away the inconsistency. Hence,
it is in as good a position to determine the truth or falsity of the prior
statement as it is to determine the truth or falsity of the inconsistent
testimony given in court. Moreover, Section 1235 will provide a party
with desirable protection against the "turncoat"' witness who changes his
story on the stand and deprives the party calling him of evidence essential
to his case.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 cmt. (West 1966).
121 See CAUF. EVID. CODE § 780(h), providing:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, the court or jury may consider in
determining the credibility of a witness any matter that has any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of his testimony at the hearing,
including but not limited to any of the following... (h) A statement made
by him that is inconsistent with any part of his testimony at the hearing.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 780(h) (West 1966).
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Uniform Rules, abolished the voucher rule by providing that "the

credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by any party,
including the party calling him." 122 The California Evidence Code,
however, continued the common-law23 prohibition on the use of leading
questions during direct examination. 1
C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure32
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also influenced the debate on

the proper evidentiary use of prior inconsistent statements.

124

Created in

1938 and designed to simplify and streamline the trial of civil matters in
the federal courts, these rules had a significant effect on the law of
evidence. Initially, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
125 26 governed the
taking of depositions and their subsequent use at trial.
122 Id.
123
124

See id.
For a discussion concerning the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

to the Federal Rules, see 8A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2143, at 165 (1994); see also 1 McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE,
supra note 1, § 3, at 4-6. Professor Graham engaged in a thorough analysis of the
application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure on the Federal Rules. See generally Michael H. Graham, Examination of a
Party's Own Witness Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Promise Unfulfilled, 54
TEX. L. REV. 917 (1976).

125 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 provided in relevant part:
(D) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an

interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used against any party who
was present or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had due
notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(2) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking
the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent of a
public or private corporation, partnership, or association which is a
party may be used by an adverse party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: 1, that the
witness is dead; or 2, that the witness is at a greater distance than
100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United
States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or 3, that the witness
is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment, or 4, that the party offering the deposition has been
unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or 5,
upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances
exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due
regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses
orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26

1997]

PRESENTING AND CHALLENGING WITNESSES

429

Prior to these rules, the traditional voucher rule prohibited a party
from calling an adversary as a witness and introducing prior statements to
impeach or contradict his or her testimony. 126 Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(d)(1), however, permitted the introduction of depositions of
witnesses for impeachment purposes at trial. 127 Moreover, Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 26(d)(2) and (3) permitted a party to introduce the

deposition testimony of an adverse party or an unavailable witness for
128
any purpose.
These provisions remained unchanged until 1970 when the
discovery provisions were reorganized and amended. 2 9 Rules 26(d), (e)
and (f) were transferred to Rule 32, where they became subdivisions (a),
(b), and (c). 130 Amended Rule 32(a) made admissible depositions offered
126 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
127 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules, a number of states permitted parties to
depose their adversaries and introduce that deposition testimony for impeachment
purposes. See, e.g., Stidd v. Dietz, 192 N.E.2d 651, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 1963); Sun Cab
Co. v. Carter, 287 A.2d 73, 77 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Garafola v. Rosecliff Realty
Co., 24 N.J. Super. 28, 40, 93 A.2d 608, 614-15 (App. Div. 1952).
128 Courts found witnesses to be unavailable when they were: (1) dead; (2) more than
100 miles from the trial or hearing; (3) unable to testify because of age, sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; (4) not able to be procured by subpoena; or (5) subject to
exceptional circumstances. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(3).
26.01 (2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter MooRE's].
See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
Prior to the 1970 amendments, each of the discovery devices set forth in these rules was
separate and self-contained. In 1970, the Advisory Committee invited the Project for
Effective Justice at Columbia Law School to conduct a field survey on the existing
discovery rules. Though the Columbia Survey concluded that the rules of discovery
should not be fundamentally changed, it recommended a rearrangement of the rules to set
forth an introductory rule that would be generally applicable to all discovery.
130 As amended in 1970, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32, which concerned the use
of depositions in court proceedings, provided in pertinent part:
(A) USE OF DEPOSITIONS. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an
interlocutory proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as
admissible under the rules of evidence applied as though the witness were
then present and testifying, may be used against any party who was present
or represented at the taking of the deposition or who had reasonable notice
thereof, in accordance with any of the following provisions:
(1) Any deposition may be used by any party for the purpose of
contradicting or impeaching the testimony of deponent as a witness.
(2) The deposition of a party or of any one who at the time of taking
the deposition was an officer, director, or managing agent, or a
person designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf
of a public or private corporation, partnership, or association or
governmental agency which is a party may be used by an adverse
party for any purpose.
(3) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be
used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the
witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than
100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the United
States, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was
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at trial as though the witness were present and testifying. The purpose of
this amendment was to eliminate the possibility of technical hearsay

objections that could have been based on a deponent's absence from the
courtroom. In short, long before the enactment of evidence codes by the
Congress or state legislatures, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
permitted the substantive use of prior inconsistent statements by adverse
parties and permitted statements
to be used to impeach witnesses
3
regardless of who called them. 1 '

TV.
A.

THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Codification of the Federal Rules of Evidence

Efforts to codify the rules of evidence switched to the federal forum
in the 1960s.
In 1961, the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States convened 132a
Special Committee to consider the creation of uniform evidence rules.
In 1962, the Special Committee concluded that these rules should be
developed and in March 1965, an Advisory Committee on the Federal
procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the
witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, 'sickness,
infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party offering the
deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness
by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such
exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the
interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow
the deposition to be used.
131 Subdivision (c) of Rule 32 was deleted.
Under the common-law voucher rule a
party was prohibited from impeaching the credibility of his or her own witness. As
adopted in 1970, Rule 32(c) expressly provided that a party does not make a person his
own witness simply by taking his deposition. In effect, the rule permitted a party to
impeach a witness whose deposition he had previously taken. When Federal Rule 607
abolished the voucher rule, the Advisory Committee deleted subdivision (c) from the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because calling parties were now permitted to impeach
their own witnesses, the Advisory Committee recognized that the concept of "making a
person one's own witness" did not retain any vitality and became an unnecessary
statement. Some state courts, however, continue to hold that calling parties did not make
deponents their witnesses by taking their depositions. See, e.g., Thundereal Corp. v.
Sterling, 368 So. 2d 923, 929 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see also 3A WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 910, at 702.
132 See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 46 F.R.D. 161, 175-76 (1969) [hereinafter 1969
PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
Professor Edward Cleary served as the Reporter.
The
Committee's Preliminary Study of the Advisability and Feasibility of Developing Uniform
Rules of Evidence for the federal courts was distributed to the legal profession for
comment in 1962. The Committee requested submissions and suggestions no later than
January 1, 1963. See id. at 177.
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The Advisory Committee released its

proposed rules for comment in 1969.134

Many ideas initially expressed in the Model Code and later in the
Uniform Rules found their way into the 1969 Preliminary Draft on the
Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and
Magistrates (1969 Preliminary Draft). The 1969 Preliminary Draft
eliminated the voucher rule by permitting calling parties to impeach their
own witnesses. Rule 6-07 provided "[t]he credibility of a witness may
be attacked by any party, including the party calling him." 1 35 The
Advisory Committee recognized that the judicial decisions and evidence
codes that had either modified or rejected the voucher rule gave strong
to the view that it was an unworkable and unsound evidence
testament
136
tool.
133

See id. at 176, 178.

134 See id. at 161.

Based on comments received from the bar, the Advisory

Committee made changes and submitted a new draft to the Judicial Conference in October
1970. See 21 WRIGHT& GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5006, at 100-01.
135 1969 PREUIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 291.
136 See id. at 292; see also 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 905, at 677
n.14 (listing rules, judicial decisions, and evidence codes from different jurisdictions
regarding impeachment of calling parties' own witnesses by a prior self-contradiction).
Various jurisdictions implemented rules permitting calling parties to impeach witnesses
under certain circumstances. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 32(a) (allowing calling party to
impeach witness with deposition testimony); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 43(g)(11)[a] (1963)
(permitting calling party to impeach witness with prior inconsistent statement); KAN. Civ.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 60-420 (West 1965) (allowing plaintiff to cross-examine his own
witness regarding prior inconsistent statements); MD. R. R.C.P. CIR. CT. 413(a)(1)
(1963) (current version at MD. R. R.C.P. CIR. CT. 2-419(a)(1)) (permitting use of
deposition testimony by any party to contradict or impeach witness); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4514
(McKinney 1963) (admitting prior inconsistent statement made in subscribed writing or
under oath). Courts also endorsed the view that calling parties could impeach witnesses.
See, e.g., Hickory v. United States, 151 U.S. 303, 309 (1894) (allowing calling party to
refresh recollection with extrinsic evidence where the witness unexpectedly proves
hostile); United States v. Freeman, 302 F.2d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 1962) (rejecting voucher
rule); Lewis v. United States, 153 F.2d 724, 725-26 (8th Cir. 1946) (allowing prior
inconsistent statements to impeach an unfriendly and evasive witness); Swift & Co. v.
Short, 92 F. 567, 569-70 (8th Cir. 1899) (holding that calling party can impeach witness
with prior inconsistent statements upon showing deceit); Harvey v. Commonwealth, 229
S.W.2d 458, 460 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (allowing impeachment with prior inconsistent
statement made before grand jury). A number of states enacted legislation permitting the
use of prior inconsistent statements to impeach the calling party's witness. See, e.g.,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 785 (West 1966) (rejecting voucher rule); D.C. CODE ANN. §. 14-102
(1966) (allowing calling party to impeach credibility of witness with prior inconsistent
statements when "taken by surprise"); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 110, § 60 (West 1967)
(repealed 1981) (authorizing calling party to impeach witness with prior inconsistent
statement upon showing surprise); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223, § 23 (West 1959)
(repealed 1975) (allowing calling party to impeach witness with prior inconsistent
statement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-4 (Michie 1953) (repealed 1973) (allowing calling
party to introduce a prior inconsistent statement when witness proves adverse).
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The flexible standard giving judges control over the circumstances
under which a calling party could lead his or her witness, first proposed
in the Model Code, was adopted. 137 Yet, unlike the Model Code, the
1969 Preliminary Draft adhered to the common-law view that leading
questions generally were only appropriate during cross-examination
because their suggestive powers sometimes produced inaccurate and
misleading testimony. 138 Rule 6-11 of the 1969 Preliminary Draft

permitted judges flexibility to alter this general rule in civil cases when a
party was examining an adversary or a witness identified with one.
The 1969 Preliminary Draft, like the Model Code and Uniform
Rules, permitted the receipt of prior inconsistent statements not only to
impeach a witness but also for substantive purposes. The Advisory
Committee incorporated much of Uniform Rule 63(1) by making
admissible prior inconsistent statements of declarants who testified at trial
and were subject to cross-examination. 39 The Advisory Committee
137 See 1969 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 305.

Rule 6-11 provided:

(a) CONTROL BY JUDGE. The judge shall exercise reasonable control over
the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so
as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the
ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3)
protect witnesses from undue harassment or embarrassment....
(c) LEADING QUESTIONS. Leading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his
testimony. Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on crossexamination. In civil cases, a party is entitled to call an adverse party or
witness identified with him and interrogate by leading questions.
Id. at 302.
138 Traditionally, leading questions were prohibited on direct examination
because
their suggestive powers were undesirable. See supra notes 40-43, 78 and accompanying
text. The rule continued into the twentieth century. See Ewing v. United States, 135
F.2d 633, 639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (permitting leading questions on cross-examination);
Nobero Co. v. Ferro Trucking, Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 394, 404, 258 A.2d 713, 719 (App.
Div. 1969) (holding that leading questions are generally not allowed on direct
examination of calling parties' witnesses, although judge may permit such questions to
avoid confusion). Courts carved exceptions to the common-law rule when the witness
was adverse, uncooperative or could easily be swayed. See, e.g., Rotolo v. United
States, 404 F.2d 316, 317 (5th Cir. 1968) (permitting leading questions to female victim
who was reluctant, young and nervous); Green v. United States, 348 F.2d 340, 341
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (permitting leading questions where witness forgets certain events or is
ignorant or reluctant to testify); Feutralle v. United States, 209 F.2d 159, 162 (5th Cir.
1954) (permitting leading questions if witness became hostile or evasive); Antelope v.
United States, 185 F.2d 174, 175 (10th Cir. 1950) (permitting leading questions to young
and timid witness); Preston v. Denkins, 382 P.2d 686, 692-93 (Ariz. 1963) (permitting
leading questions where witness was elderly and in poor health).
139 See 1969 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 335-36.
The Uniform Rules
made prior statements one of its thirty-four exceptions to the hearsay rule. The 1969
Preliminary Draft excluded prior statements entirely from the hearsay category. Rule 801 (c)(2) of the Preliminary Draft provided:
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agreed with the Uniform Commissioners that cross-examination of
declarants at a trial or hearing regarding their prior inconsistent
The Advisory Committee
statements provided adequate safeguards.

specifically endorsed the view of the California Law
Commission that "inconsistent

(c)

HEARSAY.

statements

of witnesses

Revision

[should be

"Hearsay" is a statement, offered in evidence to prove the

truth of the matter asserted, unless...
PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with his testimony.

(2)

Id. at 331. The 1969 Preliminary Draft also permitted the receipt of several other types
of prior statements. For example, Rule 8-01(c)(2)(iv) excluded transcripts from the
hearsay rules, as well as testimony given under oath at a trial, hearing or a grand jury
proceeding. The Advisory Committee explained that the oath insures the reliability of the
statement, and the requirement that the testimony be transcribed insures its accuracy. See
1969 PREIIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 338-39.

Moreover, Rule 8-02 permitted

the introduction of prior statements, including affidavits, to the extent made admissible
under the Federal Rules of Civil or Criminal Procedure or by Act of Congress. See, e.g.,
10 U.S.C. § 7730 (1970) (actions for damages caused by vessel in naval service); 29
U.S.C. § 161(4) (1970) (proof of service in NLRB proceedings); 38 U.S.C. § 5206
(1970) (current version at 38 U.S.C. § 8506 (1988)) (proof of posting notice of sale of
unclaimed property by Veterans Administration); FED. R. Civ. P. 43(e) (motion based on
facts not appearing of record); FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment proceedings);
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (to show grounds for issuing warrants).
Subsection (a) to Rules 8-03 and 8-04 of the Preliminary Draft greatly broadened the
admissibility of hearsay statements by making admissible any hearsay statement as long
as "its nature and the special circumstances under which it was made offer strong
1969 PREUMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 345, 377.
assurances of accuracy."
Subsection (b) of Rules 8-03 and 8-04 "illustrated" examples of those types of hearsay
statements which the Advisory Committee blessed with assurances of accuracy. See id.
The provision specifically used the term illustrations, not exceptions, to avoid the
implication that they were exclusive. See id. at 379. Preliminary Draft Rule 8-03(b)
provided that "[bly way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following
are examples of statements conforming with the requirements of this rule." Id. at 377.
Professor Tribe praised this formulation of the hearsay rules. See Tribe, supra note 63,
at 974.
140 The Advisory Committee, however, departed from the language used in the
Uniform Rules, which required that the declarant be available for cross-examination.
Instead, it adopted the language used in the Model Code, which required that the
declarant testify and be subject to cross-examination. The Advisory Committee remarked
that the rule is based upon:
an unwillingness to countenance the general use of prior prepared
statements as substantive evidence, but with a recognition that particular
circumstances call for a contrary result. The judgment is one more of
experience than of logic. The rule requires in each instance, as a general
safeguard, that the declarant actually testify as a witness, and it then
enumerates four situations in which the statement is excepted from the
category of hearsay.
1969 PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 132, at 336.
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admitted] because the dangers against which the hearsay rule is designed
to protect are largely nonexistent." 141
The Advisory Committee received comments on its Preliminary
Draft, revised the Preliminary Draft and forwarded it to the United States
Supreme Court in 1971.142 The Court returned the proposed rules to the
Advisory Committee for further consideration later that year and this
Revised Draft of the Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and
Magistrates (Revised Draft) was then published. 143 The Revised Draft
left unchanged the rules governing impeachment of one's own witness
and the use of leading questions. 1 4 It now identified prior inconsistent
statements as "non-hearsay," and not excluded under the hearsay rules
145
because the declarant was testifying and subject to cross-examination."
The new definition, however, did not change the conditions under which
inconsistent statements made by a witness would be permitted in evidence
under the Revised Draft. 146
The United States Supreme Court approved the Revised Draft in
November 1972 and on February 5, 1973, the rules were transmitted to
Congress. 147
Congress, however, blocked implementation of the
proposed rules by legislation and they were further debated in the
Congress for almost two years. 148 Congress enacted the Federal Rules
into law on January 2, 1975, and they became effective six months

later. 149
141 Id. at 337 (quoting CAL. EVID. CODE § 1235 cmt. (West 1967)).
142 See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5006, at 101; see also REVISED
DRAFT OF PROPOSED

RULES OF

EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED

STATES COURTS

AND

MAGISTRATES, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971) [hereinafter 1971 REVISED DRAFT].
143

See 1971 REVISED DRAFT, supra note 142, at 316.

144 See id. at 388, 395.

145 See id. at 413, 415.
146 See id. at 413. Revised Rule 801(d)(1) provided:

(d) Statements Which Are Not Hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if
(1)

PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS.

The declarant testifies at the

trial or hearing and is subject to cross examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with his testimony..
Id. (emphasis added). The Revised Draft in some respects was more traditional than the

Preliminary Draft in its treatment of hearsay exceptions. Under the Revised Draft,
hearsay statements were admissible only if they fell within one of the recognized
exceptions set forth in Rules 803 or 804. There was no comparable provision in the
Revised Draft for hearsay statements made under special circumstances that offered

assurances of accuracy.
147

RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES, 56 F.R.D.

183 (1972) [hereinafter PROPOSED RULES].
148 See S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 5-6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7052 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
149 See Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
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Congress enacted Federal Rule 607, which permitted impeachment

of witnesses by all parties, in the exact same form as proposed by the
Supreme Court. Both the Supreme Court and the Congress endorsed the
flexible use of leading questions based on apparent adversity. There
were a few changes in Federal Rule 611(c), however, during
Congressional review of the Federal Rules.
When submitted to
Congress, Proposed Rule 611(c) provided that in civil cases leading
questions could be asked of adverse parties and those witnesses identified
with them.' 5 0
The House Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on Criminal
Justice (House Subcommittee) replaced the words "[i]n civil cases" with
the word "[w]hen" to permit a defendant in a criminal case to call a
witness identified with the government and to examine that witness with
leading questions.1 5 1 The full House Committee on the Judiciary (House
Committee) also amended the proposed rule to permit a calling party to
use leading questions in the case of a hostile witness-not only one who
was adverse or identified with such a party.152 As proposed by the
House Committee, Rule 611 (c) stated that:
Leading questions should not be used on the direct examination of a
witness except as may be necessary to develop his testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on crossexamination. When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party,
or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogationmay be by
leading questions.153

150 Proposed Rule 611 (c) provided:
LEADING QUESTIONS. Leading questions should not be used on the direct
examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop his
testimony.
Ordinarily leading questions should be permitted on crossexamination. In civil cases, a party is entitled to call an adverse party or
witness identified with him and interrogate by leading questions.
PROPOSED RULES, supra note 147, at 273 (emphasis added).
151 See Hearings on Federal Rules of Evidence H.R. 5463 Before
the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 53-54, 64-66 (1974) [hereinafter 1974 Senate
Hearings] (Letter from Hon. Roszel C. Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22,
1974)) ("the purpose of the amendment ... was to extend to a defendant in a criminal
case the right to ask leading questions of a witness called by him but identified with the
government."). For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history concerning the
use of leading questions, see generally WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, § 611, at
611-6, § 611[051, at 611-83. Under such circumstances, the witness was assumed not to
be predisposed to accepting suggestions by defense counsel. See, e.g., United States v.
Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 918-19 (6th Cir. 1972) (permitting defendant to ask leading
questions of informer).
152 See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 12 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075,
7086.
153 Id.; see also 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 62 (Letter from Hon.
Roszel C. Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22, 1974)).
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The Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Senate Committee)
questioned the necessity of this amendment because the Advisory
Committee's intent was to encompass hostile witnesses but acquiesced
during conference and the House Committee version was adopted.
While agreeing to abandon the voucher rule and tinkering with the
conditions under which leading questions were appropriate, however,
Congress hotly debated the substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements and significantly changed the Supreme Court's formulation of
Proposed Rule 801(d)(1). Law enforcement authorities had provided
strong support for the Supreme Court's formulation of Proposed Rule
801(d)(1). They believed it would help counteract the danger of witness
intimidation in criminal cases.' 55 It was argued in Congress that
witnesses who testified before grand juries in many instances were
subject to coercion and intimidation prior to trial. 156 Clearly there were
instances where witnesses recanted statements they previously had made
to grand juries and to law enforcement officials. Under the common-law
model, a witness's grand jury testimony or prior statement amounted to
inadmissible hearsay regardless of its probative value. Proposed Rule
801(d)(1) was designed to remedy this problem.'57
Beginning in February 1973, the House Subcommittee conducted
hearings on the rules of evidence as proposed by the Supreme Court.
The House Subcommittee ultimately recommended that substantive
admissibility of prior inconsistent statements be limited to those made
under oath and subject to penalty for perjury at a trial, hearing,
The revision largely
deposition, or during a grand jury proceeding.
154 See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 147, at 275-76.

In its commentary, the Advisory

Committee noted that leading questions could be posed to a hostile witness or a witness

who was unwilling or biased even though the witness was not associated with an adverse
party. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 63 (Letter from Hon. Roszel C.
Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22, 1974)) ("[tihe purpose of the further
to be to allow leading questions to be asked of any hostile

amendment was ...

witness.").
155 See 120 CONG. REC. 2383, 2385 (1974).
156

See id. Several cases demonstrate the weaknesses of the traditional rule when a

witness has been coerced to recant his or her prior statement. See, e.g., Ellis v. United
States, 138 F.2d 612, 619-21 (8th Cir. 1943) (holding inadmissible as substantive
evidence grand jury testimony that had strong probative value); Young v. United States,
97 F.2d 200, 206-07 (5th Cir. 1938) (holding inadmissible grand jury testimony that was
overwhelmingly truthful that defendant had murdered a federal investigator); People v.
Johnson, 441 P.2d 111, 120-21 (Cal. 1968) (holding inadmissible prior statements of
defendant's wife and daughter before a grand jury); State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898,

900-01 (Minn. 1939) (holding inadmissible prior inconsistent statement made to a
probation officer).
157 See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 147, at 293.
158 On

March

21,

1973,

Congressman William L.

Hungate, Chairman

of the

Subcommittee, introduced House Bill 5463. See generally SUPPLEMENT TO THE HEARINGS
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mirrored decisions in the Second Circuit, which had held prior testimony
19
under oath admissible though it was not subject to cross-examination.
The House Subcommittee version of Federal Rule 801(d)(1) permitted the
receipt of such statements if they were not consistent with the testimony

and were under oath and subject to the penalty of perjury at a hearing or
trial or in deposition or before a grand jury. The House Subcommittee
was concerned that the Supreme Court's formulation of Rule 801(d)(1)
would lead to the admission of untrustworthy evidence. 16

It believed its

ON THE RULES OF EVIDENCE BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OF THE

HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, 93rd Cong. (1973) [hereinafter 1973 SUPPLEMENT TO THE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS].

The Second Circuit rule made admissible prior inconsistent statements that were
given under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury. The rule was mostly applied
in criminal cases. See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 446 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir.
1971) (restricting the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence
to those made under oath in a formal proceeding, but not requiring that there have been
an opportunity for cross-examination); United States v. Insana, 423 F.2d 1165, 1169-70
(2d Cir. 1970) (admitting prior statements made before grand jury); United States v.
Mingoia, 424 F.2d 710, 713 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding admissible prior statements made
before a grand jury); United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929, 934 (2d Cir. 1964)
(allowing prior statement to be admitted as substantive evidence where given at a former
trial and before a grand jury).
160 From March 21 to June 22, 1973, the Subcommittee held 17 sessions
in which the
rules were reviewed and comments were received.
See 1973 SUPPLEMENT TO THE
JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 158, at 92-94 (Letter from Frederick D.
McDonald to Hon. William L. Hungate (May 22, 1973)). During these sessions, the
Subcommittee expressed concerns that the Supreme Court rule would authorize
convictions based solely on unsworn statements later repudiated by the declarant, the
reliability of statements made by untrustworthy declarants, and the possible falsification
or inaccuracies in transmission of the prior statement. See id. at 92-93.
McDonald
remarked:
Cases should be tried as much as possible on in court sworn testimony
where the witness is subject to cross-examination and observation by the
trier of fact, rather than upon out-of-court, unsworn, hearsay from
admittedly untrustworthy witnesses. Adoption of the proposed rule will
mean that no one will be safe from the skilled, aggressive statement taker,
from false, slanted statements, or from the interested, prejudiced, or
dishonest impeaching witness who remembers only what he wants to
remember.
Id. at 93. Others expressed concerns that defendants would be convicted on the basis of
unsworn evidence. See id. at 82 (Letter from Jean F. Dwyer to Hon. William L. Hungate
(May 11, 1973)) ("tlhe effect [of the Supreme Court formulation] is to make a
conviction, or the imposition of civil penalties, possible without direct evidence. If a
witness has made a false accusation, repented, and retracted it, the defendant could still
(unjustly) be convicted"); id. at 122, 125-29 (Letter from James F. Schaeffer to Hon.
William L. Hungate (June 22, 1973)) ("[ilt would allow a defendant to be tried and
convicted of the most serious offenses under circumstances that not a single witness took
the stand and testified under oath as to a single fact within the personal knowledge of the
witness which tended to connect the accused with the crime"). Schaeffer criticized the
Supreme Court's reasons for the broad admissibility of hearsay statements.
He
commented that hearsay dangers do exist even when the declarant is in court and subject
159
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rule would provide sufficient guarantees that the statement sought to be
admitted was actually made and that statements made under oath in a
prior formal proceeding provided greater assurances of reliability."'
The Subcommittee finalized its report and submitted it to the full
House Committee on October 10, 1973.162 The House Committee
largely reiterated its Subcommittee's version of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)
though it eliminated the substantive admissibility of grand jury testimony
and added the requirement that the prior statement have been subject to
cross-examination. 163 Federal Rule 801(d)(1) and (2) as reformulated by
the House Committee insured that:
to cross-examination because the right to cross-examine "means a right to timely and full
cross-examination, not a delayed and limited one." Id. at 129. He also commented that
prior statements made nearer in time to the matter to which it related are not necessarily
more accurate because "the statement may have been made as an off-hand remark, not
under oath, in a spirit of bragging, or venality ....

The lack of ability to cross-examine

at the time of the making of the alleged statements defeats any realistic attempt to test
these unknown factors." Id. at 128-29.
161 See 1973 SUPPLEMENT TO THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note
158, at 98 (Letter from Hon. Albert B. Mars to Herbert E. Hoffman (May 31, 1973))
("prior statements made under oath in legal proceedings are the hearsay statements which
would seem likely to be the most reliable and, therefore, most helpful to the fact finder");
id. at 98-99 (Letter from Edward W. Cleary to Herbert E. Hoffman (May 31, 1973))
("[i]f the witness has made a prior statement under oath, the threat of a perjury charge
makes it highly unlikely that he will subsequently relate a different story again under
oath"); see also Mark Reutlinger, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Presently Inconsistent
Doctrine, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 361, 363-64 (1975) (explaining that the witness is presently
under oath); John M. Stalmack, Prior Inconsistent Statements: Congress Takes a
Compromising Step Backward in Enacting Rule 801(d)()(A), 8 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 251,
258 (1977) (criticizing the widely believed assumptions underlying the oath that it insures
the statement was made with proper circumspection, and that it impresses upon the
declarant that he will subject himself to perjury if he does not tell the truth because the
oath does not still maintain the religious or ceremonial significance that it previously had).
162 The full committee debated H.R. 5463 on October 16 and 18 and amended
it on
November 6, 1973.
See H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 4 (1973), reprinted in 1974'
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7077-78.
163 The deletion of grand jury testimony and the requirement of cross-examination
were vigorously debated in Congress. See 120 CONG. REc. 2383-86. Congressman
Mayne proposed a rule identical to the Second Circuit formulation that made admissible
all prior inconsistent statements given under oath even if not subject to cross-examination,
which also included grand jury testimony. This proposal, he believed, would resolve
problems created by recanting or turncoat witnesses. In support of his proposal, Mayne
commented that the jury would have the opportunity to make use of the grand jury
testimony, but would not be compelled to accept it. See id. at 2385. Mayne explained:
The witness who now relates a different story about the events in question
must necessarily assume a position as to the truth value of his prior
statement, thus giving the jury a chance to observe and evaluate his
demeanor as he either disavows or qualifies his earlier statement. The jury
is alerted by the inconsistency in the stories, and its attention is sharply
focused on determining either that one of the stories reflects the truth or
that the witness is simply too lacking in credibility to warrant its believing
either story.
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(1) unlike in most other situations involving unsworn or oral
statements, [under this revision] there can be no dispute as to whether
the prior statement was made; and (2) the context of a formal
proceeding, an oath, and the opportunity for cross-examination
provide firm additional assurances of the reliability of the prior

statement. 164
The House Committee, like its Subcommittee, believed that special
circumstances of reliability were necessary to insure that the statements
alleged to be inconsistent with a witness's present testimony were
actually made.
The House of Representatives passed House Bill 5463 on February
6, 1974.165 The bill included the formulation of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)
proposed by the House Committee. The initiative on this legislation then
passed to the Senate.
The Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference and the
Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence (Joint Committee) appeared
before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Senate Committee) when it
considered House Bill 5463.166 The Joint Committee criticized the
reasoning of the House Committee, particularly its conclusion that the
rule's revision would insure that the prior inconsistent statement, in fact,

Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 160 (1970)). Mayne held the view that
the requirement of cross-examination at the time the declarant made the statement was
unnecessary when the declarant was present and subject to cross-examination. He stated
that "it is not amiss to permit the jury to make an affirmative use of the prior grand jury
testimony under this amendment, because the trial subjects the witness to full crossexamination about that earlier testimony." Id.
Congressman Wiggins concurred with Mayne's view because the declarant "can be
cross-examined with respect to all of the circumstances which prompted his change of
testimony." Id. But Congresswoman Holtzman disagreed with the Mayne proposal and
commented that "I think we must make sure that these statements are given under
circumstances that are similar to those at trial and subject to the safeguards of crossexamination." Id. Similarly, Congressman Dennis endorsed the requirement of crossexamination. Dennis stated that he did "not know to what extent we should have our
rules of law ... laid down or changed by criminals who threaten witnesses." Id. at
2386. Congressman Hogan proposed an amendment mirroring the Supreme Court
formulation that made admissible any hearsay statements made by a witness who is in
court and subject to cross-examination about the prior statement. See id. at 2386-87.
164 H.R. REP. No. 93-650, at 13 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7086-87.
The House believed that its rule guaranteed the reliability of the statement as well as
'neutralizeld] the effect of any influence, coercion, or deceit directed at the witness."
Graham, supra note 10, at 1577 n.38.
165 See generally H.R. REP. No. 93-650 (1973), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N.
7075.
166 See generally 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151.
Judge Thomsen served as
Chairman of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and Professor
Cleary served as the reporter to the Advisory Committee.
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had been made. 167 It noted that the House Committee must have assumed
that testimony given in the proceedings described would be recorded in a
written transcript and that the transcript would guarantee the statement's
Yet the rule as proposed did not require a written
reliability. 16
transcript and, at least at that time, testimony before federal grand juries
often was not recorded verbatim.1 69 Moreover, the Joint Committee

noted that many out-of-court statements, particularly confessions or
admissions, were not recorded in a written transcript but nevertheless
were admissible.17

The Joint Committee also complained that while a

formal proceeding, the oath and the opportunity for cross-examination do
provide "firm additional assurances of reliability," these guarantees were

167

Judge Thomsen stressed the unsoundness of the rule as proposed by the House

Committee. See id. at 54-56 (Letter from Hon. Roszel C. Thomsen to Hon. James 0.
Eastland (May 22, 1974)). In particular he criticized the House's "underlying assumption
that in the case of prior inconsistent statements some factor is present that requires an
extraordinary degree of assurance that the statement was in fact made." Id. at 66. He
noted that the House did not explain its reasoning underlying this assumption. See id.
168 See id. (Letter from Hon. Roszel C. Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22,
1974)) (criticizing the House Committee's underlying assumption that the prior
inconsistent statement "would take the form of a written transcript").
169 See id. (noting that the House Committee's version of the rule did not require a
written transcript and that "former testimony may be proved by the testimony of any
person who was present and heard it given"). Prior to 1979, recordation of grand jury
testimony was permissive but not mandatory.
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
For a
collection of cases discussing this rule, see United States v. Aloisio, 440 F.2d 705 (7th
Cir. 1971). A number of courts were of the view that recordation was the better practice.
See, e.g., United States v. Cramer, 447 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1971); Schlinsky v. United
States, 379 F.2d 735 (1st Cir. 1967). In 1979, recordation of all grand jury proceedings
became mandatory.
See FED. R. CRIM. 6(e)(1).
Rule 6(e)(1) provides that "all
proceedings, except when the grand jury is deliberating or voting shall be recorded
stenographically or by an electronic means device." United States v. Archer-Daniels
Midland Co., 785 F.2d 206, 212 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Venegas, 800 F.2d
868, 870 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178, 183 (6th Cir. 1982). The
Department of Justice Manual provides that:
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(1) requires that all grand jury
proceedings be recorded except when the grand jury is deliberating or
voting. Government attorneys should not have any conversations, even of
a casual nature, with grand jurors unless they are being recorded. The
recording, however, is not required to be transcribed and transcripts
should not be prepared unless there is a specific need for them. Reporters
and stenographers are bound by the secrecy requirements of Rule 6(e)(2).
It is important that they be made aware of that rule.
7 THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL § 9-11.243, at 9-271 (1992).
170 See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 66 (Letter from Hon. Roszel C.
Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22, 1974)) (commenting that admissions,
confessions, spontaneous utterances, statements for purposes of diagnosis or treatment,
declarations of pedigree, reputation, dying declarations, declarations against interest, and
former testimony are admissible without any requirement that they be in writing).
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redundant because a witness would be in court, under oath, and subject to
cross-examination in the ongoing trial or proceeding. 171
Representatives from the bar also testified before the Senate
Committee concerning the proposed Federal Rules. 172 The Washington

Council of Lawyers, for example, appeared before the Senate Committee
in support of the House version of Rule 801(d)(1).
This body
emphasized that statements made prior to trial might be inaccurately
related by others because memory lapses are not uncommon and people
have been shown to have selective memories. 1 73 It further recognized
that casual remarks could be ambiguous or even inaccurate when the
declarant was not speaking under circumstances that emphasized the need
for accurate recall and reporting. 174 Moreover, details that were omitted
171 Judge Thomsen criticized the House Committee's reasoning that the requirements
of a formal proceeding, an oath, and opportunity to cross-examine provide firm additional
assurances of reliability, explaining that:
As has been demonstrated previously, these assurances are already present
in full measure in the Rule as submitted by the Court. The amendment
distorts them by overemphasis; not one formal proceeding, but two; not
one oath, but two; not one cross-examination; but two.
These are
additional assurances beyond reason. Former testimony, as a hearsay
exception, requires only one of each. No other hearsay exception requires
any of them.
Id.
172 In April 1971, the Washington Council of Lawyers was organized as a professional
organization to represent lawyers' interests. See id. at 299. Herbert Semmel, speaking
on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers, listed four substantial dangers that can
arise when prior inconsistent statements are introduced into evidence:
(1) inaccurate repetition of oral statements made months or years before
the trial; (2) misleading statements subject to unintended interpretation
made when the witness had no appreciation for the necessity for accurate
reporting; (3) incomplete statements leading to unintended meaning, made
when the witness had no appreciation for the necessity of complete
reporting; and (4) inaccurate or unintended statements made by a witness
as a result of suggestion or coercion.
Id. at 302.
173

See id.

174

See id. Semmel stated:
The problems of inaccurate repetition, ambiguity and incompleteness of
out-of-court statements may be found in both written and oral statements,
although the problem is more acute in oral statements.
But written
statements are also subject to distortion. We are all familiar with the way a
skilled investigator, be he a lawyer, police officer, insurance claim agent,
or private detective, can listen to a potential witness and then prepare a
statement for signature by the witness which reflects the interest of the
investigator's client or agency. Adverse details are omitted; subtle changes
of emphasis are made. It is regrettable but true that some lawyers will
distort the truth to win a case and that some police officers will do the same
to "solve" a crime, particularly one which has aroused the public interest
or caused public controversy. Or the police officer may be seeking to put
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at the time of a casual statement could become critical at the trial, and

ambiguous statements, which later appear to contradict the witness's
testimony at trial, might have been made.' 75 Of course, out-of-court
statements made by7 6witnesses as a result of suggestion or coercion might
well be inaccurate.1
The Senate Committee ultimately disagreed with the House, and the
bill approved by the Senate recommended restoration of Proposed Rule
801(d)(I, which had been submitted to Congress by the Supreme
Court. 17 It deleted the requirement that a prior inconsistent statement be
given under oath, subject to cross-examination and under penalty of
perjury at a trial, proceeding, or a deposition.'7 8 The Senate Committee
away a "dangerous criminal" who the officer "knows" is guilty but against
whom evidence is lacking.

Id.
175

See 1974 Senate Hearings,supra note 151, at 302. Semmel stated:
Many seemingly inconsistent statements are the result of casual comments
made by persons who are unaware of the significance which may later be

attached to these remarks. The comment may be incomplete; details are
omitted which were unimportant to the declarant at the time but which may
be crucial at a trial. Language may be employed in a loose, ambiguous
An
manner which later appears contradictory to testimony at trial.
observation may be conclusory. Or the declarant may have indulged in the
very human tendency to subconsciously fill in the details where only a
portion of an observed event remains in the memory.
Id.
176 See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
177 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 148, at 15-16, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7062-63. Experts proffered a number of reasons why the House amendment should
reflect the rule submitted by the Supreme Court. See 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note
151, at 50-52 (testimony of Edward W. Cleary on June 4, 1974) (stating that "their effect
is for all practical purposes virtually to destroy the utility of the rule as a solution for the
problems it was designed to meet, such as fading memories, bribery, intimidation, and
other influences which cause witnesses to change their stories. "), id. at 109, 111-12
(prepared statement of W. Vincent Rakestraw) (stating that "by admitting prior statements
as affirmative proof, the law can prevent those miscarriages of justice that occur when
witnesses are intimidated or otherwise improperly influenced, or are motivated by malice
or spite, to repudiate their initial statements under circumstances enabling the jury to
discern the falsity of that repudiation"); id. at 64-66 (Letter from Hon. Roszel C.
Thomsen to Hon. James 0. Eastland (May 22, 1974)) (rejecting both the House and the
Supreme Court versions of the rule). Judge Thomsen cited several cases that demonstrate
the weaknesses of the traditional rule when a witness has been coerced to recant his or
herTrior statement. See id. at 64-65.
The limitation effectively restricted the substantive admissibility of prior
For decisions
inconsistent statements to those made during a judicial proceeding.
permitting the introduction of grand jury testimony, see United States v. Morgan, 555
F.2d 238, 242 (9th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193 (8th Cir.
1977). The court in United States v. Castro-Ayon held that "other proceedings"
encompassed immigration interrogations. United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055
Sworn statements made to law enforcement officers were not made
(9th Cir. 1976).
admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Micke, 859 F.2d 473, 477 (7th Cir. 1988); United
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believed that requiring a prior statement be subject to cross-examination

was "unnecessary

since

[the admissibility

of prior

inconsistent

statements] comes into play only when the witness testifies in the present
trial ... and can explain an earlier position and be cross-examined as to
both." 179 The Senate Committee also found unnecessary the requirement
that the statement be made under oath because the witness would be
under oath in the present proceeding.80
The disparate bills were reconciled in conference.
The
Conference claimed to have reconciled the different evidential viewpoints
regarding Federal Rule 801(d)(1) and to have adopted the Senate
amendment, but in reality the bill sent to the President overwhelmingly
reflected the views of the House of Representatives. 182
States v. Livingston, 661 F.2d 239, 242 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Martin v. United States, 528
F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1975).
179 SENATE REPORT, supra note 148, at 15-16, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
706263. The Senate Committee remarked that the only hearsay exception that required that
prior statements be made under oath is that for former testimony. See id.; see also 1974
Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 111 (prepared statement of W. Vincent Rakestraw
(June 5, 1974)) ("all prior inconsistent statements should be admissible for their truth and
not just for impeachment purposes, because the witness who made such statements is now
before the court and subject to cross-examination about them"). One author explained
the Senate Committee's views as follows:
The jury has sufficient demeanor evidence to judge the credibility of the
prior statement if the declarant was presently testifying in court. . . . The
committee felt that its rule was superior because the prior statements,
having been made closer in time to the events they describe, would have
been subject to less improper influence and would have been made when
the witness' memory was relatively fresh.
Graham, supra note 10, at 1578 n.41.
180 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 148, at 16, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7063.
The requirement that the statement be given under oath was intended to alleviate the
possibility of a conviction based solely on unsworn testimony. The Senate required that
the statement be given at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding to diminish the possibility
that it would be fabricated or involve errors in the transmission of its content. See Freda
F. Bein, Prior Inconsistent Statements: The Hearsay Rule, 801(d)(I)(A) and 803(24), 26
UCLA L. REv. 967, 977 n.56 (1979).
181 On December 11 and 12, 1974, the House and Senate met
to discuss their
respective versions of House Bill 5463. On December 14, 1974, they submitted House
Conference Report No. 93-1597.
182 Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) provided:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if (1) PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS. The declarant testifies at the
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the
statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with [the
declarant's] testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a
deposition ....
FED. R. EVID. 80i(d)(1)(A).
The most significant difference between the version
recommended by the House and the version finally adopted is that the final version
includes statements given at an "other proceeding."
While grand jury testimony is

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:399

As enacted, Federal Rule 801(d)(1) required special circumstances
of reliability so that a potential dispute over what a testifying witness had

actually said in the past essentially was eliminated as an issue for a
factfinder.18 3 In virtually all occasions, the prior statement also would
have been reduced to writing. Of course, both the present testimony and

the inconsistent statement would have been made under oath.

The

factfinder would not have to determine the content of the prior
statement.I14 Rather, the factfinder was to concentrate on the motivations

for what apparently were conflicting statements made under oath."8 5
Where such special circumstances of reliability were not present, the
prior inconsistent statements could be admitted only for impeachment
purposes subject to Federal Rules 607 and 613.
admissible under the rule, the precise scope of the term "other proceeding" is unclear.
See, e.g., United States v. Stockton, 788 F.2d 210, 219 n.14 (4th Cir. 1986) (admitting
grand jury testimony where witness recanted such testimony at trial); United States v.
Hemmer, 729 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1984) (admitting grand jury testimony that was
inconsistent with in-court testimony); United States v. Marchand, 564 F.2d 983, 997-99
(2d Cir. 1977) (admitting grand jury testimony that named defendant). In United States v.
Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1976), where sworn tape-recorded statements
given by aliens at a border patrol station were admitted, the court stated:
First, we note that Congress intended the term "other proceeding" to
extend beyond grand jury proceedings. If the conference committee had
intended to limit the reach of this rule to grand-jury proceedings, words
were at hand to do so; the choice of the open-ended term "other
proceedings" was intentional .... Second, we note that the immigration
proceeding before Agent Pearce bears many similarities to a grand-jury
proceeding: both are investigatory, ex parte, inquisitive, sworn, basically
prosecutorial, held before an officer other than the arresting officer,
recorded, and held in circumstances of some legal formality. Indeed, this
immigration proceeding provides more legal rights for the witnesses than
does a grand jury: the right to remain totally silent, the right to counsel,
and the right to have the interrogator inform the witness of these rights.
Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d at 1058.
183 See Graham, supra note 10, at 1582-83. Graham recognized that
"Congress chose
to limit substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements to situations in which the
likelihood of total fabrication was practically nonexistent and the risk of subtle influence,
coercion, or deception was significantly reduced." Id. at 1582.
184 See id. at 1591-92. Graham explained that the jury is called upon
to judge the
credibility of the witnesses:
The special problems of distortion through subtle wording variations,
complete omissions, fabricated additions followed by uncritical signing, or
subtle influence or appeal to the declarant's desire to please another person
are resolved by the jury after it has heard the problems explained by the incourt declarant and explored by the cross-examination of the person who
took the written statement.
The jury, consistent with its traditional
function, is assigned the tasks of judging the credibility of each witness and
of deciding what in fact occurred when the prior statement was allegedly
made.
1d.
185 See id.at 1592.
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Many States Have Enacted the Model for the Presentationof
Witnesses Created by the FederalRules of Evidence.

Unlike their predecessors, the Federal Rules have proven to be
enormously popular with the states. As of June 1, 1996, twenty-seven
states have adopted Federal Rule 607 verbatim.1 8 6 Nineteen states have
adopted Federal Rule 611 verbatim.' 87 Other states have adopted Federal
Rule 611 (c) without change.'8 8
Thirteen states have adopted Federal Rule 801(d)(1) verbatim. 18 9
Alaska's evidence rule omits "and subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement" and the oath requirement.190 Both Arizona
and Delaware have adopted the Supreme Court's formulation of Rule
801(d)(1)(A) as submitted to Congress, which allowed prior statements
not made under oath to be introduced.' 9 ' Florida and Oregon embraced
192
the principles of Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) without substantial change.
186 See ARIZ. R. EVID. 607; UNIF. R. EVID. 607 (ARK.); DEL. R. EVID. 607; HAW.
R.

EVID. 607; IDAHO R. EVID. 607; IOWA R. EVID. 607; Ky. R. EVID. 607; ME. R. EVID.
607; MINN. R. EVID. 607; Miss. R. EVID. 607; MONT. R. EVID. 607; NEB. REV. STAT. §
27-607 (1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 50.075 (1971); N.H. R. EVID. 607; N.M. R. EVID.
11-607; N.C. R. EVID. 607; N.D. R. EVID. 607; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 607 (West
1978); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-8 (Michie 1996); TENN. R. EVID. 607; TEx. R.
EVID. 607; UTAH R. EVID. 607; VT. R. EVID. 607; WASH. R. EVID. 607; W. VA. R.
EVID. 607; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 906.07 (West 1996); Wyo. R. EVID. 607.
187 Many states have adopted Federal Rule 611(c).
See ARK. R. EVID. 611 (c); COLD.
R. EVID. 611(c); DEL. R. EVID. 611(c); HAW. R. EVID. 611(c); MONT. R. EVID. 611(c);
N.H. R. EVID. 611(c); N.C. R. EVID. 611(c); N.D. R. EVID. 611(c); OHIO R. EVID.
611(c); OR. EVID. CODE § 611(3); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-14-20 (Michie 1995); UTAH
R. EVID. 611 (c); VT. R. EVID. 611(c); WASH. R. EVID. 611(c); WYo. R. EVID. 611(c).
188 See FLA. EVID. CODE 90.612; IOWA R. EVID. 611(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27611(c) (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 611 (West 1978). New Jersey Rule of

Evidence 611 (c) follows Federal Rule of Evidence 611 (c) almost verbatim. See infra note
301 and accompanying text.
189 See ALA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); IDAHO R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A);
IOWA R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); ME. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(A); MINN. STAT. ANN. EVID. R. 801(d)(1)(A);
MISS. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-801(4)(a)(i) (1975); N.H. R. EVID.
801(d)(1)(A); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 280(1)(D)(1)(A) (West 1991); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 19-16-2 (Michie 1995); TEx. R. EVID. 801(e)(1)(A); VT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A);
WASH. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(i); W. VA. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
190 See ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); Van Hatten v. State, 666 P.2d 1047, 1049-54

(Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (holding tape-recording of grand jury testimony substantively
admissible where witnesses were evasive and unable to remember at trial).
191 See ARIz. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); see also State v. AUred, 655 P.2d 1326, 1329-30
(Ariz. 1982) (admitting out-of-court statements made to investigator in child abuse case);
Colorado and Montana also omitted the oath
DEL. UNIFORM R. EVID. 801(d)(1).
requirement. See COLO. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A); see also
State v. Bell, 731 P.2d 336, 339 (Mont. 1987) (admitting prior statement made to police
officer as substantive evidence). Nevada adopted the Preliminary Draft version of the
rule. See NEv. REv. STAT. tit. 4, § 51.035(2)(a) (1971).
192 See FLA. STAT. ANN. EVID. CODE § 90.801(2)(a); OR. EVID. R. 801(4)(a)(A); see
also Kirkland v. State, 509 So. 2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 1987) (holding that police
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New Jersey and Hawaii subject prior inconsistent statements to special
Michigan and North Carolina have
circumstances of reliability.19 3
eliminated subdivision (d)(1) of Federal Rule 801 so that prior
inconsistent statements would not be given substantive effect. 194
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEW JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE
A.

The Common-Law Model for Presenting Witnesses

New Jersey embraced the common-law model for the presentation of
witnesses from the outset. For example, New Jersey courts applied the
voucher rule to prohibit calling parties from impeaching the credibility of

their own witnesses in 1790.
permitted during direct examination.

Leading questions, too, were not
196

In fact, this rule was reduced to

investigation was not an "other proceeding" under the statute); State v. Delgado-Santos,
497 So. 2d 1199, 1199 (Fla. 1986) (holding that prior inconsistent statement produced at
police interrogation were not "another proceeding").
193 For a discussion of New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(a)(1) concerning the
substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent statements, see infra note 287 and
accompanying text. Hawaii admits prior inconsistent statements made by witnesses who
testify at the trial or hearing as long as such statements were:
(A) Given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding, or in a deposition; or (B) Reduced to writing and signed
or otherwise adopted or approved by the declarant; or (C) Recorded in
substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other means contemporaneously with the making of the statement.
HAW. R. EVID. 802.1(1).
194 Michigan does not give prior inconsistent statements substantive effect. See MICH.
R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(a). North Carolina deleted subdivision (d)(1) from its Rules of
Evidence. See N.C. R. EVID. 801(d)(1). North Carolina courts have held that prior
inconsistent statements are admissible only for impeachment purposes. See, e.g., State v.
Minter, 432 S.E.2d 146, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (holding grand jury testimony
admissible for impeachment purposes but not as substantive evidence).
195 See Beake's Ex'rs v. Birdsall, 1 N.J.L. 15, 16-17 (1790) (citing Adams v. Arnold,
12 Mod. 376 (1700)) (acknowledging the longstanding doctrine that calling parties could
not discredit their own witnesses). The voucher rule persisted into the early twentieth
century. See Ingersoll v. English Ex'r, 66 N.J.L. 463, 465, 49 A. 737, 738 (1901)
(holding that calling parties could not impeach the character of their own witnesses);
Brown v. Bulkley, 14 N.J. Eq. 294, 301-02 (1862) (prohibiting calling parties from
impeaching the character of their own witnesses). By the early twentieth century, while
many states permitted calling parties to introduce prior inconsistent statements to refresh a
witness's recollection or to impeach his or her credibility in the case of surprise, New
Jersey courts declined to carve such exceptions in the traditional voucher rule. See supra
note 32 and accompanying text.
196 Until 1991, New Jersey's evidence rules did not even address the use of leading
questions. Under New Jersey decisional law, though, trial courts permitted leading
questions on direct examination if the judge deemed it necessary "to avoid confusion, to
clarify testimony, or otherwise to bring out the truth .

.

. ."

Nobero Co. v. Ferro

Trucking Inc., 107 N.J. Super. 394, 404, 258 A.2d 713, 719 (App. Div. 1969); see also
Williams v. Guerreri, 136 N.J.L. 60, 61, 54 A.2d 198, 199 (1947); State v. Fuersten,
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legislation in 1900.
New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 2A:81-11
specifically provides that "except as otherwise provided by law, when
any party is called as a witness by the adverse party he shall be subject to
the same rules as to examination and cross-examination as other
witnesses." 197 Prior inconsistent statements generally could not be
introduced by calling parties either.198 But New Jersey did begin
permitting the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for the limited
purpose of "neutralizing" witness testimony upon the demonstration of
surprise. 199 Neutralization under New Jersey law differed from full
103 N.J.L. 383, 390, 135 A. 894, 897 (E. & A. 1927); Leonard v. Standard Aero Corp.,
95 N.J.L. 235, 236, 112 A. 252, 252 (E. & A. 1920); Finkelstein v. Geismar, 91 N.J.L.
46, 50, 106 A. 209, 210 (1917), aff'd, 92 N.J.L. 251, 106 A. 209 (E. & A. 1918);
Luckenbach v. Sciple, 72 N.J.L. 476, 478, 63 A. 244, 245 (E. & A. 1906); Trenton
Passenger Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 60 N.J.L. 219, 223, 37 A. 730, 732 (E. & A. 1897);
Chambers v. Hunt, 22 N.J.L. 552, 562 (E. & A. 1849). For additional New Jersey cases
discussing the use of leading questions, see 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §
770 at 160.
197 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:81-11 (West 1994). The statute prohibited
parties from
asking leading questions to an adverse party whom they called to the stand, but permitted
leading questions on cross-examination. See Thomas E. Lenahan, Jr., Consequences of
Calling an Adverse Party as a Witness, N. J. LAW., Feb. 1986, at 13-15. It was within
the trial court's discretion to permit parties to use leading questions to interrogate adverse
witnesses whom they called to the stand. See Stern, supra note 48, at 70-71. The author
noted that "the principal disadvantage of calling the adverse party as your witness is that
it permits your adversary to cross-examine and lead the client.
However, crossexamination, like direct examination, is left to the court's sound discretion." Id.
198 Calling parties were limited to introducing prior inconsistent statements to show a
contradiction with in-court testimony. See, e.g., State v. Saccone, 7 N.J. Super. 263,
267-68, 72 A.2d 923, 925 (App. Div. 1950); Alexander v. Marech, 13 N.J. Misc. 425,
426, 178 A. 278, 278 (1935), aff'd, 116 N.J.L. 246, 183 A. 459 (E. & A. 1936);
Rhodehouse v. Director General, 95 N.J.L. 355, 361, 111 A. 662, 665 (E. & A. 1920).
Non-calling parties, on the other hand, were permitted to introduce prior statements for
impeachment purposes. See, e.g., State v. Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 438, 337 A.2d
374, 377 (App. Div. 1975); State v. Salimone, 19 N.J. Super. 600, 608-09, 89 A.2d 56,
60-61 (App. Div. 1952). This rule, though, had been subject to criticism because it was
thought that jurors might afford such statements substantive value. See REPORT OF THE
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE 61, 62-63 (1963) [hereinafter
1963 REPORT].
199 The general doctrine of neutralization has been summed up as follows:
While the rule is well settled that a party who offers a witness will not be
permitted afterwards to impeach his character for truth and veracity, or to
impugn his credibility by general evidence tending to show him to be
unworthy of belief, yet it is equally well established that the party will not
be precluded from proving the truth of any particular fact, by any other
competent testimony, in direct contradiction to what such a witness may
have testified.
Ingersoll v. English, 66 N.J.L. 463, 465, 49 A. 737, 738 (1901). Neutralization has
been defined as "the erasure or cancellation of unexpected harmful testimony." State v.
Gallicchio, 44 N.J. 540, 545, 210 A.2d 409, 412 (1965). Its purpose is to restore the
status prevailing before the witness testifies and to essentially remove the in-court
testimony from the case. See State v. Smith, 55 N.J. 476, 486-87, 262 A.2d 868, 873

448

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:399

fledged impeachment forbidden by the voucher rule in that "[t]he rule

against impeachment denies the right to impeach the general reputation of
that the whole
the witness for truth, but does not deny the right to show
200
or any part of the testimony of the witness is untrue."
New Jersey was one of the first states to consider the revision and
codification of its evidence rules in the wake of publication of the
On October 7, 1954, the New Jersey
Uniform Rules in 1953.201
(1970); State v. Caccavale, 58 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 157 A.2d 21, 28 (App. Div.
1959). It also serves to "wipe the slate clean." See State v. Hogan, 137 N.J.L. 497,
501-02, 61 A.2d 70, 73, affid, 1 N.J. 375, 63 A.2d 886 (1949). For a lengthy discussion
regarding neutralization, see State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 558-62, 92 A.2d 786, 799800 (1952).
For a collection of United States cases that permitted calling parties to
neutralize witnesses' testimony, see Annotation, Proper Practice and Relief on
Development of Hostility by Parties Own Wtness, 117 A.L.R. 326 (1938) and
Annotation, Right of Party Surprised by Unfavorable Testimony of Own Witness to Ask
Him Concerning Previous Inconsistent Statements, 74 A.L.R. 1042 (1931).
Like its English antecedents, New Jersey law required a calling party to establish
"surprise" before being permitted to introduce the "neutralizing" statements. See, e.g.,
State v. D'Adame, 84 N.J.L. 386, 395-96, 86 A. 414, 417 (E. & A. 1913). In D'Adame,
the court held admissible prior contradictory statements to neutralize the witness's
testimony in the event of surprise:
The state, having been thus surprised into offering evidence, the effect of
which was exactly contrary to what it was endeavoring to prove, viz., the
guilt of the defendant, had the right, if it could do so, to neutralize the
effect of such evidence by proving the [prior] self-contradictory statements
of the witness ....
Id. at 395, 86 A. at 417. See State v. Bassone, 109 N.J.L. 176, 181, 160 A. 391, 393-94
(E. & A. 1932) (affirming trial court's decision to permit prior inconsistent statements to
neutralize a witness's testimony on direct examination where surprise was established);
State v. MacRorie, 86 N.J.L. 401, 403-04, 92 A. 578, 579 (1914) (disallowing the
admittance of prior self-contradictory statements where examiner was not surprised by the
witness's testimony); State v. Johnson, 73 N.J.L. 199, 201, 63 A. 12, 13 (1906)
(permitting the use of prior inconsistent statements to neutralize a witness's testimony
where trial judge found surprise); see also 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §
902, at 669; Ladd, supra note 103, at 530; cf. State v. Perillo, 18 N.J. Super. 549, 551,
87 A.2d 727, 728 (App. Div. 1952) (finding reversible error where statements were
admitted under guise of neutralization); Ciardella v. Parker, 10 N.J. Super. 537, 543, 77
A.2d 496, 498 (App. Div. 1950) (holding no basis for neutralization where witness fails
to recollect); State v. Kwiatkowski, 83 N.J.L. 650, 653-54, 85 A. 209, 210-11 (E. & A.
1912) (admitting prior testimony but only to refresh memory). For a comparison of the
New Jersey and federal rules, see United States v. Michener, 152 F.2d 880, 883 nn. 3-4
(3d Cir. 1945).

200 See Buchanan v. Buchanan, 73 N.J. Eq. 544, 546, 68 A. 780, 781 (1908); see also

Lenz v. Public Serv. Ry. Co., 98 N.J.L 849, 851, 121 A. 741, 742 (E.& A. 1923); Fox

v. Forty-Four Cigar Co., 90 N.J.L 483, 487-88, 101 A. 184, 186 (E. & A. 1917). The
Fox court permitted introduction of a written statement, not to attack a witness's general
reputation for truth and veracity, but rather only to contradict the witness's present
testimony. See id. at 488, 101 A. at 186. See generally 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE,
sura note 2, §§ 902-05, at 668-93; 58 AM. JUR. Witnesses § 799 (1948).
See 83 N.J. L.J. 284, 284 (1960). The author stated that New Jersey was "the
first state to take action on the tireless labors begun by Dean Wigmore, and then carried
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Supreme Court appointed a Committee on the Revision of the Law of
Evidence (Court Committee) to study and recommend revisions to New
Jersey's law of evidence. 2
The Court Committee used the Uniform
Rules as the model for its recommendations, and in May 1955, the Court
Committee approved the text of the Uniform Rules with only minor
changes .203
Uniform Rule 20, which permitted calling parties to impeach their
own witnesses, was essentially adopted by the Court Committee. 2 04 The
Court Committee reiterated the views of the ALl and Uniform
Commissioners that one need not vouch for witnesses because "a party
has very little to say concerning who his witnesses may be, and for the
most ..
part, they
may,, 205be total strangers, except of course, expert and
..
character witnesses.
Finally, the Court Committee opted to make
prior hearsay statements admissible as substantive evidence regardless of
whether they were inconsistent with the declarant's in-court testimony 2so6
long as the witness was present and available for cross-examination. 0
forward by Edmund M. Morgan and John M. Maguire, by the American Law Institute
with its Model Code, and by the National Conference with its Proposed Uniform Rules,
upon which New Jersey's Act is built." Id. It was clear that New Jersey's evidence rules
were in need of reform. See Editorial, The Model Code of Evidence, 75 N.J. L.J. 4

(1952).

See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE,
TO THE

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY iii (1955) [hereinafter JACOBS REPORT]. Justice Nathan
L. Jacobs chaired the Committee, which was comprised of a distinguished panel of
judges, practicing lawyers and professors including Alfred C. Clapp and Joseph
Weintraub. See id. It was the first detailed study in New Jersey on a revision to the Law
of Evidence. See 83 N.J. L.J. at 284.
203 See JACOBS REPORT, supra note 202, at x. The Court Committee recognized
that

the Uniform Rules coincided to a great extent with existing New Jersey law. See id. at
ix-x. In fact, the Uniform Rules had been cited with general approval by numerous New
Jersey courts. See, e.g., Stanley Co. of Am. v. Hercules, 16 N.J. 295, 306, 108 A.2d
616, 621 (1954); State v. Doto, 16 N.J. 397, 405, 109 A.2d 9, 13 (1954); State v.
Roscus, 16 N.J. 415, 422, 109 A.2d 1, 5 (1954); Miller v. Transp. Oil Co., 33 N.J.
Super. 53, 58, 109 A.2d 427, 429-30 (App. Div. 1954), affid, 18 N.J. 407, 113 A.2d 777
(1955). Still, New Jersey's legal profession was not easily inclined to abandon its
familiar tools and ultimately resisted the Court Committee's proposed rules.
See
generally Charles E. Clark, Foreword, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 479 (1956).
See JACOBS REPORT, supra note 202, at 39-42.
205See id.at 42. The Court Committee referred to the discussion on impeachment of
one's witness in Wigmore's treatise, where Wigmore favored complete abolition of the
voucher rule and characterized it as "a primitive notion." Id. at 41-42 (quoting 3A
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 896, at 659). The Court Committee recognized
other leading authorities that criticized the voucher rule. See Ladd, supra note 2, at 8586 (noting the false premises underlying the voucher rule); id. at 531 (remarking that the
rule should not surprise the New Jersey Bar because "it was the unanimous view of all
persons working on the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules, that a rule
preventing a party from impeaching his own witness should be completely abolished.").
206 See JACOBS REPORT, supra note 202, at 118-19. Rule 63(1) provided in pertinent
part, that:
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The Court Committee believed that such statements were highly probative
and necessary evidence.20 7
In October 1955, the New Jersey Legislature intervened in the rule-

making process by creating a Commission (Legislative Commission) to
improve and revise the proposed evidence rules. 208 The Legislative
Commission believed that the New Jersey Constitution vested the
Legislature, not the Supreme Court, with authority over the law of
evidence.20 9

Evidence of a statement ...offered to prove the truth of the matter stated
is hearsay evidence and inadmissible except: A statement previously made
by a person who is present at the hearing and available for cross
examination with respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided
the statement would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as
a witness.
Id. The Court Committee expressly rejected the policy behind Model Code Rule 503(a),
which admitted all hearsay statements made by an unavailable declarant. The Court
Committee stated that "the shift in Rule 63 is from the emphasis placed on the
unavailability of the declarant in Rule 503(a) of the Model Code to the circumstances
under which the statement was made. In most cases these circumstances generate an
equivalent of some sort (traditionally and euphemistically called 'a guarantee of
credibility') of cross-examination." Id. at 119.
207 See id. at 119-20. The Court Committee expressed concern that "the
State [may
be] left without evidence because of 'lapse-of-memory' of its witnesses due to fear of
reprisals, vengeance, etc. of their criminal associates." Id. at 120. The Court Committee
advanced the view held by many legal scholars that hearsay statements could be tested for
truth and accuracy at the present trial or hearing because the declarant is under oath and
available for cross-examination. See 2 McCORICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251,
at 118-19; 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 1018, at 996.
See JACOBS REPORT, supra note 202, at 122 (admitting "[aiffidavits to the extent
admissible by the statutes of this [state]"). The Court Committee noted that because
affidavits are hearsay, adoption of the rule was pro forma. See id. This rule mirrored
Uniform Rule 63(2). See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing the
admissibility of affidavits under the Uniform Rules).
208 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE LAW OF

EVIDENCE, INCLUDING UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE PROPOSED BY IT TO THE SENATE AND
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 1 (1956) [hereinafter BIGELOW
REPORT].
2D9 See BIGELOW REPORT, supra note 208, at 3, 11-12. The New Jersey Legislature

created the Legislative Commission through a resolution entitled "A Joint Resolution
establishing a commission to study the improvement of the Law of Evidence in this
state." Id. at 1. For a comprehensive discussion concerning the separation of powers,
see id.at 3-12. The Legislative Commission, headed by John 0. Bigelow, sought to draft
a set of evidence rules to be enacted by statute because "some provisions or parts of rules
would be of a legislative nature and others might be of a procedural nature, making it
realistically impossible to separate them effectively and safely."
See 1967 STUDY
COMMISSION REPORT, infra note 225, at 2.

The Legislative Commission concluded that

the power over the law of evidence is vested in the Legislature. See BIGELOW REPORT,
supra note 208, at 3, 11-12. It expressed its view that "unless there is an express
restriction on the grant of legislative power, or an exclusive grant of a portion thereof to
another branch of the government, the continued right of the Senate and General
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The Legislative Commission praised the proposals made by the
Court Committee but made several changes for the sake of clarity and
brevity .2
The Legislative Commission decided not to propose an
evidence rule that would permit the receipt of any out-of-court statement
by an available witness. 2 1
Rather, it returned to the language of
Assembly to exercise their historic legislative power over the law of evidence cannot be
denied." Id. at 4.
210 See BIGELow REPORT, supra note 208, at 1-3.
The Legislative Commission
recommended changes in only 17 of the 104 rules and sub-rules proposed by the Court
Committee. See id. at 2. In particular, the Legislative Commission stated:
Each rule contained in that report was assumed prima facie to be sound in
principle and to be expressed in apt phraseology. We do not recommend
change in any of the rules except for what seem to us substantial reasons.
The bases for this attitude of deference are obvious, but we may mention
especially two of them:
The Model Code of Evidence which is the
foundation of the Uniform Rules was the work of the principal American
authorities on the law of evidence; the Model Code itself, and the
accompanying notes, are proof of the care, skill and wisdom of which the
Code is the product. To that we add our admiration for the members of
the Court Committee, our confidence in them and especially their
chairman, Mr. Justice Nathan L. Jacobs.
Id. at 2-3. The Legislative Commission recommended adoption of the Uniform Rules with
additional modifications that would bring them more closely in line with existing New
Jersey law. See id. at 2. In general, it sought to retain or even increase the discretionary
power of the trial judge, but recognized that "[a] danger of codification is rigidity and a
narrowing of the field of discretion, and we have sought to reduce or eliminate that risk."
Id. at 3.
211 See id. at 54.
Rule 63(1) of the Bigelow Report provided an exception for
recorded recollections:
Recorded Recollection.
A written statement of what was perceived by the witness is admissible if
the judge finds that the witness wrote or signed the statement, or put some
distinctive symbol thereon, or caused the written statement to be made, as
an accurate record of what he perceived, at the time of the occurrence or
shortly thereafter and while the recollection of the witness was still clear .
Id. The Legislative Commission rejected the Court Committee's proposed rule that
admitted prior statements made by declarants who were present and available for crossexamination.
See id. at 54-55.
It drastically limited the admissibility of hearsay
statements to those made in writing at or about the time of the occurrence. See id. The
Legislative Commission was concerned that unreliable hearsay statements would be
admissible under the Court Committee rule. It claimed that by making admissible any
" previous" statement, the Court Committee rule would include statements made "some
time, even long after, the event, even those made during the course of trial." REPORT OF
THE PROJECT COMMTTEE ON PROPOSED RuLES OF EVIDENCE, Essex County Bar
Foundation, 1, 30 (1963) [hereinafter EssEx COUNTY BAR FOUNDATION REPORT].
It
believed that its "recorded recollection rule," which required the statement to have been
made at the time of the occurrence or shortly thereafter would ensure its reliability
because the witness's recollection would have been clear. See id. at 31. Moreover, the
requirement that the statement be in writing guaranteed even greater reliability that the
statement was made. See id. The Legislative Commission also expanded the hearsay
exception concerning affidavits to include answers to interrogatories.
Rule 63(2)

452

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:399

Uniform Rule 20, which permitted parties to impair the credibility of
witnesses 122 Yet, in a subsequent rule, Rule 21(2), the Legislative
Commission eviscerated the broad impeachment rule it endorsed by
allowing calling parties only to neutralize
the in-court testimony of their
2 13
witnesses in the event of surprise.
B.

New Jersey's Adoption of an Evidence Code in 1967

Evidence reform in New Jersey waited almost another decade before
the New Jersey Supreme Court and the Legislature sorted out their
respective responsibilities under the New Jersey Constitution. The first
codification of New Jersey's evidence rules occurred in June 1960 with
the enactment of the Evidence Act. 21 4 The Evidence Act codified
sections of the Uniform Rules, which dealt with definitions and the scope
of the proposed rules of evidence. It also revised sections of the Uniform
Rules dealing with privileges. 215 The Evidence Act then established a
mechanism through which the remaining rules of evidence would be
provided that "subject to Rule 64, affidavits, and answers to interrogatories, to the extent
admissible by the statutes of this state or by rules of court, shall be admitted." Id. at 55.
212 See BIGELow REPORT, supra note 208, at 25.
The Legislative Commission
permitted any party to introduce any evidence to support or impair the credibility of
witnesses. It extended credibility to all matters relating to the accuracy of the testimony
such as opportunity to observe, ability to remember and relate what transpired. See id.
213 See id.
Rule 21(2) provided that "[a] party shall not... seek to impair the
credibility of the witness after he has examined him at the trial on any of the issues in the
action, but this shall not prevent the neutralizing of his testimony in case of surprise." Id.
The Legislative Commission also limited the ability of calling parties to impair the
credibility of their own witnesses by prohibiting them from attacking their credibility after
testimony had been given. The Legislative Commission believed that this would lead to
an unfair advantage because calling parties could listen to testimony and then, if the
testimony proved unfavorable, the calling party could attack the witness's credibility. On
the other hand, if the testimony were favorable, the calling party could leave the witness
unchallenged. See id. at 26. Members of the Legislative Commission voiced three
reasons for their objection to complete abolition of the voucher rule. See 1963 REPORT,
supra note 198, at 61-63. First, they feared that impeachment would coerce witnesses to
perjure themselves, and that some witnesses would testify falsely to avoid such
impeachment. See id. at 61. Second, it believed that calling parties should not be able to
attack a witness' credibility after testimony had been given because the calling party
would be able to hear the testimony and then attack the witness's credibility if it were
unfavorable. See id. at 61-62. Third, it was concerned that prior inconsistent statements
that were introduced for impeachment purposes would be considered by the jury as
substantive evidence. See id. at 62-63.
Several leading authorities addressed these
concerns. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, ProprietorshipOver Deponents, 68 HARV. L.
REv. 600, 617-24 (1955); Ladd, supra note 2, at 86-88; McCormick, supra note 82, at
536-37.
214 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-1 to 49 (West 1960).
A bill was introduced in
1957, which contained the Legislative Commission proposal. See 1963 REPORT, supra
note 198, at 2.
That bill was not enacted and no further action was taken for
approximately three years. See id.
5 See 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at
2.
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proposed by the New Jersey Supreme Court, presented and discussed at a
Judicial Conference, and then filed with both Houses and the
216
Governor.
They would become effective if not objected to2 17through a
resolution passed by both Houses and signed by the Governor.
Shortly thereafter, in October 1960, the New Jersey Supreme Court
established the Committee on the Revision of Rules of Evidence (the
Official Committee). 2 18 The New Jersey Supreme Court charged the
Official Committee with reexamining the Uniform Rules in light of the
revisions previously proposed by the Court Committee and the
Legislative Commission.
In March 1963, the Official Committee
submitted
a
final
set
of
evidence
rules to the the New Jersey Supreme
2 20
Court.

The Official Committee, like so many other study committees,
completely abandoned the voucher rule. Thus, all parties would be able
to impeach their witnesses:
[F]or the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a
witness, any party including the party calling him may examine him

216 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-33 to 39 (West 1960).
217 See id.

218 See 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at 3. Professor Alexander D. Brooks served as
the Reporter. The Official Committee was charged with recommending a final set of
evidence rules for promulgation by the Supreme Court. See id. The Official Committee
sought to "(a) explain the function of each rule, (b) analyze the merits of the proposed
rules, and (c) suggest the treatment of problems likely to arise under them." Id.
219 See id. Members of the bar submitted comments.
For example, in 1962, the
Essex County Bar Foundation Committee on the Rules of Evidence studied the various
proposals that had been advanced by the Court Committee and the Legislative
Commission.

See generally EssEx COUNTY BAR FOUNDATION REPORT, supra note 211.

The Bar Committee left unchanged the version of Rule 20 which had been approved by
the Court Committee and the Legislative Commission. Id. at 16-17. It recommended,
however, the deletion of Rule 21(2) of the Legislative Commission version, which limited
calling parties to neutralizing their own witnesses' testimony in the event of surprise. See
id. The Bar Committee endorsed the Legislative Commission's version of Rule 63(1),
which permitted the introduction of prior statements of witnesses, but added that "on
request the judge may require the witness to be first examined as to the extent of his
present recollection and may exclude the written statement, if the witness is able to testify
adeuately from his own recollection." Id. at 30.
2 See generally 1963 REPORT, supra note 198. The Official Committee had the
following objectives in mind: (1) reformulate the evidence rules in simple, clear,
familiar, and readily understandable language; (2) modify or eliminate evidence rules that
had become anachronistic, unworkable, or impractical, and substitute them with rules that
can be more easily applied and that would expedite and clarify the trial of the case; and
(3) establish a unified, integrated and internally consistent body of law infused with a
common objective in which each rule would be considered in relation to the others. See
id. at 3-5. Regarding the admissibility of evidence, the rules sought to admit all relevant
evidence subject to broad exclusionary policies and court discretion. See id. at 5.
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and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by him and
any other matter relevant upon the issue of credibility. 2 1

The majority of the Official Committee believed the voucher rule
served no legitimate purpose in modern jurisprudence and noted that
every legal scholar studying the subject favored its abolition. 222 The
Official Committee also endorsed the views of the Court Committee by
making admissible prior statements of available declarants:
A statement which the judge finds was previously made by a person
who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examination with
respect to the statement and its subject matter, provided the statement

would be admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness
223

221

1963

REPORT,

supra note 198, at 59.

By adopting Uniform Rule 20 as

recommended by the Court Committee, it rejected the limitation imposed by the
Legislative Commission that a calling party could only introduce prior contradictory
statements to neutralize a witness' testimony in the event of surprise. See id.
222 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. But, many authorities feared that
prior
statements permitted for impeachment purposes would be used by the jury as substantive
evidence.
See Keeton, supra note 213, at 606-07; Ladd, supra note 2, at 86.
McCormick claimed that prior statements are more reliable than later testimony and
proposed his own rule for dealing with turncoat witnesses. See generally Charles T.
McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 25
TEx. L. REv. 573 (1947).
223 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at 129. The Official Committee explained that "the
intendment of Rule 63(1) is to make use of such prior statements as are available and not
lose them because they are characterized as hearsay." Id. at 131. It acknowledged the
widely held belief that many "prior statements are better evidence, because
contemporaneously made, than testimony given on the stand long after an event." Id.
The proposed rule, however, proved controversial among some members of the
Committee. See id. at 132-35. Five basic grounds for opposition were articulated. Id.
First, it was argued that the rule would be abused:
If any prior statement of a witness is to be regularly admitted, the pressure
to secure such statements, which is now substantial, will inevitably be
increased. The trial will certainly tend to be cluttered with prior statement
after prior statement, written and oral, drawn not with a view to preserving
the memory of the witness or the lawyer but with a view to making the best
case before the jury or to presenting the jury with a written brief.
Id. at 132. Second, some members feared that the opportunity for cross-examination
would be inadequate. See id. at 133; see also State v. Saporen, 285 N.W. 898, 901
(Minn. 1939); Judson F. Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 UCLA L.
REv. 43, 49 (1954). Third, some objected that the rule would facilitate the use of
"manufactured or shaded evidence" because the admission of such statements could open
the door to perjury. See 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at 134. Fourth, some members
feared that a defendant could be convicted on the basis of hearsay statements. See id. at
134-35. Finally, some feared that untrue and unreliable statements could be obtained by
certain individuals who had an interest in the case (i.e., insurance adjusters and
investigators). See id. at 135.
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The Legislature again created a commission to review the Official
Committee's work.2 24 The Rules of Evidence Study Commission (1967
Commission), which was created by the Legislature in 1967, made
further changes to the rules proposed by the Official Committee and
endorsed by the New Jersey Supreme Court. The 1967 Commission
issued its report in April 1967 and the evidence rules proposed in that
report became effective on September 11, 1967.225
The New Jersey Evidence Rules as enacted did little to alter the
common-law voucher rule despite its severe criticism by the many New
Jersey advisory bodies that had studied it. 2
New Jersey Rule 20 as
enacted provided:
[F]or the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a
witness, any party including the party calling him may examine him
and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant upon the issue of credibility,
except that the party calling a witness may not neutralize his
testimony by a prior contradictory statement unless the judge finds he
was surprised. No evidence to support the credibility of a witness
shall be admitted except to meet a charge of recent fabrication of
testimony.

The 1967 Commission recognized that the introduction of prior
inconsistent statements was a permissible and effective method for
placing a witness's credibility in issue. 22 7 Non-calling parties were
permitted to introduce prior inconsistent statements to impeach the
credibility of a witness and for substantive purposes as well. 22 8
See generally 1967 STUDY COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 117. The Commission
was charged with reviewing the 1963 Report proposed by the Official Committee and
recommending any action it deemed appropriate pursuant to its statutory authority. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-33 (West 1960).
225 See NEw JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE STUDY COMMISSION ON PROPOSED
RULES OF

THE NEw JERSEY SUPREME COURT (1967) [hereinafter 1967 RULES].
226 See supra notes 205, 221 and accompanying text.
227 See NEw JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE WITH ANNOTATIONS PREPARED BY THE STATE
RULES OF COURT REVIEW COMMISSION OF THE NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE (1972)
[hereinafter 1972 EDITION]. See, e.g., State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 383, 251 A.2d
99, 110-11 (1969) (admitting prior inconsistent statement to impeach credibility of
witness).
228 See 1972 EDITION, supra note 227, at 237-40. Rule 63 provided:
Evidence of ... [an out-of-court] statement offered to prove the truth of
the matter is inadmissible except ... (1) A statement is admissible if
previously made by a person who is a witness at a hearing, provided it
would have been admissible if made by him while testifying and the
statement: (a) is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing ... except
that such a statement may be admitted if offered by the party calling the
witness only as permitted by Rule 20.
Id. at 237-39. See generally Fox, supra note 4. Accordingly, Rule 63(1), when taken in
conjunction with Rule 20, enabled non-calling parties to introduce prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment and substantive purposes without restriction.

456

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:399

Nevertheless, New Jersey Rule 20 only permitted calling parties to
introduce prior inconsistent statements for the limited purpose of

neutralizing a witness's in-court testimony in the event of surprise.
New Jersey aligned itself with those commentators who believed

that when declarants were present at trial, under oath, subject to
observation of their demeanor by fact-finders, and available for crossexamination, receipt of such statements as substantive evidence
outweighed any risk that this hearsay might be unreliable. 23 0 But a sharp
distinction was drawn between the use of such evidence by calling and
non-calling parties. While non-calling parties could freely use such
statements as substantive evidence, calling parties could not. 23 The 1967
Commission never tried to explain why such hearsay statements were
sufficiently reliable to serve as substantive evidence when offered by a
non-calling party, but so valueless when offered by a calling party so as
not even to qualify as impeachment material. As we shall see, this
unanswered question in New Jersey evidence persists today.

229

See 1972 EDITION, supra note 227, at 72. Though Rule 20 was intended to abolish

the common-law voucher rule, calling parties were still limited in their ability to impair
the credibility of their own witnesses. See id. Rule 63(1), which limited calling parties to
introducing prior inconsistent statements of their own witnesses for neutralization
purposes, was consistent with New Jersey common law. See, e.g., State v. Gallicchio,
44 N.J. 540, 545, 210 A.2d 409, 412 (1965); State v. Cooper, 10 N.J. 532, 560-61, 92
A.2d 786, 800 (1952); State v. Caccavale, 58 N.J. Super. 560, 571-72, 157 A.2d 21, 28
(App. Div. 1959); State v. Baechlor, 52 N.J. Super. 378, 389, 145 A.2d 631, 637 (App.
Div. 1958). Because prior contradictory statements could only be introduced if the trial
court found surprise, a preliminary examination was needed. See State v. Guido, 40 N.J.
191, 199-200, 191 A.2d 45, 50 (1963). If the court found that the calling party was
surprised by the trial testimony and that the testimony was adverse, neutralization would
beermitted. See Gallichio, 44 N.J. at 545-46, 210 A.2d at 412.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The 1967 Rules, insofar as they dealt
with non-calling parties, moved New Jersey toward the modern view which permitted the
receipt of prior inconsistent statements as long as it otherwise would have been admissible
if made by the witness while testifying. See State v. Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 437,
337 A.2d 374, 376-77 (App. Div. 1975) ("the fact-finder may give such weight to the
statement as it deserves, considering the reasons, if any, given for the contradiction and
other evidence bearing on the issue."). In Provet, a rape victim gave a statement to
police officers that was inconsistent with her in-court testimony during cross-examination.
The trial court instructed the jury to consider the inconsistent statement as bearing only
on the witness's credibility. See id. In an opinion authored by Judge Botter, who would
later serve as Chairman of the Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence, the
Appellate Division found the trial court's instruction to be harmless error. See id. at 43839, 337 A.2d at 377. Other courts have similarly held that it was harmless error for
judges to instruct juries that prior inconsistent statements could not be introduced as
substantive evidence. See State v. Cole, 154 N.J. Super. 138, 144, 381 A.2d 40, 42-43
(App. Div. 1977); State v. Maddox, 153 N.J. Super. 201, 210-11, 379 A.2d 460, 464
(A9. Div. 1977).
See 1967 RULES, supra note 225, at 30.
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C. Adoption of Interim Rule 63(a)(]) in 1980
The New Jersey Evidence Rules governing the presentation of
witnesses essentially remained unchanged between 1967 and 1980.
Under New Jersey's modification of the Uniform Rules, adversaries
could introduce prior inconsistent statements of witnesses as substantive
evidence, but the parties calling them could not. 232 This odd combination
seemed to join elements of the common-law voucher rule with the more
modern view that prior inconsistent statements, however made, could be
used as substantive evidence.
This hybrid, reflecting New Jersey Rules 20 and 63(1), however
233
failed to effectively account for the recanting or turncoat witness.
State v. Ross, 234 which reached the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1979,
highlighted this real dilemma. 235 There, four witnesses, who were
friendly with the defendant Jack Ross, gave statements to police officers
at a murder scene. 2 36 Two of these witnesses later gave sworn written
statements relating the details of what they observed. 237 The written and
oral statements tended to show that Ross had committed the murder.238
232

See supra note 231 and accompanying text.

233 See generally Gallichio, 44 N.J. 540, 210 A.2d 409; Guido,
40 N.J. 191,

191
A.2d 45; State v. Provoid, 110 N.J. Super. 547, 266 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1970). The
recanting or turncoat witness problem arose when a witness would give a statement
shortly after the occurrence of an event. At trial, the witness would either deny giving
the statement or testify that it was false. Under existing New Jersey Rule 63(1), calling
parties were powerless-they could only introduce the prior statement to neutralize the
witness's in-court testimony in the event of surprise. The statement could not be
introduced for its substantive value even when the witness told the calling party in
advance that he intended to recant his prior statement. The recanting or turncoat witness
problem has been illustrated on several occasions. See generally G. Michael Fenner,
Handling the Turncoat Wimess Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 536 (1980); McCormick, supra note 222.
234 162 N.J. Super. 47, 392 A.2d 210 (App. Div. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds, 80
N.J. 239, 403 A.2d 457 (1979).
235 This case was the impetus behind reformation of
the New Jersey Rules of
Evidence. See also State v. Reddick, 169 N.J. Super. 115, 119-20, 404 A.2d 340, 342
(App. Div. 1979). In Reddick, a witness identified the defendant as the driver of a
getaway car during an armed robbery. See id. at 119, 404 A.2d at 342. However, the
witness indicated that he intended to deny that identification at the time of trial. See id.
The prosecutor requested that the trial judge call the police officer who conducted the
photographic identification procedure, and the request was granted. See id. at 120, 404
A.2d at 342. The defendant's conviction rested exclusively on the police officer's incourt testimony that the witness had told him that he recognized defendant's photograph
as depicting the man in the getaway car during the robbery. See id. The Supreme Court
found that calling the police officer was used as a pretext, and reversed the appellate
court decision. See id.
236 See Ross, 80 N.J. at 244, 403
A.2d at 460.
See id.
238 See Ross, 162 N.J. Super. at 50. 392 A.2d at 211.

458

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[27:399

When the witnesses were called to testify they advised the prosecutor that
they intended to testify inconsistently with these statements.2 39 The
prosecutor, during a pretrial hearing, requested the trial court to call
these individuals as "court witnesses." 240 If called in this fashion, the
prosecutor would be able to introduce their prior statements as
241l
The trial judge
substantive evidence under New Jersey Rule 63(1).
agreed with the prosecutor, permitted the substantive use of these
statements, and the defendant was convicted of murder. 242 The appellate
division affirmed the conviction by_ a divided vote and the New Jersey
Supreme Court reviewed the case.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial judge had
abused his discretion when he called individuals as court witnesses,
thereby permitting the prosecutor to introduce the prior inconsistent
statements. 244 The Court was concerned that the calling of these
witnesses as "court witnesses" was a pretext for disregarding New Jersey
245
Clearly, under these rules, the prosecutor could
Rules 20 and 63(1).
not have called these witnesses and at the same time have substantively
introduced their prior written and oral statements. Moreover, the trial
court explained to the jury that the four witnesses were to be called as
court witnesses because neither the prosecutor nor the defendant could
vouch for their credibility. 246 Because, in some respects, these witnesses
provided helpful information to the defendant, the trial court by
impugning their credibility impermissibly intruded on an area properly
left to the jury.

See id.
M See id. at 50-51, 392 A.2d at 211-12. To circumvent the recanting witness
problem, sometimes prosecutors requested that the court call as its own witness someone
who it suspected would disavow a prior statement that inculpated the defendant. See State
v. Singleton, 158 N.J. Super. 517, 386 A.2d 880 (App. Div. 1978); State v. Andreano,
117 N.J. Super. 498, 285 A.2d 229 (App. Div. 1971). See generally Annotation, Court's
Witnesses (Other than Expert) in State Criminal Prosecution, 16 A.L.R.4th 352 (1982); 9
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 2484, at 276.
241See Ross, 162 N.J. Super. at 51-52, 392 A.2d at 212. The prosecutor was not able
to introduce the witness's prior statements as substantive evidence under Rule 63(1), or
even for impeachment purposes under Rule 20, because he could not demonstrate
surrise. Id.at 54, 392 A.2d at 213.
2 See id. at 51, 392 A.2d at 212.
243 See id. at 52, 392 A.2d at 212.
24 See State v. Ross, 80 N.J. 239, 249, 403 A.2d 457, 462 (1979).
245 See id. The Court criticized the appellate court decision. It noted that "[olur
research has not disclosed any case sanctioning this technique for admitting into evidence
a prior inconsistent statement of a court witness for substantive proof of the facts stated
therein. Here, the trial court's action circumvented Evid. R. 63(1)(a) and violated its
spirit and intent." Id.(footnote omitted).
246 See Ross, 162 N.J. Super. at 51, 392 A.2d at 212.
239
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The Ross case focused New Jersey's attention on the fact that New
Jersey Rules 20 and 63(1) prevented a calling party from introducing
evidence of statements that were clearly made and highly probative.

These circumstances often arise in the criminal context where significant
public-policy issues are presented when such evidence is excluded.

Moreover, the Ross court also expressed concern that some of the
statements, particularly those made orally, which might be admissible

under New Jersey Rule 63(1) when
247 presented by an adversary,
themselves were of suspect reliability.
Shortly after Ross, the New Jersey Supreme Court amended New
Jersey Rules 20 and 63(1)(a), specifically to deal with the problems
highlighted there, and appointed a Special Committee on Evidence Rules
(Special Committee) to study these new rules. 2 48 Amended Rules 20 and

63(1), in tandem, permitted the admission of prior inconsistent statements
of tegtifying witnesses by either the calling or adverse party. 249
special circumstances of reliability were required:

But

247 See Ross, 80 N.J. at 253, 403 A.2d
at 464.
248 See 106 N.J. L.J. 41, 67 (1980). The Supreme Court's Committee on Criminal
Practice explained that:

Under present New Jersey law, if a witness recants a prior statement, there
is nothing that can be done about it. If, shortly after the occurrence, a
witness gives a statement of obvious evidential value concerning an event
and upon being called to testify at a subsequent trial either denies having
given the statement or avers that it was false, a proponent can, at present,
hope to have the statement admitted for consideration by the jury only in
"neutralization" of the testimony under oath.
Id. Even prior to Ross, the Committee was of the view that:
depriving the jury of the knowledge of the existence of a material reality
(the pretrial statement of evidential value) is to becloud ihe fact-finding and
truth seeking process by an arbitrary, artificial and irrational rule. The fact
that the witness said something of importance on a prior occasion (that he
denies now) is a reality of which the jurors should be aware.
101 N.J. L.J. 437 (1978). One author explained that the amendment was intended to
make two basic changes:
First, it allowed the party calling the witness to offer prior inconsistent
statements as substantive evidence without a showing of surprise. Second,
it restricted to a limited class those prior inconsistent statements that could
be admitted substantively by either party. The class included only those
statements contained "in writing signed by the witness under circumstances
establishing its reliability" or "given under oath subject to the penalty of
perjury at a trial, judicial hearing, proceeding before an agency
empowered to issue subpoenas, or in a deposition."
Fox, supra note 4, at 783-84.
249 See 106 N.J. L.J. at 67. The amendments permitted calling parties to introduce
prior statements of a recanting witness as substantive evidence, provided that special
circumstances of reliability existed. Id. One court, which interpreted the amendments,
remarked that "at present, prior inconsistent statements can be offered substantively to
prove the truth of [the] matter asserted if the statements are in a form which satisfy the
reliability criteria established by the amendment to Evid. R. 63(l)(a) ... whether the
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Rule 20. Evidence Generally Affecting Credibility.
[Flor the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a
witness, any party including the party calling him may examine him
and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant upon the issue of credibility,
except that the party calling a witness may not neutralize his
testimony by a prior contradictory statement unless the judge finds he
was surprised. The exception as to neutralization shall not, however,
apply to prior contradictory statements admissible into evidence
pursuantto Rule 63(1)(a) .... [emphasis added]
Rule 63(1). Previous Statements of Witnesses.
A statement is admissible if previously made by a person who is a
witness at a hearing, provided it would have been admissible if made
by him while testifying and the statement: . . . (a) Is inconsistent
with his testimony at the hearing and ... the inconsistent statement
is in writing signed by the witness under circumstances establishingits reliability or given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial, judicial hearing, proceeding before an agency empowered to
issue subpoenas, or in a deposition ....

The amended rules now, like their federal counterparts, required
special circumstances of reliability before prior statements could be used
250
In so doing, these rules eliminated the illogical and
substantively.
differential treatment of impeachment depending on which party called
the witnesses.25'
New Jersey Rule 63(1)(a) now insisted that circumstantial
guarantees exist showing the prior statement was actually said before it
prior inconsistent statement is offered by the proponent of a witness or another party."
State v. Hacker, 177 N.J. Super. 533, 537 n.2, 427 A.2d 109, 111 n.2 (App. Div. 1981).
In that case, Judge Botter engaged in a thorough analysis of the amendments. See id.
Though the amendments relaxed the voucher rule, at the same time they restricted the
introduction of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence when offered by the
non-calling party to statements satisfying the new criteria set forth in Rule 63(1)(a). See
id.; see also State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 106-07, 523 A.2d 215, 219-20 (App.
Div. 1987). One author explained that the amendment "restricted to a limited class those
prior inconsistent statements that could be admitted substantively by either party." Fox,
supra note 4, at 784; cf. State v. Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 337 A.2d 374 (App. Div.
1975).

See 106 N.J. L.J. at 67. The amendments brought the New Jersey Rules in accord
with their federal counterparts, which had been adopted five years earlier. Rule 63(1)
was broader, however, because it included written statements signed by the witness.
Also, the New Jersey Rule was much clearer than Federal Rule 801(d)(1), which did not
articulate the meaning of "other proceedings." See Fox, supra note 4, at 784 n.41. For
a general discussion of what constitutes "other proceeding" under Federal Rule
801(d)(1), see Annotation, What is "Other Proceeding" Under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of
Federal Rule of Evidence Excepting from Hearsay Rule Prior Inconsistent Statements
Given "At a Trial, Hearing, or Other Proceeding, " 37 A.L.R. FED. 855 (1978).
21 See 106 N.J. L.J.
at 67.
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232

It wisely expanded the
could be received as substantive.evidence.
rather restrictive Federal Rule 801(d)(1) to include the receipt of prior

inconsistent statements contained "in a writing signed by the witness
under circumstances establishing reliability" as well 2 53as the sworn
testimony already provided for in Federal Rule 801(d)(1).
Amended Rule 20 also eliminated most of the vestiges of the
common-law voucher rule by permitting calling parties to impeach the

credibility of their own witnesses as long as the statements used to do so
had special circumstances of reliability. 254 If such circumstances were
absent, calling parties could only introduce these prior inconsistent
statements to neutralize their witness's in-court testimony, and only if the
trial judge found the calling party was surprised. Adversaries could
introduce prior inconsistent statements lacking special circumstances of
reliability to impeach credibility as had been permitted under the common
law. 5,
D. The 1982 Amendment to Rules 20 and 63(1)(a)
The 1980 amendments, however, were short lived. The Special
Committee found them to be too restrictive and the New Jersey Supreme
Court again amended New Jersey Rules 20 and 63(1)(a)." 5 The Special
252 See id. The Committee explained that

the jury would be permitted to be informed
by any party of the existence of the prior statement, subject to conformity with stated
criteria ensuring its reliability, provided that the maker of the statement is called as a
witness and is available for cross-examination." Id.
253 See id. The Committee recognized that Federal Rule 801(d)(1) is similar to the
proposed rule "but in more limited form." Id. Affidavits are clearly admissible as a
writing signed by the witness. See State v. Galiyano, 178 N.J. Super. 393, 398, 429
A.2d 385, 388 (App. Div. 1981).
2U See 106 N.J. L.J. at 67. The proposed amendment would permit calling parties to
impeach the credibility of recanting witnesses with prior inconsistent statements as long as
the requirements of Rule 63(1) were satisfied. "The liberalization of Evid. R. 20 brings
the rule closer to the broad rule initially proposed in the Report of the New Jersey
Supreme Court Committee on Evidence (1963), at 59." State v. Hacker, 177 N.J. Super.
533 537 n.2, 427 A.2d 109, 111 n.2 (App. Div. 1981).
25 See 106 N.J. L.J. at 67.
256 Rules 20 and 63(1) were amended in September 1981, to be effective July 1982.
See 108 N.J. L.J. 301 (1981). These rules provided:
Rule 20. Evidence Generally Affecting Credibility.
For the purpose of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any
party including the party calling him may examine him and introduce
extrinsic evidence relevant upon the issue of credibility, except that the
party calling a witness may not neutralize his testimony by a prior
contradictory statement unless the statement is in a form admissible under
Rule 63(1)(a) or the judge finds he was surprised.
Rule 63(1). Previous Statements of Witnesses.
A statement is admissible if previously made by a person who is a witness
at a hearing, provided it would have been admissible if made by him while
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Committee believed that hearsay statements offered by non-calling parties
need not have special circumstances of reliability. 257 It also believed that
the 1980 amendments excluded from their scope some otherwise reliable
statements. 258 Thus, statements "contained in a sound recording or in a
writing made or signed by the witness in circumstances establishing its

reliability" could now be received for their truth even if presented by the
calling party. 2 59 This addition was clearly inserted to assist prosecutors
in cases where recanting, recalcitrant or turncoat witnesses could be
expected.
Though adversaries could now introduce prior inconsistent
statements for their truth, calling parties, too, could introduce prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. In the case of calling
parties, however, the statements would have to meet special reliability
criteria set out in New Jersey Rule 63(1)(a). 26 0 Absent such indicia,
testifying and the statement: . . . (a) Is consistent with his testimony at the
hearing and is offered in compliance with the requirements of Rule 22(a);
and (b) however, when the statement is offered by the party calling the
witness it shall be admissible only if, in addition to the foregoing
requirements, it [ I (i) is contained in a sound recording or in a writing
made or signed by the witness [ I in circumstances establishing its
reliability or (ii) was given under oath subject to the penalty of perjury at a
trial or other judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, administrative or grand
jury [ proceeding[ 1, or in a deposition ....
Id.

257 See 108 N.J. L.J. at 302.

The Committee recommended return to the original
version of Rule 63(1)(a), which promoted broad admissibility for non-calling parties. See
State v. Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 438-39, 337 A.2d 374, 377 (App. Div. 1975).
Affidavits and sound recordings were found to be admissible as substantive evidence
when introduced during cross-examination. See State v. Galiyano, 178 N.J. Super. 393,
398, 429 A.2d 385, 387-88 (App. Div. 1981). Richard J. Biunno commented:
The most important change in this amendment was to delete the
requirement that the "special reliability" provisions of the 1980 amendment
must be met even where the party offering the prior inconsistent statement
as substantive evidence is not the proponent of the witness. Thus the rule
reverted to the original rule of broad admissibility for inconsistent
statements offered by an adverse party, even if the statement was not in
writing or made under oath. It was decided that only where the proponent
of the witness offered the prior inconsistent statement as substantive
evidence was compliance with those reliability requirements necessary.
RIcHARD J. BnINNo, NEw JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE 771 (1996).

258 See 108 N.J. L.J. at 302.
259 Id. The amendment included any document in the declarant's handwriting even
if
unsigned as well as statements typed by the declarant. In rationalizing the expansion of
the rule, the Committee stressed that "it is not the making of the statement in
circumstances establishing reliability to which this change in the rule is intended to refer
but rather only the mechanics by which the statement is made." Id.
260 See 108 N.J. L.J. at 302. Prior statements also had to be inconsistent.
See State v.
Ramos, 217 N.J. Super. 530, 538, 526 A.2d 284, 288 (App. Div. 1987) (holding that
statement made to police officer was not "inconsistent" with in-court testimony). Prior
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calling parties only could neutralize witness testimony in the event of
surprise. 26 1 The 1982 amendments also expanded and clarified the types
of proceedings that would qualify such prior statements for admissibility
to include judicial, quasi-judicial legislative, administrative and grand

jury proceedings, or depositions.292

The question of when such written or recorded statements were
sufficiently reliable to be received as substantive evidence was answered
in State v. Gross.26 3 Predictably, the case involved the review of a

criminal conviction.

One of the witnesses to a murder, himself

implicated in the crime, gave the police a sworn statement that identified
the defendant as the killer.2 64 At trial, however, he denied the defendant
was involved. 265 Thereafter, the out-of-court statement was introduced
under New Jersey Rule 63(a)(1). 266 The defendant was convicted but the
appellate division remanded for a hearing by the trial judge on the
267
The appellate division split on the evidentiary
statement's reliability.
standard to be used in determining reliability. 261 It was this disagreement
that led to the New Jersey Supreme Court's review.

statements have been found to be "inconsistent" when witnesses testified in-court that
they could not remember the contents of the prior statements or the events giving rise to
them. See State v. Bryant, 217 N.J. Super. 72, 77, 524 A.2d 1291, 1294 (App. Div.
1987); State v. Burgos, 200 N.J. Super. 6, 11, 490 A.2d 316, 318 (App. Div. 1985); see
also Debra T. Landis, Denial of Recollection as Inconsistent with a PriorStatement so as
to Render Statement Inadmissible, 99 A.L.R.3d 934, 949 (1980).
261 See State v. Johnson, 216 N.J. Super. 588, 608-09, 524 A.2d 826, 836 (App. Div.
1987). In Johnson, the State sought to impeach the credibility of its own witness. The
witness had given a statement to an investigating police officer in which he stated that he
did not see the person who committed the crime. See id. at 608, 524 A.2d at 836. At
trial, however, the witness testified that the defendant did not commit the crime, and that
he had lied to the investigator because he was scared. See id. The appellate court
explained that because the witness's statement was not written, recorded or given under
oath, neutralization was improper unless there had been surprise. See id. It further
explained that if the State had no indication that the witness would contradict his prior
statement, the trial court should have conducted a preliminary hearing after the testimony
to be neutralized was given. See id. at 609, 524 A.2d at 836. The appellate court held
that the State was surprised, and that the prior statement was properly admitted to
neutralize the in-court testimony. See id. The fact that a preliminary hearing was not
held was found to be harmless. See id.
262 See 108 N.J. L.J. at 302.
The Committee recommended "rephrasing of the
enumerate the type of proceedings intended to be
specifically
to
requirement
'proceeding'
included in place of the former and somewhat inartful 'other proceeding' language." Id.
263 216 N.J. Super. 98, 106-08, 523 A.2d 215, 219-20 (App. Div. 1987), aft'd, 121
N.J. 1, 577 A.2d 806 (1990).
M4 See id. at 102-03, 523 A.2d at 217.
2M See id. at 102, 523 A.2d at 217.
See id. at 104-05, 523 A.2d at 218.
267 See id. at 110-12, 523 A.2d at 221.
26 See Gross, 121 N.J. at 3-4, 577 A.2d at 806-07.
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The court agreed with the appellate division and, despite strong
evidence that the statements were actually made, determined that the trial

court must conduct a hearing to determine whether the statements were
reliable. 269 The factors to be weighed in this determination included:
(1) the declarant's connection to and interest in the matter reported in
the out-of-court statement; (2) the person or persons to whom the
statement was given; (3) the place and occasion for giving the
statement; (4) whether the declarant was then in custody or otherwise
the target of investigation; (5) the physical and mental condition of
the declarant at the time; (6) the presence or absence of other persons;
(7) whether the declarant incriminated himself or sought to exculpate
himself by his statement; (8) the extent to which the writing is in the
declarant's hand; (9) the presence or absence, and the nature of, any
interrogation; (10) whether the offered sound recording or writing
contains the entirety, or only a portion or a summary of the
communication; (11) the presence or absence of any motive to
fabricate; (12) the presence or absence of any express or implicit
pressures, inducements or coercion for the making of the statement;
(13) whether the anticipated use of the statement was apparent or
made known to the declarant; (14) the inherent believability or lack of
and (15) the presence or absence of
believability of the statement
2 70
corroborating evidence.

The court agreed with the majority of the appellate division panel
that the offering party could establish such reliability by a preponderance
of the evidence standard." 2 7 1 If the test was satisfied, the statement

269 See id. at 17, 577 A.2d at 814. The appellate court explained that the statements
need not have "circumstantial probabilities of trustworthiness" equivalent to the standards
reflected in the hearsay exceptions. See Gross, 216 N.J. Super. at 108, 523 A.2d at 220.
The court reasoned that, while the hearsay exceptions assume that the declarant is not a
witness at the hearing, New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) requires that the witness be present and
subject to cross-examination at the hearing so that the examiner can test the truth of the
prior statement. See id. at 109, 523 A.2d at 220; see also State v. Spruell, 121 N.J. 32,
41 577 A.2d 821, 826 (1990).
170 Gross, 216 N.J. Super. at 109-10, 523 A.2d at 220-21. Several courts have since
applied the fifteen criteria set forth in Gross to find that prior inconsistent statements
inculpating the defendant were made under reliable circumstances. See, e.g., State v.
Burnis, 145 N.J. 509, 534, 679 A.2d 121, 134 (1996) (statement given during police
interrogation); State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 539, 651 A.2d 19, 47 (1994) (statement
made by inmates to police officer); State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 248, 590 A.2d 1107,
1115 (1991) (tape recorded statement); Spruell, 121 N.J. at 41-42, 577 A.2d at 826
(signed statement during interrogation); State v. Cherry, 289 N.J. Super. 503, 525, 674
A.2d 589, 600 (App. Div. 1995) (oral statement recorded by police officer and signed by
witness); State v. Johnson, 287 N.J. Super. 247, 261-62, 670 A.2d 1100, 1107 (App.
Div. 1995) (grand jury testimony procured by subpoena); State v. Merritt, 247 N.J.
Super. 425, 434, 589 A.2d 648, 652 (App. Div. 1991) (recorded statement).
See Gross, 121 N.J. at 15, 577 A.2d at 813.
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should be submitted to the jury and that body would be instructed on
these factors as well.
Review of the fifteen criteria leaves little doubt that a trial court's
review of these written or recorded statements would mirror the
voluntariness review of confessions routinely undertaken by federal and
state courts. 272 The relevance of these criteria in the criminal rather than
the civil context is quite striking. In reality, many of the criteria are
directly related to the question of whether the statement was voluntarily
made by the declarant rather than either being the product of police
coercion or an effort by the declarant to exculpate himself or herself or to
curry favor with the authorities.
It was yet another criminal case, this time one permitting receipt of
a sound recording, which made clear that the analysis of when prior
statements of witnesses could be received was to be virtually identical to
that employed in determining whether a confession may form the main
273
evidential basis for a conviction.
In State v. Mancine,
a prior
statement, reduced to a sound recording, served as the principal evidence
in a homicide trial. There, a witness romantically involved with the
defendant, made a statement to the police implicating the defendant. At
trial, she sought to disavow the statement claiming it was the product of
police coercion. After determining that the prosecutor satisfied the
requirements of New Jersey Rule 63(1), and the fifteen reliability factors
identified in Gross, the trial court permitted the recording to be played to
the jury. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter largely based on
the witness's recorded statement, and the appellate division affirmed the
conviction.
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and
declined to engraft a per se rule against the use of prior inconsistent
statements as the main substantive evidence supporting a conviction. 274
Rather, the Court directed that, in addition to insuring compliance with
the criteria in New Jersey Rule 63(1) and in Gross, the trial court should
"determine whether there is any legal evidence, apart from . . . facts and
circumstances, from which the jury might determine that the [statement]
is trustworthy.", 275 Thus, it now appears that in criminal cases, prior
272 In the post-Gross situation, Mancine actually sought to ensure the voluntary,

reliable nature of prior statements and applied the same standard as previously used with
confessions. See Mancine, 124 N.J. at 250, 590 A.2d at 1116; see also 18 U.S.C. §
3501 (1982).
273 124 N.J. 232, 250, 590 A.2d 1107, 1116 (1991).
274 Seeid. at 251,590 A.2d at 1117.

275 Id. at 250, 590 A.2d at 1116.
state courts.

The Mancine approach has been adopted by other

See, e.g., Dumornay v. State, 664 A.2d 469 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995)

(admitting prior inconsistent tape-recorded statement as substantive evidence); State v.
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inconsistent statements admissible under New Jersey Rule 63(1) must also
be reviewed using the same standards set for evaluating the admissibility
of confessions.
E. New Jersey's Adoption of Evidence Rules Modeled on the
FederalRules of Evidence
New Jersey began looking at another revision to its evidence rules
in the mid 1980s, this time in an effort to harmonize them with the
Federal Rules. New Jersey had made an unsuccessful effort to minimize
the differences between the New Jersey and Federal Rules in the early
1980s. However, by the time the Supreme Court Committee on the
Rules of Evidence (Botter Committee) met in 1991 to consider whether to
recommend adoption of the Federal Rules in New Jersey, the rules for
the presentation of witnesses were quite different.2 76 They would remain
SO.
The Botter Committee ultimately was unable or unwilling to
harmonize New Jersey's Rules with the Federal Rules.2 77 Instead, it
proposed a hybrid representing portions of the New Jersey Rules and the
Federal Rules.2 78 It further recommended that the New Jersey Rules be
reorganized and renumbered to correspond to the Federal Rules. New
Jersey Rule 63(1)(a) became Rule 803(a)(1), and New Jersey Rule 20
became Rule 607. 2 9

Marcy, 680 A.2d 76, 82 (Vt. 1996) (holding that tape-recorded statement was sufficient

to support conviction); see also People v. Cuevas, 906 P.2d 1290, 1306 (Cal. 1995);
State v. Eastman, 913 P.2d 57, 67 (Haw. 1996); Nance v. State, 629 A.2d 633, 645
(Md. 1993); State v. West, 667 A.2d 540, 544 (Vt. 1995); State v. Robar, 601 A.2d
1376, 1381 (Vt. 1991). See generally Stanley A. Goldman, Guilt by Intuition: The
Insufficiency of Prior Inconsistent Statements to Convict, 65 N.C. L. REv. 1, 1 (1986)
(addressing whether a conviction can be based solely on a prior inconsistent statement).
276 See REPORT OF THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON THE RuLEs OF EVIDENCE
(1991), reprinted in 129 N.J. L.J. 393 (Supp. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 REPORT].
Honorable Theodore I. Botter served as Chairman of the New Jersey Supreme Court
Committee on the Rules of Evidence.
The Botter Committee was charged with
considering "whether or to what extent New Jersey should adopt the Federal Rules of
Evidence which are not followed by many states." Id. The Supreme Court was of the
view that New Jersey attorneys appearing in federal courts and other state courts would
benefit from a common body of evidence law. See id.
277 See generally 1991 REPORT, supra note 276.
278 See id. at 1. The Supreme Court Committee on the Rules of Evidence stated that
"we have adopted the substance and language of the federal rules when we considered
them equal to or better than our present rules. However, in a number of instances we
preferred the prevailing New Jersey law." Id. The 1991 REPORT represented the best of
the 1967 New Jersey Rules and the 1975 Federal Rules, which were both derived from
the 1953 Uniform Rules. See id.
279 See id. at 5.
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In effect, New Jersey readopted its evidence rules on the
presentation of witnesses and the use of prior inconsistent statements by

simply giving them the numbers of their federal counterparts. Proposed
New Jersey Rule 607 essentially mirrored the 1982 version of New
Jersey Rule 20 and permitted calling parties to impeach the testimony of

their witnesses with prior inconsistent statements made under oath or
contained in sound recordings or in writings made or signed by the
witnesses provided the statements were reliable. 28 Still, New Jersey
Rule 607, as proposed, was narrower than its federal counterpart.
Proposed New Jersey Rule 607 provided that:
Except as otherwise provided by Rules 405 and 608, for the purpose
of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party
including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and
introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility, except
that the party calling a witness may not neutralize the witness'
testimony by a prior contradictory statement unless the statement is in
a form admissible under Rule 803(a)(1) or the judge finds that the
party calling the witness was surprised....
The Botter Committee believed that the rules of evidence should
specifically deal with the issue of when leading questions were
appropriate. It recommended that New Jersey essentially adopt Federal
Rule 611 (c), which made the decision of when leading questions could be
asked dependent on the functional relationship between the party and the
testifying witness.282 New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 2A:81-11, which
provided that "except as otherwise provided by law, when any party is
called as a witness by the adverse party he shall be subject to the same
rules as to examination and cross-examination as other witnesses,"
however, still remained on the books.2 3 As noted, several New Jersey
280

See id. at 5, 24-25. The 1982 amendments to New Jersey Rule 20 broadened the

right of calling parties to impeach their own witnesses by allowing them to introduce prior
inconsistent statements if the calling party was surprised or if such statements were given
under oath at a formal proceeding, or were contained in a sound recording or writing
made or signed by the witness. The Botter Committee modified the voucher rule, but
refused to follow the federal rules, which entirely rejected it.
281 See 1991 REPORT, supra note 276, at 5. The Botter Committee acknowledged that
its proposed rule was "narrower than Federal Rule 607 which permits the credibility of a
witness to be attacked by any party, including the party who called the witness, without
limitation on the use of prior inconsistent statements for the purpose." Id.
282

See id., at 27.

283 See id. Prior to 1991, N.J. STAT. ANN.

§ 2A:81-11 was analogous to Federal Rule

611 (c). That statute prohibited parties from asking leading questions to adverse parties
whom they called to the stand, but permitted leading questions on cross-examination. See
Lenahan, supra note 197, at 13-14. It was within the trial court's discretion, however, to
permit parties to use leading questions to interrogate adverse witnesses whom they called
to the stand. See Stern, supra note 48, at 70-71 (noting that "the principal disadvantage
of calling the adverse party as your witness is that it permits your adversary to cross-
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courts have suggested that parties could not ask leading questions of
adversaries they called to the stand.28 4 The Botter Committee appeared
to alter these rules.28 5
Proposed New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) incorporated New Jersey Rule

63(1)(a), which had imposed special circumstances of reliability on
calling parties but not adversaries. 2 8 6 Under New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1),

a statement previously made by a person who is a witness at a trial or
hearing would now be admissible if it:
(1) is inconsistent with the witness' testimony at the trial or hearing
and is offered in compliance with Rule 613. However, when the
statement is offered by the party calling the witness, it is admissible
only if, in addition to the foregoing requirements, it (A) is contained
in a sound recording or in a writing made or signed by the witness in
circumstances establishing its reliability or (B) was given under oath

examine and lead the client. However, cross-examination, like direct examination, is left
to the court's sound discretion.").
284 See supra notes 48, 196-97 and accompanying text.
285 In fact, the only changes recommended to the rule were to permit the use of
leading questions on direct examination when a witness was unresponsive and substitute
the phrase "when a witness demonstrates hostility" for the term "hostile witness." Rule
611 (c) provided:
Mode and Order of Interrogation and Presentation
(c) LEADING QUESTIONS. Leading questions should not be used on the
direct examination of a witness except as may be necessary to develop the
witness' testimony. Ordinarily, leading questions should be permitted on
cross-examination. When a party calls an adverse party or a witness
identified with an adverse party, or when a witness demonstrates hostility
or unresponsiveness, interrogation may be by leading questions, subject to
the discretion of the court.
N.J. R. EvID. 611(c). Yet despite adoption of New Jersey Rule 611(c), N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:81-11 continues to confuse the analysis. See generally Gianfranco Pietrafesa,
Where You Can Use Leading Questions, 137 N.J. L.J. 1042 (1994). A leading
commentator to the New Jersey Rules has read Rule 611 (c) to require a demonstration
that the adverse party refuses to responsively answer:
If an adverse party refuses to answer questions responsively, the examining
attorney may properly seek permission from the court to suggest the
answers he is looking for. Absent such behavior by the witness, however,
there is no greater latitude to use leading questions on direct examination
when an adverse party is called to testify than there is generally.
BIuNNO, supra note 257, at 607.
286 See 1991 REPORT, supra note 276, at 34. Courts have commonly construed cases
that had interpreted former Rule 63(1)(a) for application of Rule 803(a)(1). See BIUNNO,
supra note 257, at 769; see, e.g., State v. Mancine, 124 N.J. 232, 246-56, 590 A.2d
1107, 1114-19 (1991); State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 106, 523 A.2d 215, 219
(App. Div. 1987), afid, 121 N.J. 1,577 A.2d 806 (1990); State v. Soney, 177 N.J.
Super. 47, 58, 424 A.2d 1182, 1188 (App.Div. 1980); State v.Provet, 133 N.J. Super.
432, 436-39, 337 A.2d 374, 376-77 (App.Div. 1975). For the history and application of
the rule, see State v. Hacker, 177 N.J. Super. 533, 537 n.2, 427 A.2d 109, 111 n.2
(App.Div. 1981).
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subject to the penalty of perjury at a trial or other judicial, quasiadministrative or grand jury proceeding, or in a
judicial, legislative,
7
8
deposition.

The New Jersey State Bar Association reviewed the work of the
Botter Committee Report and ultimately disagreed with the way it
proposed to present and challenge witnesses.
It argued that the

renumbering of the evidence rules in accordance with the federal scheme
was deceptive. The Bar Association was particularly concerned that the
rules governing the presentation of witnesses, while mirroring the
Federal
Rule numbers, had significantly
different contents.
Consequently, it asked the New Jersey Supreme Court to reject the
proposed rules.2 8
But the court rejected the Bar Association's advice and adopted the
Rules as recommended in the Botter Committee Report. 2 8 9 The New
Jersey Rules became effective on July 1, 1993.290
VI.

IMPROVING THE WITNESS PRESENTATION MODEL UNDER THE

NEW

JERSEY RULES OF EVIDENCE

A.

Introduction

Uniformity and predictability are highly desirable characteristics in
the law of evidence.

287

N.J. R. EVID. 803(a)(1).

New Jersey's recent adoption of the Federal

New Jersey has not adopted the federal characterization

of prior inconsistent statements as non-hearsay.

The federal rationale for not treating

prior inconsistent statements as hearsay was the fact that the witness was present and
testifying.
New Jersey rejected that rationale and continues to characterize these
statements as admissible hearsay.

288 See REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION ON THE PROPOSED RULES

OF EVIDENCE (1992). The State Bar Association argued that the Botter Committee
proposal would not create a body of uniform evidence rules because few Federal Rules
would be adopted verbatim and more than a dozen would not be adopted in any form.
See id. at 3. Moreover, the State Bar Association could not justify numbering the New
Jersey Rules after the Federal Rules when only portions of the Federal Rules would be
adopted. See id. The State Bar Association essentially wanted to "leave well enough
alone." It recognized that a substantial body of case law interpreting New Jersey's
existing rules had already been created and "there is no persuasive reason why years of
practice, experience, and precedent should be discarded in favor of adoption of the
federal rules." Id. at 5. It then proposed its own substantive changes to the evidence
rules. As to New Jersey Rule 63(1)(a), the State Bar Association claimed that the more
restrictive federal rule would better ensure the reliability of the statement. See id. at 6. It
also favored the adoption of Federal Rule 607 which permitted either party to impeach the
credibility of his or her own witness without limitation. See id. For a general discussion
of the State Bar Association criticisms, see 131 N.J. L.J. 757 (1992).
289 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-1 to -49 (West 1994).
290 See id.
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Rules hopefully will further both goals. The Federal Rules have been in

effect for over twenty years and many states have adopted or enacted
them as their evidence law.z92 The New Jersey Supreme Court has
indicated that where the State's evidence rules are either similar to or
developed from federal authority, it would look to federal decisions to
assist in interpreting them.2 93 The wealth of published federal evidence
decisions will no doubt bring greater uniformity and predictability to
New Jersey's evidence law generally. But, as we also have noted, New
Jersey has substantially departed from the Federal Rules in its model for

the presentation and challenge of witnesses. 294 We are convinced that

these departures have harmed and will hinder the development of

effective rules in this critical area.
New Jersey has refused to adopt the federal rule that permits calling
parties to impeach their own witnesses. 295 Under New Jersey Rule 607,
a calling party is limited to the impeachment and substantive use of prior
inconsistent statements containing special circumstances of reliability .296
291

For more than 40 years, the New Jersey Supreme Court and Legislature have tried

to develop an evidence model governing the presentation of witnesses that would foster
uniformity and predictability in the courtroom. New Jersey's efforts can be seen as part
of a larger movement during the twentieth century to reform and make uniform the entire
body of evidence rules. See generally 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5005, at
61-92. In 1892, the National Commissioners held its first meeting and began drafting
Uniform Acts to address particular issues of evidence. Id. § 5005, at 76. In 1920, the
Commonwealth Fund, one of the first charitable organizations, sponsored the Legal
Research Committee to reform the laws of evidence. See Barbara C. Salken, To Codify
or Not to Codify- That Is the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an

Evidence Code, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 641, 654 (1992). The American Law Institute was
formed several years later in 1923. See 21 WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 95, § 5005,
at 77. In 1938, the American Bar Association Committee on Improvement in the Law of
Evidence, chaired by Wigmore, issued a report endorsing the Commonwealth Fund Legal
Research Committee report, as well as a broader "agenda for reform." See REPORT OF
THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, 63 A.B.A. REP. 583-84

(1938).
292 See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
293 See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 86 N.J. 565, 581-82, 432 A.2d 493, 501-02 (1981);
GATX Term. Corp. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 86 N.J. 46, 53-54, 429
A.2d 355, 359 (1981). New Jersey trial and appellate courts also have looked to federal
decisions for guidance. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 246 N.J. Super. 209, 220, 587 A.2d
272, 277 (App. Div. 1991); State v. Gregorio, 142 N.J. Super. 372, 378, 361 A.2d 586,
589 (Law Div. 1976).
294 See supra notes 276-90 and accompanying text.
295 The Federal Rules, which completely abolished the voucher rule, permit any party
to attack the credibility of witnesses called to the stand. See FED. R. EVID. 607. The
New Jersey Rules embrace the voucher rule to some extent by permitting non-calling
parties to impeach the credibility of witnesses, while permitting calling parties to impeach
the credibility of witnesses with prior inconsistent statements only if such statements are
accompanied by special indicia of reliability. See BiUNNO, supra note 257, at 599-601.
296 See N.J. R. EVID. 607. The New Jersey model avoids the discrepancy created by
its federal counterpart. Under the federal model, parties can introduce prior inconsistent
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Short of such evidence, prior inconsistent statements may only be used
where the calling party can show surprise. 297 Clearly, New Jersey is

expressing a preference that calling parties not impeach their witnesses.
Even when dealing with adverse witnesses, New Jersey limits the type of

impeaching evidence it-will tolerate a calling party to use.
As we noted, before New Jersey Rule 611(c) was adopted,
substantial uncertainty existed as to whether leading questions could be

used when questioning an adversary. The uncertainty was caused by the
continued vitality of New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 2A:81-11.298 New
Jersey Rule 607 and the State's long history of opposition to leading

questions of adversaries reflects an apparent preference that adversaries
not be called as witnesses.2 99 Perhaps the only articulable rationale for
such a preference is the desire to limit the use of impeachment evidence.
New Jersey has repeatedly expressed a concern that such evidence might
300
be misused as substantive evidence by a jury.
Of course, if a' party
only waits, the adversary or witness likely will testify and under New
Jersey Rule 803(a)(1), any prior inconsistent statements will then be
admissible for substantive purposes. Thus, the problem New Jersey sees
with impeachment evidence is eliminated or minimized by discouraging

statements that were not made under oath at a prior proceeding for their impeachment
value. The New Jersey model requires prior inconsistent statements introduced both for
impeachment and substantive purposes to have been made under reliable circumstances.
See Fox, supra note 4, at 780 n.23; Graham, supra note 2, at 918-21. For a discussion
of the subterfuge problem, see infra note 50 and accompanying text.
297 See N.J. R. EVID. 607.
298 See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
Since 1900, the statute has
prohibited the examination of an adverse party using leading questions. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:81-11 (West 1994).
Trial judges have occasionally exercised "broad
discretion" to permit parties to interrogate adverse witnesses using leading questions. See
Application of Howard Sav. Bank, 143 N.J. Super. 1, 7-8, 362 A.2d 592, 596 (App. Div.
1976); State v. Rajnai, 132 N.J. Super. 530, 539-40, 334 A.2d 364, 369-70 (App. Div.
1975). In divorce actions, leading questions are generally permitted because adverse
parties are "hostile per se." See Lerman v. Lerman, 245 N.J. Super. 312, 315-16, 585
A.2d 425, 426-27 (Ch. Div. 1990). Despite the exercise of judicial discretion, the statute
has created confusion because it contains no explicit authorization permitting adverse
parties to be examined using leading questions. See Stern, supra note 48, at 70-71.
299 See Fox, supra note 4, at 780 (discussing the development and modification of the
voucher rule in New Jersey); Graham, supra note 2, at 918-21.
For a discussion
explaining the policy reasons underlying the voucher rule, see generally 3A WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 897, at 661, § 898, at 661, § 899, at 663.
300 The various Committees that considered the revision and codification
of the New
Jersey Rules have expressed concern that juries would consider prior inconsistent
statements for their substantive value. See, e.g., 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at 62-63.
New Jersey courts shared this concern. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 162 N.J. Super. 47, 5152, 392 A.2d 210, 212 (App. Div. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 80 N.J. 239, 403 A.2d
457 (1979); State v. Provet, 133 N.J. Super. 432, 438, 337 A.2d 374, 377 (App. Div.
1975).
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adversaries or witnesses friendly to them from being called during the
calling party's case.
We believe that New Jersey Rule 611(c) clearly has eliminated one
obstacle to the calling of adversaries or witnesses identified with them.
The rule plainly was intended to permit leading questions when
adversaries or witnesses identified with them are testifying. 3 0 1 As we
noted, because the official commentary to New Jersey Rule 611 (c) seems
to clearly sanction them, New Jersey trial courts will probably permit the
use of leading questions of adversaries. Nevertheless, the New Jersey
Legislature should repeal New Jersey Statutes Annotated § 2A:81-11 and
bring the present ambiguity surrounding the use of leading questions to
an end.
A broader concern, however, remains. Does New Jersey's evidence
model, which permits the substantive receipt of all prior inconsistent
statements when offered by a non-calling party but limits them to ones
having special circumstances of reliability when offered by a calling
party, make sense? 30 2 We do not believe it does. Rather, we believe the
social science literature suggests that there are real differences in the
quality of prior inconsistent statements that should be considered in
determining whether they should receive substantive weight.30 3 Because
such differences in evidential quality appear to exist, particularly about
whether the prior statement was actually made, it makes sense that some
prior statements be admissible only for impeachment purposes. We
disagree that juries cannot perform the function of crediting some
statements that they have confidence were made in the past for their
substantive value while at the same time using other prior inconsistent
301

After a tortured past, New Jersey seems to have adopted the flexible Federal Rule

611(c).

See generally BIUNNO, supra note 257, at 634.

New Jersey Rule 611(c) now

makes it clear that "when a party calls an adverse party or a witness identified with an
adverse party... interrogation may be by leading questions, subject to the discretion of
the court." N.J. R. EVID. 611(c).
302 The differential treatment is misguided and has never been properly
explained.
The New Jersey Supreme Court's Special Committee provided an unsatisfactory

explanation for requiring indicia of reliability for calling parties but not for non-calling
parties.

See 108 N.J. L.J. 302 (1993) (explaining that "the 1979 amendment of R.

63(1)(a) is too restrictive and... the special reliability requirements preconditioning
substantive admissibility are appropriate only as to the prior inconsistent statements of a
proponent's own witness."). One author noted that the Special Committee's explanation
was a "bare conclusory justification," and presented another possible rationale for the
differential treatment. See Fox, supra note 4, at 787 n.55.
Fox claimed that the
differential treatment "must be based on the demonstrably false theory that prior

inconsistent statements offered by the calling party present hearsay dangers which must
be guarded against, whereas prior inconsistent statements offered by the non-calling party

do not." Id. at 785.
303 See infra notes 314-34 and accompanying text.
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statements in which they have less certainty were made only to test a
witness's credibility. 304
B.

New Jersey Rule of Evidence 803(a)(1) Permits the Eliciting of
Less Reliable Information by Non-Calling Parties

New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) permits a non-calling party to elicit prior
inconsistent statements of witnesses for their substantive value. 30 5 There
is no need to establish special circumstances of reliability as a condition
for substantive use as there is under the Federal Rules.
This approach

has been justified because it limits the need for a jury or other factfinder
to distinguish between statements introduced for impeachment purposes
as opposed to those received for their substantive value. In a much
quoted passage from the 1963 Report, the Official Committee justifies the
broad substantive admissibility of such statements by criticizing the

common-law model:
The prior statement is limited to an evaluation of credibility and the
jury is instructed that they are not to consider the statement as
substantive evidence. It is widely acknowledged that this is a fiction,
and that the jury in fact often gives the prior statements substantive
3W Impeachment by use of prior inconsistent statements is one of
five main forms of
attack upon the credibility of a witness. See I MCCoRMiCK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, §
33, at 111. The others are the (1) demonstration of bias; (2) attack of a witness's
character for truth; (3) attack of the perception of a witness's memory; and (4)
contradiction of a witness's testimony. See 1 id. Impeachment by use of prior
inconsistent statements is one of the most common occurrences during the course of a
trial. A Westlaw search using "impeach! /5 inconsistent," for all federal and state cases
after 1944, produced 10,067 results. In almost every trial, juries are called upon to
consider witnesses' prior inconsistent statements to assess credibility.
Courts have
established an elaborate framework to insure that prosecutors do not use impeachment as
a subterfuge for placing inadmissible hearsay before juries. One court held that "a trial
court must apply Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and weigh the testimony's impeachment
value against its tendency to prejudice the defendant unfairly or to confuse the jury."
United States v. Ince, 21 F.3d 576, 580 (4th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted). Moreover,
courts have developed rules to insure that alleged prior inconsistent statements are not
taken out of context. For a discussion of "opening the door" or "rule of completion,"
see United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 978-83 (9th Cir. 1996).
305 See N.J. R. EVID. 803(a)(1).
306 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. Prior statements are admissible when
offered by non-calling parties provided that the statements would have been admissible if
made by the witness while testifying at the hearing. The only other requirement imposed
on non-calling parties is that the statement is inconsistent with the witness' in-court
testimony. See BIUNNO, supra note 257, at 769. Several commentators have discussed
the requirement of inconsistency. See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 34,
at 113; 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 251, at 117, 121. One New Jersey
court found that statements are inconsistent with in-court testimony when "there has been
omitted a material assertion that would normally have been made and which is presently
testified to may be considered a prior inconsistent statement." State v. Provet, 133 N.J.
Super. 432, 437, 337 A.2d 374, 377 (App. Div. 1975).
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effect. If confronted with two conflicting statements a typical jury
will tend to believe one of them. The instruction is confusing and
requires a form of mental gmnastic that is obviously beyond the
capacity of the ordinary juror.

But this expediency avoids two important questions about such prior

inconsistent statements.

How do we know the statement was actually

made? And, are not such oral statements, even if made, significantly less

reliable than ones made under special circumstances of reliability?
There simply are no mechanisms in New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) to
insure that an alleged prior inconsistent statement was actually said. For
example, a witness is called to testify in a civil case that he observed an
accident and the defendant failed to yield the right of way. During crossexamination, the defendant questions the witness about an alleged
statement made to another at the accident scene that the witness was
looking away at the point of impact. The witness denies making the
statement. Obviously, effective cross-examination of this assertion is
impossible. 308 The jury or other factfinder is left to judge whether the
307 1963 REPORT, supra note 198, at 130;

see also Provet, 133 N.J. Super. at 438,
337 A.2d at 377. Most authorities argue that limiting instructions are a "mere verbal
ritual." See McCormick, supra note 11, at 580; see also Annotation, Extrajudicial
Statements by Witness Who is Subject to Cross-examinationas Evidence of Facts to Which
They State, 133 A.L.R. 1445, 1466 (1939) .(providing that "[tlhe impression that
testimony makes upon the minds of the jury can never be entirely removed or controlled
by instructions from the court, no matter how conscientiously the jury may try to follow
the instructions."). Psychoanalysts have recognized that limiting instructions can be
ineffective. See Lawrence S. Kubie, To Break the Hold of the Past, 16 N.Y. COUNTY
LAWS. ASS'N BAR BULL. 139 (1959); C.G. Schoenfeld, A Psychoanalytic Approach to the
Kubie commented that "the
Law of Evidence, J. PSYCHOL. LAW 109, 111-12 (1985).
effects of introducing highly charged... data... must continue to influence the feelings
of judge and jury even after it has been stricken from the written record when an
Wiping it from the written page does not wipe it from the
objection is sustained ....
human mind." Kubie, supra, at 142.
308 The purpose of cross-examination has been explained as follows:
By means of cross-examination the witness may be required to explain
ambiguous, unclear, or inconsistent testimony; personality traits that
influence cognitive functioning may be disclosed; the effect of the witness'
mental set at the time of perception, possible suggestive influences, and
numerous other factors which affect a witness' mental processes may be
may also disclose deliberate
Cross-examination
investigated....
testimonial falsification, although it is probably far less effective than the
polygraph.
Stewart, supra note 51, at 22. Cross-examination is used to explore the witness's
sincerity, narration, perception and memory. See generally Morgan, supra note 4; John
S. Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REV.
484, 485 (1937).
But cross-examiners are incapable of attacking a statement's veracity when the
witness denies having made the statement. See Fox, supra note 4, at 796-97. Fox noted
that hearsay dangers would result from admitting statements that the declarant denies
having made because "there is nothing to prevent the trier of fact from drawing favorable
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statement was made-a task for which they have few tools to assist them.
Obviously, where written or other permanent evidence exists that such a
prior statement was made, one is able to examine the two statements and
make judgments as to the declarant's perception, memory, narration, and

sincerity-classic considerations made by juries or other factfinders when
sorting through credibility questions.30 9
Such apparent inconsistencies actually can have a significant impact
on a case. Consider in the same civil case, during cross-examination, the
witness is confronted with a claim he told another that he had observed
the plaintiff, who was driving at the time of the accident, apparently
reaching for an object moments before the impact. The witness denies
making the statement and says he never observed such a thing. Again,
the jury or other factfinder has little at their disposal to resolve whether
the out-of-court statement was actually made. 310
Of course, these examples are starkest when the alleged prior
inconsistent statement and the testimony in court have the opposite
polarity. But, as noted in testimony before the Senate Committee during
consideration of Federal Rule 801(d)(1), "there are substantial dangers in
31
allowing any inconsistent statement to be introduced in evidence." 1
inferences concerning the declarant's sincerity,

narrational abilities, memory and

perception as to the making of the prior statement." Id. at 786. Another author noted
that "[a]ll arguments about the effectiveness of the opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant about the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement would appear
moot." Bein, supra note 180, at 1026. A leading authority, however, argued that crossexamination can be effective even when the witness denies having previously made an
oral statement:

Since both the declarant and the person who allegedly heard the statement
can appear before the trier of fact, cross-examination can test both
witnesses' perception and memory of what they were doing at the time the
statement was supposedly made, and the trier of fact can evaluate their
demeanor.
4 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 42, 801(d)(1)(A)[05], at 801-159.
309 See Bein, supra note 180, at 984. Juries are generally called upon
to assess a
declarant's perception, memory, sincerity and narration. See id. As one author noted,
"lwhile cross-examination may reveal a complete absence of one of the four conditions
necessary for crediting the witness' testimony, more frequently it assists the trier by
exposing errors or clarifying inaccuracies of somewhat lesser magnitude." Id. at 984-85.
One author noted that non-calling parties may cross-examine witnesses
only as to
matters within the scope of direct-examination, and therefore, do not control the scope of
a witness's testimony. See Fox, supra note 4, at 787-88.
311 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 302 (testimony
and statement of Herbert
Semmel (June 5, 1974)). Semmel criticized the broad admissibility rule proposed by the
Advisory Committee.
He claimed that the Advisory Committee rule permitted "the
introduction as substantive evidence of any prior inconsistent statement by a witness at the
trial, oral or written, casual or formal, sworn to or unsworn." Id. Semmel supported the
House version of Federal Rule 801(d)(1) and noted four dangers in allowing any prior
inconsistent statement to be introduced into evidence.
See supra note 172 and
accompanying text.
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Memory lapses are particularly of concern "when a witness tries to

repeat what are often casual remarks by another person at a time when
the listener may not have even been aware of the importance of the
remarks or that he will later be called upon to repeat them. '

312

So too,

the seemingly inconsistent statement may result from a portion of an
overheard conversation or from casual comments "made by persons who
3 13
them."
are unaware of the significance which may later be attached to
Again, the jury or other factfinder has little at its disposal to resolve
whether the out-of-court statement was actually made.
Social science research has shown that the majority of testimonial
errors are unintentional because most witnesses believe that their in-court
testimony is true.31 4 Researchers have shown that the frequency of
recollection, the recency of the event, and the intensity of the incident
315
A witness's perception of
bear on the quality of a witness's memory.

312

1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 302. The United States Supreme Court

has stressed that effective cross-examination can cure inaccuracies in the repetition of
casual remarks. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 (1970) (stating that crossexamination is "adequate to make equally admissible ... both the casual, off-hand
remark to a stranger, and the carefully recorded testimony from a prior hearing."); see
also Graham, supra note 10, at 1573, n.25; Jennifer L. Hilliard, Substantive Admissibility
of a Non-Party Witness' PriorInconsistent Statements: Pennsylvania Adopts The Modem
View, 32 VILL. L. REv. 471, 477-78, nn. 31, 140 (1987).
313 1974 Senate Hearings, supra note 151, at 302 (testimony and statement of Herbert
Semmel (June 5, 1974)). Semmel noted that "the comment may be incomplete" and that
"details [may be] omitted which were unimportant to the declarant at the time but which
may be crucial at a trial." Id. He further noted that inaccurate repetition is "more acute
in oral statements." Id.
314 See Dillard S. Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL
L.Q. 391, 391 (1932). Gardner characterized testimonial errors as "subjectively accurate
but objectively false." Id.
315 See id. Gardner noted that individuals are better able to recall recent events. See
id. at 392-93. He stressed that:
If two conflicting statements of the same witness about the same incident be
brought out in evidence, it is proper for the judge to instruct that the jury
may give greater credit to the statement nearer the incident described, and
from the psychological viewpoint it would be his duty to do so.
Id. at 394. Gardner also claimed that the emotional factor that impacts on the law of
association is intensity. The more vivid or striking an event, the more lucid and retentive
the witness's recollection, and the less striking the incident, the more clouded the witness'
memory. See id. at 394-95. Another author suggested that a witness' perception and
memory will always be selectively tainted despite efforts to be truthful:
[Iln spite of every effort to be honest, the perceiving, recording,
processing, reliving and reproducing of the events one observes and of the
events in which one participates always are selectively colored; that these
sources of error are ubiquitous; and that a relatively rare and minor role is
played by those errors which are introduced by deliberate deceit, by
mechanical limits of the brain as a recording apparatus or by organic brain
damage.
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For example, leading

questions have been shown to negatively impact a witness's memory by
implanting inaccurate information contained in the questions.3 17

This

research also shows that a witness's testimony may
be influenced by
318
authority figures such as law enforcement officials.
But juries and other factfinders normally are not fully aware of these
influences and tend to discount them. This fact is graphically illustrated
by the results of recent studies done on the impact of eyewitness
testimony on juries' decisions. Juries accord significant weight to a

Lawrence S. Kubie, Implications for Legal Procedure of the Fallibility of Human
Memory, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 59, 59 (1959). But that same author recognized that most
witnesses are unable to remember all events, and that total recall should be regarded with
sus icion. See id. at 67.
Distortion can be caused by numerous factors including visual or auditory
problems. See Gardner, supra note 314, at 397. There is also great disparity among
individuals' abilities to make judgments, comparisons, and estimates.
Id. at 398.
Imagination often distorts events by supplying facts that cannot be recalled. See id.at
400-01.
"As memory fades, imagination retouches the details; where this is done
unconsciously, therefore honestly, we are apt to recall what we think should have
normally occurred, or, if personally involved, what we wish had occurred, or what, from
sufestions now half-forgotten, we believe occurred." Id.
Studies have shown that leading questions can change a witness's recollection of an
event. See David F. Hall, Postevent Information and Changes in Recollection for a
Natural Event, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 124, 124-25 (1984).
Hall surveyed the
psychological literature concerning the impact of information a witness acquires after an
event. Id. at 125. So too, Loftus found that witnesses were more likely to give an
incorrect answer after misleading questions were posed. See ELIzABETH F. LoFTUs,
EYEWrTNESS TESTIMONY 91 (1979). Loftus also found more errors when subjects were
forced to answer leading questions than when they were free to narrate. See id. Factors
found to affect misleading questions include: "(1) the intervals between an event, a
subsequent misleading message, and a final test of recollection, (2) warnings, and (3) the
syntactic form of questions and messages."
Hall, supra, at 129-30. Another author
reached the same conclusion. See Gardner, supra note 314, at 402. Gardner claimed
that suggestion destroys memory because the information contained in leading questions
becomes part of the witness's memory. See id. He explained that cross-examination can
reveal whether the witness was coached or subjected to suggestion. See id.at 402-03.
He further found that leading questions can be inaccurate because suggestion is believed
to "devastate memory, and its power is increased by any factor which renders the
individual uncritical, submissive, and acquiescent." Id. at 403-04.
318 Psychologists have concluded that eyewitnesses are more likely to give an incorrect
answer when they have been subject to the influence of authorities. Such individuals
have great influence over an eyewitness to a complex event. See LoFrus, supra note
317, at 98. Others have found that information that witnesses acquire during interviews
with police, or while viewing mug shots, can alter their recollection of the crime or
suspect information. See Hall, supra note 317, at 124-25. Proponents of the orthodox
rule adhere to this belief. See Graham, supra note 10, at 1573 (acknowledging the
orthodox view that "prior inconsistent statements are often biased as a result of subtle
influence, coercion, or deceit on the part of the person eliciting the statement, who is
often an investigator or police officer.").
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witness's confidence regarding an eyewitness identification.3 19 Yet a
juror's commonsensical assumption "that eyewitness confidence is highly

related to eyewitness accuracy is not supported by research. Many times
confidence and accuracy has been
the correlation between eyewitness
32

near zero or even negative."

°

Like the eyewitness case, when jurors or other factfinders are asked

to determine whether a disputed prior statement was made, they are likely
to resolve the question by considering the respective witness's confidence
in what was said and heard. One might think that, after all, this is just
another type of witness demeanor question that jurors can adequately deal
with. But psychologists note that:
Although it may seem logical that witnesses who are more confident
of their identifications would be more likely to be accurate, recent
research suggests that the confidence accuracy relationship is not
The concept of reconstructive
necessarily a strong positive one.
memory implies that people's confidence in their memories may not
be a good criterion for deciding whether those memories are
accurate. 321

In short, when the question of whether the prior statement was made
is in dispute, jurors and other factfinders do not have the tools to easily
resolve it. When no dispute over the existence of the statement exists, as
when special circumstances of reliability are imposed, the jury can look
319

One study found that jurors place significant weight on the confidence of witnesses

called upon to identify a defendant. See Brian L. Cutler, Juror Sensitivity to Eyewitness
IdentificationEvidence, 14 L. HUM. BEHAV. 185, 189 (1990). Jurors have been found to
regard the assertiveness and positiveness of witnesses as the best test of accuracy. See
Gardner, supra note 314, at 391. But jurors place less weight on this factor when
presented with expert psychological testimony on eyewitnesses. See Brian L. Cutler et
al., The Eyewitness, the Expert Psychologist, and the Jury, 13 L. HUM. BEHAv. 311, 323
(1989).
320 Steven G. Fox & H.A. Walters, The Impact of General Versus Specific Expert
Testimony and Eyewitness Confidence upon Mock JurorJudgment, 10 L. HUM. BEHAV.
215, 216 (1986). Researchers have found that there is a low correlation between witness
confidence and accuracy. See id. Nevertheless, it has been found that jurors will use
eyewitness confidence in assessing accuracy even when an expert psychologist tells them
not to rely on the witness's confidence. See id. at 224-25. Another researcher found that
"the most positive feeling of accuracy is no guarantee of, or evidence of, the truthfulness
of the testimony." Gardner, supra note 314, at 391.
321 John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors to
Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 L. HUM. BEHAV. 19, 20 (1983).
The authors claimed that "the concept of reconstructive memory implies that people's
confidence in their memories may not be a good criterion for deciding whether those
memories are accurate." Id. Others have discussed this issue. See, e.g., Kenneth A.
Deffenbacher, Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 L. HUM. BEMAv. 243, 245-46
(1980); Michael R. Leippe, Effects of Integrative Memorial and Cognitive Processes on
the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 L. HUM. BEHAV. 261,
262-65 (1980).
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at the traditional concerns of perception, memory, narration, and
sincerity in resolving which statement is accurate. We believe that it
should be clear that the prior statement was said or written before it may
be received as substantive evidence.
While the principal function of imposing special circumstances of
reliability is to insure a statement was made, these conditions can and
apparently do improve the accuracy of a statement's content.
Psychologists studying commitment, conformity pressure and source
credibility in eyewitness testimony have found that early commitment to
details of an incident helps that individual withstand pressure by authority
322
figures to conform their observations to those of other eyewitnesses.
In one such experiment, ninety-one volunteers were individually
escorted to a room where they were joined by another subject, dressed
Each pair of volunteers
either in street clothes or in a police uniform.
and subjects was advised that they would view a short film to be used in
They were told that accurate
evaluating eyewitness testimony.
observations were essential. After viewing the film, the volunteer and
324
In
subject were separated and the volunteer filled out a questionnaire.
some instances, the volunteer was asked to sign it. Thereafter, the
volunteer and subject were reunited and the volunteer advised that the
other subject had been selected for immediate interview. Half of the
volunteers heard the other subject estimate the speed of the first car at
325
forty-five miles per hour and the second car at sixty miles per hour.
326
The actual speed of both cars was thirty miles per hour.. Two weeks
later each volunteer was administered another questionnaire and this time
322 See generally Norman J. Bregman & Hunter A. McAllister, Eyewitness Testimony:

The Role of Commitment in Increasing Reliability, 45 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 181 (1982). The
researchers found that "commitment is a variable that holds great promise in
accomplishing the goal of altering the influence of pressure from an authority figure."
Id. They also suggested that "in order for an eyewitness to remain independent,
consistent, and possibly more accurate it may be necessary for the witness to make a
commitment as early as possible so as not to be influenced by conformity pressure at the
scene of the event, in line-ups, in the courtroom, etc." Id. at 182. See generally M.
Deutsch & H.G. Gerard, A Study Of Normative and Informational Influence upon
IndividualJudgment, 51 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PsYcH. 629 (1955) (hypothesizing that a firm

commitment early on can prevent conformity pressure); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Shifting
Human Color Memory, 5 MEMORY COGNITION 696 (1977) (noting that subjects who made

a commitment to color response were less apt to shift their preference as subjects who did
not make a commitment); cf. Kevin D. McCaul et al., Commitment and the Prevention of

Adolescent Cigarette Smoking, 2(4) HEALTH PSYCHOL. 353 (1983) (finding that
adolescents' commitment to nonsmoking failed to increase their resistance to persuasion
concerning cigarette smoking).
323 See Bregman & McAllister, supra note 322, at 182.
32

See id.

325 See id.
326 See id.
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all volunteers were required to sign it. 3 2 7 The main dependent measure

was to be the volunteer's estimate of the speed of the second car-the one
alleged to have caused the accident.32 s

The researchers reported that those volunteers who initially signed
the questionnaire were more resistant to influence from the overheard
interview. 32 9 The researchers also observed that in this, and in other
studies, authority figures were able to influence eyewitness reports
through various techniques such as leading questions or the provision of
false information. 330 However, early commitment by eyewitnesses "in
the form of signed statements appears to be an effective technique for
protecting an eyewitness's testimony from the influence of authorities
encountered during the judicial process. ,331
Other special circumstances of reliability identified in New Jersey
Rule 803(a)(1), such as the oath, also appear to increase the accuracy of
332
In one of the classic legal articles on the subject
the statements made.
See
See
329 See
330 See
331 Id.
327
328

id. at 183.
Bregman & McAllister, supra note 322, at 183.
id.
id.
The researchers concluded that "speed estimates are significantly influenced in

an eyewitness who is exposed to conformity pressure exerted by an authority figure.
However, if the eyewitness makes a commitment concerning automobile speed prior to
being exposed to conformity pressure from an authority figure, the effect produced from
this conformity pressure is dissipated." Id. at 184.
332 Testimony given at formal proceedings also appears to enhance the accuracy
of
out-of-court statements.
Witnesses are believed to be "influenced by the awesome
difference between an informal statement of no immediate consequence to
anyone... and formal testimony in court under penalty of perjury." Reutlinger, supra
note 161, at 368-69. Statements made at formal proceedings are usually recorded. See 4
WEINSTEIN'S ON EVIDENCE, supra note 42,
801(d)(1)(A)[051, at 801-158 (stating that "a
stenographic record of the prior statement normally will be available for a statement
qualifying under the rule"). Recorded statements are believed to be trustworthy. See
Fox, supra note 4, at 791 (recognizing that witnesses may be less likely to deny having
made statements when they know those statements were recorded); McCormick, supra
note 11, at 588 (noting that "if the words of a witness are taken down by a stenographer
at an official hearing and later transcribed, the trustworthiness of the report of the words
is of high degree"). As to the accuracy of recorded statements, another author noted:
The recorder's attention is focused on the information to be recorded, and
the informational stimuli are few, all of which may fall within the span of
apperception. The act of writing is a task that requires attending to the
process of transmitting the perceived stimuli to the written word. Names,
dates, places, statistics, sales information, and other short bits of
information which are especially subject to forgetting are easily recorded
with accuracy. Since the recorder or others may rely upon the document
for future purposes, there is usually a motive, obligation, or duty to
perform accurately. In many instances formal or informal verification will
result in correction of error. Finally, since recordation usually occurs
shortly after the event, memory error is minimal, and once recorded, the
information is immune from that source of error.
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of perception and memory, for example, the author identified numerous
studies that had
334 of
333 reported that the oath improved the accuracy

testimony.333 These early findings were confirmed in later studies.
In sum, we believe that imposing special circumstances of reliability
as a prerequisite for the substantive receipt of prior inconsistent out-ofcourt statements will improve the factfinding process. While, as noted in
the next section, these special circumstances of reliability need not be as
restrictive as presently exist under Federal Rule 801(d)(1), they serve an

important function in insuring that the prior statement was made. They
also improve the quality of the evidence at little cost to the litigants.
New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) should be amended to require special
circumstances of reliability regardless of which party seeks to introduce
the prior statement.
C. The Special Circumstances of Reliability Contained in the
FederalRules of Evidence Should Be Expanded to Include
Statements Signed or Made by a Witness and Video and Audio
Recordings Containing Them
New Jersey has expanded the special circumstances of reliability that
allow the receipt of a prior inconsistent statement as substantive evidence.
In 1980, statements signed by the declarant were added to the federal
special circumstances of reliability that included testimony under oath
during a proceeding.3 35 When New Jersey Rule 63(1) was amended in
Stewart, supra note 51, at 24.
333 See Gardner, supra note 314, at 408 n.127.

The author cited several studies that
found that the oath reduces error and increases the caution witnesses exercise when
making out-of-court statements. See id. These findings are in accord with the long-held
See 2
belief that the oath guarantees the truthfulness of out-of-court statements.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 1, § 245, at 93.
334 Sworn testimony -is more accurate than unsworn testimony. See Stewart, supra
note 51, at 22. Witnesses exercise greater caution when testifying under oath. See id. at
22-23. The modern day significance of the oath is to impress upon the witness the
formality and finality of the judicial process. See id. But the inherent weakness in the
oath requirement has been discussed on several occasions. See Bein, supra note 180, at
1009 (noting that the oath requirement is valueless because "the statements can only be
credited if the witness is presently lying"); Fox, supra note 4, at 790 (explaining that "[a]
prior inconsistent statement can only be offered when the declarant is testifying
inconsistently under oath at a subsequent proceeding. Consequently, the witness must be
making an untrustworthy statement at the prior proceeding, at the present proceeding, or
at both"); Schoenfeld, supra note 307, at 113-14 (remarking that perjury is rampant in the
courtroom).
335 See supra note 250 and accompanying text. As noted by one author, "the rationale
of requiring that the prior statement be made in a signed writing or in a prior proceeding
was that these criteria serve as effective guarantees of the prior statement's
trustworthiness sufficient to eradicate any possible hearsay dangers." Fox, supra note 4,
at 784. As to the requirement of a "proceeding," New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) is clearer
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it again expanded the categories of statements with special

circumstances of reliability. Sound recordings containing statements as
well as writings made or signed by the declarant "in 336circumstances
establishing ... [their] reliability" now met this criterion.
Curiously, at the time New Jersey Rule 63(1) was amended, the

Special Committee did not appear to be concerned that the content of
such statements be reliable but only that the document or media in which
the statement was contained be authentic. 337 The Special Committee was

specific that the phrase "reliability" appearing in New Jersey Rule
63(a)(1) was not intended to refer to the trustworthiness of the statement.

The Special Committee noted that "it is not the making of the statement
in circumstances establishing reliability to which this change in the rule is
intended to refer but rather only the mechanics by which the statement is
that
made." 338 It would appear that the Special Committee was worried 339
incomplete.
or
altered
be
might
statement
a
contained
that
audio tapes
Whatever the merits of this observation, it is now more a matter of
historical interest. The New Jersey Supreme Court has decided that the
word "reliability" in New Jersey Rule 63(1) should mean more than
simply authenticity. In State v. Gross, the court required the trial court

to consider fifteen factors in determining whether such statements are
reliable and thus admissible. 340 Several of these factors clearly deal with

authentication issues such as whether the writing is in the declarant's
hand and whether the recording or writing contains the entirety or only a

One author noted that "the
and arguably broader than Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
vagueness of this language has produced litigation, especially in reference to what
constitutes 'other proceedings.'" Id. n.41. Federal courts have construed "other
proceeding" to encompass grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan,
555 F.2d 238, 241-42 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mosley, 555 F.2d 191, 193 (8th
Cir. 1977). Immigration interrogations have also been found to constitute "other
proceedings." See United States v. Castro-Ayon, 537 F.2d 1955, 1058 (9th Cir. 1976).
336
The Special Committee explained that writings "made" by the declarant included
writings handwritten by the declarant, even if not signed by him, as well as statements
that were typed by the declarant. See 108 N.J. L.J. 302 (1981).
337 See id.
338 Id. (emphasis added).
339 See id.
340 The New Jersey Supreme Court declined to adhere to the traditional view that the
oath and opportunity for cross-examination at the time the statement was made insure the
reliability of a statement. See State v. Gross, 121 N.J. 1, 12-13, 577 A.2d 806, 811-12
(1990). The Gross court followed the thinking of the Special Committee which had
proposed the 1980 amendments. See 106 N.J. L.J. 41 (1980). The Special Committee
had noted that "[t]raditional reasons for rejecting hearsay statements as not having been
given under oath and not having been subjected to exposure of deficiencies by crossexamination would not apply." Id.
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portion of the communication. 341 But other factors deal with the special
sensitivity courts express where such statements are used in criminal
proceedings. For example, in determining the reliability of such a
statement, trial courts, and ultimately factfinders, must consider whether
the declarant was in police custody and/or the target of a criminal
investigation. 342 The court also is to examine whether the declarant
3 43
sought to exculpate himself or herself when making the statement.
Other factors plainly deal with questions believed to be within the ken of
jurors such as the presence or absence of any motive to fabricate.3 44
Though Gross was a criminal case, its teachings appear applicable to
all instances where litigants seek to make use of what is now New Jersey
Rule 803(a)(1). We believe Federal Rule 801(d)(1) is quite restrictive in
the special circumstances of reliability it imposes as a condition for the
substantive receipt of prior inconsistent statements. 345 New Jersey's
expansion of these special circumstances still insures that the statement
was made, and the Gross factors virtually eliminate concerns that the
statement might be incomplete or taken out of context.
As we have observed, social science research shows that the signing
of statements increases their accuracy by protecting witnesses from later
influences, particularly from authority figures. 34 6 Moreover, the law and
social custom make it plain that when such a statement is signed it likely
will be relied upon by others. Certainly people understand
that signed
347
documents, like contracts, are to be given legal effect.
341 See State v. Gross, 216 N.J. Super. 98, 109-110, 523 A.2d 215, 220-21 (App.
Div. 1987), afid, 121 N.J. 1, 577 A.2d 806 (1990).
342 See id.
343 See id.

3" See id. at 109-10, 523 A.2d at 220-21.

345 One author stressed that Federal Rule 801(d)(1)(A) unduly restricts
the types of

prior inconsistent statements that are made substantively admissible:
Acknowledging the legitimacy of Congress' concern regarding rule
801(d)(1)(A), it nevertheless appears that the rule's safeguards, which are
designed to ensure that a prior inconsistent statement was actually made
and accurately recorded, are overly strict. Why should the rule exclude

because of doubt about whether it was made a signed or handwritten
statement that is acknowledged by the witness or proved to be his by other
evidence? Why should it exclude an oral statement not made under oath
when the witness during his testimony admits he made it? Why should the

rule exclude on any ground substantive admission of prior inconsistent
statements in an affidavit prepared by the party's attorney that was
executed under oath and submitted to the court in the same or another
proceeding?
Graham, supra note 10, at 1583.

See supra notes 323-31 and accompanying text.
347 See generally I ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, §§ 2.8-2.10,
at 131
(1993); 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 62, at 731 (1963).
3"
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The reliability of declarants' statements contained in sound
recordings and in writings made by them are more problematic. As one
commentator observed "[i]t requires a vast inferential leap ... to assume

that any writing made by a person or any sound recording made of348a
person's voice guarantees a threshold level of trustworthiness."
Nevertheless, in our view, more than adequate assurances of reliability
exist if the Gross factors are first considered by the trial court.
It is important to note, too, that the cost of developing substantive
evidence by law enforcement authorities and by litigants is significantly
reduced if resort is made to written and/or recorded statements. Of
course, as Federal Rule 801(d)(1) is presently formulated, this evidence
must be preserved through grand jury testimony, or in a civil matter
through the taking of a deposition in order to have substantive effect.
There are practical efficiencies in broadening the special circumstances of
reliability so that witnesses' statements may be received as substantive
evidence. This is particularly true in the law enforcement field where the
admissibility of such evidence will permit police officers to efficiently
gather usable evidence at crime scenes.
While the present New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1) probably allows for
the receipt of statements preserved on videotapes, New Jersey should
amend its evidence rules to specifically permit it.3 49
Videotape
technology allows for the inexpensive and accurate recording of
statements and is increasingly being used in police work.350 Obviously,
348 Fox, supra note 4, at 792.

The author claimed that the "assumption may be valid
only to the extent that the declarant can foresee that the truth of the statement will be
relied upon by others." Id.
349 Some states have enacted statutes or evidence rules that encompass
the admission
of statements contained on videotape. For example, an Illinois statute provides in part
that "[iln all criminal cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule if... (C) the statement is proved to have been
accurately recorded by a tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar
electronic means of sound recording." ILL. COMP. STAT. 38/115-10.1 (West 1985). The
Hawaii Rule of Evidence provides in part that "statements previously made by witnesses
who testify at the trial or hearing are not excluded by the hearsay rule ... [if](C)
[rlecorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or
other means contemporaneously with the making of the statement."
HAW. R. EVID.
802.1(1).
350 Investigative procedures are often memorialized on videotape
to determine whether
law enforcement officials acted properly. Videotapes enhance the accuracy of testimony
because they preserve witnesses' statements and their demeanor. See Ernest H. Short et
al., An Assessment of Videotape in the Criminal Courts, 1975 BYU L. REV. 423, 439.
Another author cautioned that videotapes should be admissible only if they meet the
following standards:
"(1) relevance; (2) fairness and accuracy; (3) the exercise of
discretion as to whether the probative value of the videotape outweighs the prejudice or
possible confusion it may cause; and, (4) other evidentiary considerations such as the
presence of hearsay." Charles W. German et al., Videotape Evidence at Trial, 6 Am J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 209, 216 (1982).
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videotape permits the court and jury to view the declarant when the
statement is being made and no doubt would assist the trial court in
weighing many of the reliability factors addressed in Gross.
The federal judicial system has a much lower criminal and civil case
volume than the average state system.3 51 This is certainly the case in
New Jersey. Accordingly, conditioning the substantive receipt of prior
inconsistent statements upon the fulfillment of more stringent special
circumstances of reliability has less of an impact on the federal system
and its litigants. Federal law enforcement officials, for example, are in a
better position to place important witnesses before grand juries so that
prior inconsistent statements can be preserved for potential substantive
use. So too, with significantly greater amounts of money generally at
stake, civil litigants in federal courts usually can conduct the discovery
352
necessary to satisfy the more stringent circumstances of reliability.
Yet, we believe that little, if any, additional protection for the truth
finding process is achieved.
Changing Federal Rule 801(d)(1) to permit the receipt of video,
audio and written statements of declarants will introduce greater
flexibility into the law with little or no harm to the factfinding process.
Moreover, given the strong effect the Federal Rules have had on evidence
law in the states, we believe that such an amendment will cause expanded
use of written and recorded statements by the states, thereby furthering
the goals of uniformity in the law of evidence.

351 In 1993, 264,038 cases were filed in the United States District Courts. See 1994
FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS,

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED

STATES COURTS (1994). Of those, 6584 cases were filed in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. From September 1992 through September 1993,
968,859 cases were filed in New Jersey trial courts.
See NEw JERSEY JUDICIARY
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT (1993).
Each year, the

Department of Justice estimates the total expenditures for the criminal justice system in
both the state and federal systems. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 202 (1993).

In

1993, the federal government spent approximately $10 billion dollars on the criminal
justice system. The state and local governments combined spent approximately $64
billion dollars on their criminal justice systems.
352 One author commented that cases in federal courts generally
involve larger
damages and judgments than the average state court case. See Theodore Eisenberg &
James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 731, 760-70 (1992). It has also been found that attorneys spend more time on
federal cases than on state cases. See Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Courts and Litigation
Investment: Why do Lanyers Spend More Time on Federal Cases?, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 7, 8
(1984).
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D. New Jersey Should Permit Calling Partiesto Freely Impeach
Their Witnesses as is Permitted Under the FederalRules of
Evidence
For virtually the entire time that New Jersey has had an evidence
code, its model for presenting and challenging witnesses has attempted to
minimize the use of prior inconsistent statements for impeachment
purposes.
This model has succeeded in limiting the receipt of
impeachment evidence but has exacted a price by discouraging the calling
of adversaries or witnesses associated with them. This price is a high
one to pay in modern litigation where few witnesses can truly be selected
by a party and adversaries and witnesses identified with them often have
information vital to the success of a lawsuit.
If New Jersey changes its evidence rules to require the presence of
special circumstances of reliability before permitting the substantive
receipt of prior inconsistent statements, some inconsistencies that do not
satisfy these criteria can be offered for impeachment purposes by the noncalling party. If impeachment evidence again takes its place as a part of
New Jersey evidence law, there is no reason to continue the differential
use of impeachment tools by calling and non-calling parties. Changing
the present New Jersey Rule 607 to conform with its federal counterpart
would further the goals of uniformity and predictability in the law of
evidence that we have discussed. The use of prior inconsistent statements
as impeachment evidence has not only been a core part of the common
law, but also has been integrated into the Federal Rules without any
proof that its use is having an adverse effect on the factfinding process.
We suggest New Jersey permit calling parties to freely impeach the
witnesses they call. Naturally, we would expect that the impeachment
tool likely would be used where adversaries or witnesses identified with
them were involved. If New Jersey intends to freely permit parties to
lead their adversaries and witnesses identified with them, as it would
appear with the adoption of New Jersey Rule 611(c), impeachment
through the use of prior inconsistent statements is a necessary and
appropriate tool.
There is some concern, based on experience with Federal Rule 607,
that calling parties may attempt to abuse the impeachment tool by using it
as a subterfuge to place before the jury otherwise inadmissible
evidence. 3
But in most instances these abuses have occurred in the
353 The specific concern is that if parties are permitted to introduce statements that are

not accompanied by indicia of reliability, false evidence might be manufactured and too
much impeachment evidence might find its way into the courtroom. See McCormick,
supra note 11, at 586. This would allow jurors to listen to impeachment evidence and
consider it for its truth. The concern, though, can be resolved under New Jersey Rule
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criminal arena where a witness turns coat. This is unlikely to occur in
New Jersey, because, as we have noted, New Jersey Rule 803(a)(1)

permits the substantive receipt of prior written or recorded statements of
witnesses. Were New Jersey to permit calling parties to impeach their
witnesses, use of the tool almost certainly would take place where an

adversary or a witness identified with one is called to testify in a civil
trial. Many of these statements then, even if not possessing
special
354
circumstances of reliability, would be admissible hearsay.
In any case, several different mechanisms have been developed in
the federal courts to deal with the use of impeachment materials as a
subterfuge. Even prior to enactment of the Federal Rules, the federal
courts forbade the calling of "a witness for the primary purpose of
impeaching him with otherwise inadmissible evidence." 355 The federal
courts have continued to use the "primary purpose" doctrine to insure
403, however, which permits trial judges to exclude statements if the risk of undue
prejudice is greater than the statement's probative value. See N.J. R. EVID. 403. Use of
Rule 403 has been criticized for leading to different and irreconcilable determinations.
See Michael H. Graham, The Relationship Among Federal Rules of Evidence 607, 801
(d)(1)(A), and 403: A Reply to Weinstein's Evidence, 55 TEX. L. REv. 573, 576 (1977).
Trial court decisions will not be overturned unless the reviewing court finds an abuse of
discretion. See, e.g., State v. Carter, 91 N.J. 86, 106, 449 A.2d 1280, 1290 (1982);
State v. Boratto, 80 N.J. 506, 514, 404 A.2d 604, 608 (1979); State v. Rogers, 19 N.J.
218, 229, 116 A.2d 37, 42 (1955); Thomas v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 282 N.J. Super. 569,
582-83, 660 A.2d 1236, 1242-43 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 574, 667
A.2d 191 (1995); State v. Bass, 221 N.J. Super. 466, 474, 535 A.2d 1, 5 (App. Div.
1987); Hill v. Newman, 126 N.J. Super. 557, 563, 316 A.2d 8, 11 (App. Div. 1973).
Oral statements made by adversaries can be introduced as admissions
or adoptive
admissions under Federal Rule 801 (d)(2), which provides:
ADMISSION BY PARTY-OPPONENT. The statement is offered against a party
and is (A) the party's own statement in either an individual or a
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has
manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person
authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D)
a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the
scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the
relationship, or (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). New Jersey Rule 803(b) essentially follows the structure as
well as the substantive content of Federal Rule 801 (d)(2).
355 Don Johnsen, Impeachment with an Unsworn Prior Inconsistent Statement
As
Subterfuge, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 295, 297 (1987). The federal courts have long
held that prosecutors cannot use prior inconsistent statements under the guise of
impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury evidence that is not
otherwise admissible. See, e.g., United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
1985) (quotations omitted); United States v. DeLillo, 620 F.2d 939, 946 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, 190 (4th Cir. 1975); Kuhn v. United States, 24
F.2d 910, 913 (9th Cir. 1928). The test has been criticized because it is often difficult for
courts to ascertain a prosecutor's "primary purpose" for calling witnesses. See Johnsen,
supra, at 317.
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that the liberal impeachment policy reflected by Federal Rule 607 is not
In addition, Federal Rule 403 is available to prevent the
abused.
introduction of otherwise admissible evidence where it is likely that such
impeachment will lead to confusion of the issues and mislead the jury.35 6
These mechanisms would certainly be available to the New Jersey courts
in the event broader impeachment is permitted by a calling party.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The later part of the twentieth century has seen dramatic changes in
the rules of evidence in most United States jurisdictions. The Federal
Rules, which were enacted a little over twenty years ago, now exert a
dominant influence over United States evidence law with over half of the
states modeling their evidence codes on them. New Jersey was one of
the first states to codify its rules of evidence modeling them after the
Uniform Rules. But, in 1993, New Jersey adopted an evidence code
closely tied to the Federal Rules. However, New Jersey chose to keep
the rules it developed for the presentation and challenge of witnesses.
In our view, New Jersey should alter this course and essentially
adopt the federal evidence model for presenting and challenging
witnesses. The federal approach of requiring special circumstances of
reliability prior to the substantive receipt of prior inconsistent statements
better guarantees that these statements were actually said-a key
ingredient for proper evaluation by juries. Moreover, the social science
literature appearing after New Jersey adopted the Uniform Rules suggests
that statements that satisfy these reliability criteria are more likely to be
accurate. But, while we believe the federal model for the evidential use
of such prior statements is preferable, its special reliability criteria can be
broadened to permit the substantive use of signed statements or ones
made by declarant witnesses as well as audio and video tapes containing
such statements. This amendment would still serve the main goal that the
requirement of special circumstances of reliability was designed to
achieve-to ensure that the statement was actually made-while better
responding to the investigative needs of law enforcement and litigants in
smaller civil disputes.

356 New Jersey Rule 403 is modeled after Federal Rule 403, which provides that

otherwise admissible evidence may be excluded if the judge finds that its probative value
outweighs the risk of undue prejudice.

See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 711 F.2d

748, 751-52 (6th Cir. 1983) (probative value of reading inconsistent grand jury testimony
outweighed its prejudicial effect); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 234 (4th
Cir. 1982) (prejudicial effect of exculpatory statements outweighed probative value);
DeLillo, 620 F.2d at 947 (probative value of tape recording outweighed its prejudicial

effect).
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Finally, New Jersey should abandon its differential treatment of
calling parties and their ability to use impeachment tools. To minimize
the receipt of such hearsay in the past, New Jersey forbade calling parties
from impeaching their witnesses. But this has made it difficult for parties
to call their adversaries or individuals identified with them. If New
Jersey adopts an evidence rule that requires special circumstances of
reliability to support substantive admissibility of prior inconsistent
statements, some inconsistent statements will be received only for
purposes of impeachment. In that instance, there exists no reason for
denying the impeachment tool to calling parties in New Jersey.

